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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the ongoing debate over the impact of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on host country economic growth. Interest in this issue has grown in 
recent years, motivated by disparate findings on the effects of FDI and its increasing 
importance in the global economy. In the recent literature, much attention has focussed 
on the role of host country factors in determining the nature and growth effects of FDI. 
However, there is no consensus on precisely which host country factors matter and the 
role of some factors has not been systematically examined.
This thesis presents new empirical evidence on the FDI-growth nexus, focussing on the 
impact of host country trade and FDI policies and investments in human capital. In the 
general analytical literature and country case studies, attention has been placed on host 
country FDI policies as a key determinant of the growth effects of FDI. However, as 
yet no cross-country analysis of this issue has been undertaken due to the limited 
availability of systematic quantitative indicators of FDI policies. To address this 
deficiency, a new cross-country dataset on FDI policies is compiled and applied to 
separate cross-country analyses.
In order to provide a richer understanding of the linkages between the growth effects of 
FDI and host country trade and FDI policies and human capital, the thesis examines 
how each of these factors influences the nature of multinational enterprise (MNE) 
production. Industry-level data on the operation of overseas United States MNE 
affiliates are used to examine two factors which are hypothesised to be important for 
understanding how FDI promotes host country economic growth. These are the 
determinants of MNE affiliate export orientation and the determinants of technology 
transfer to MNE affiliates. In addition, national level data are used to investigate the 
growth effects of FDI, conditional on host country factors.
The results support the hypothesis that these host country factors influence both the 
nature of MNE production and the growth effects of FDI. Liberal FDI policies and 
open trade policies, in particular, are found to encourage more export oriented MNE 
affiliate production while liberal FDI policies are also found to have a strong positive 
influence on technology transfer to MNE affiliates. There is also weaker evidence that 
open trade policies and higher levels of host country human capital encourage 
technology transfer. Finally, consistent with these findings, the results suggest that the
growth effects of FDI are stronger where liberal FDI and open trade policies are adopted 
while the evidence on human capital is less conclusive.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
“Successful development ... requires a mechanism for ensuring adequate flows o f the 
large quantity o f disembodied ideas that are used in production. The government o f a 
poor country can therefore help its residents by creating an economic environment that 
offers an adequate reward to multinational corporations when they bring ideas from the 
rest o f the world and put them to use with domestic resources. ’’ Römer (1993)
“Today’s policy literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers 
from [FDI] ... At the national level, the effect of [FDI] on economic growth is weak, and 
disappears as more country characteristics are controlled for. ’’ Rodrik (1999)
“Several country studies have found no evidence of technology spillovers from 
multinational investments, leading -  so it seems — to a more-or-less widespread view 
among informed observers that, whatever its merits, reliance on multinationals does not 
convey gains in terms o f technological development. But these countries are hardly 
exemplars o f effective development strategy; accordingly, one might want to shy far 
away from postulating generalities on the basis offindings about them. ” Westphal 
(1998)
1.1 Introduction
The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in promoting economic growth is an issue 
that continues to generate debate amongst researchers and the wider community. An 
optimistic view asserts that FDI plays an important role in connecting countries to the 
international economy, thereby providing domestic firms and workers with 
opportunities to gain access to new markets and technology. In contrast, a more 
sceptical view argues that FDI is either no different from any other form of investment 
or, worst still, may impede domestic development by stymieing local entrepreneurship. 
Popular sentiment, as expressed through anti-globalisation movements, parallels these 
views by highlighting concerns over the influence of large global corporations.
Official attitudes to FDI are also diverse. Spurred by popular distrust and nationalistic 
sentiment, particularly in former colonies, many regimes have traditionally viewed FDI 
with suspicion and others have adopted an overtly hostile policy stance. Today almost
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all countries impose some form of restriction on the flow of FDI and the operations of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). Furthermore, some countries, particularly in parts of 
Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, maintain major barriers to FDI.
The broad trend in recent years, however, has been for authorities in most countries to 
adopt a more welcoming attitude to foreign investors. A broader range of sectors and 
large scale privatisation projects are now open to foreign capital while fewer conditions 
are being imposed on investors. Authorities in an increasing number of countries have 
gone further by offering incentives to lure new FDI, including tax concessions.
The positive view of FDI is supported by the observation that MNEs have a record of 
playing a major role in the industrial development of some of the fastest growing 
economies over the past half century. During the 1960s and 1970s, MNEs were at the 
forefront of labour intensive manufacturing in countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia 
and Singapore and are today again at the forefront of these industries in China, Mexico 
and Vietnam. MNEs engaged in more sophisticated forms of manufacturing and 
services also play a leading role in some of the fastest growing industrialised 
economies, such as Ireland and modern day Singapore.
Nevertheless, the correlation between FDI and growth across countries over the last 
three decades suggests the impact of FDI on host economies is far from homogenous 
(figure 1.1). Across a large sample of countries the correlation between FDI and growth 
is positive but weak. However, the experiences of many individual countries differ 
markedly from the average and there are many instances where countries receiving 
relatively high inflows of FDI over an extended period have achieved relatively poor 
growth outcomes.
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Figure 1.1: FDI and growth, 1970 to 2005
••••
FDI share of GDP (%)
Source: UNCTAD online FDI database and World Bank World Development Indicators 
online database.
Notes: based on net FDI inflows, real GDP per capita growth and averages of annual 
observations over the period 1970 to 2005.
The results from detailed empirical studies, which control for a variety of other 
determinants of growth, also suggest the relationship between FDI and growth is 
complex.1 A growing literature, drawing on firm, industry or national level data seeks 
to identify whether the presence of MNEs or the inflow of FDI raises host country 
productivity. The results of many studies fail to report a consistent positive link and 
indeed some find evidence of a negative effect on productivity. In addition, many of the 
studies that do report positive results have been criticised by Rodrik (1999), Carkovic 
and Levine (2005) and others for suffering from methodological weaknesses.
1.2 Hypotheses and aims of the thesis
It is perhaps unsurprising that FDI does not always exert the same impact on host 
country growth. Beginning in the 1970s, various hypotheses have been proposed 
arguing that host country factors influence both the nature of MNE production that a 
country attracts and the benefits that accrue from any given flow of FDI. The earliest 
contribution to this literature is by Bhagwati (1973; 1978; 1985) who argues that 
prevailing import-substitution bias in the policy regime causes allocative inefficiencies.
1 This literature is reviewed in chapter 3.
3
As a consequence, it is shown that under some circumstances FDI inflows can reduce 
host country welfare (Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 1977).
More recently, others, including Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), Borensztein et al. 
(1998) and Moran (1998; 2001), have highlighted how a broader range of host country 
factors impact on the nature of MNE production and the ability of the host economy to 
benefit from FDI. These contributions draw on elements of two areas of economic 
theory. The first area is endogenous growth theory, which focuses on how new 
knowledge, particularly disembodied knowledge, is accessed and put to use by 
economic agents. The second area is FDI theory, which explains the motives for 
different patterns of international investment and production.
Two aspects of MNE production which are argued to influence gains from FDI are 
technological sophistication and export orientation. First, FDI associated with more 
technologically advanced MNE affiliates is expected to facilitate higher productivity 
gains for the host country. MNE affiliates employing more advanced techniques are 
likely to operate at higher levels of productivity, thereby making a larger direct 
contribution to host country output. Perhaps more importantly, the presence of higher 
technology MNE production deepens the pool of knowledge that local firms can access 
and put to use in their own production processes. This creates more opportunities for 
local firms to reap productivity gains from FDI.
Second, MNE export oriented facilities tend to feature a number of characteristics that 
make them particularly conducive to increasing host country productivity. They tend to 
employ more technologically advanced production techniques, engage in lager scale 
production and are more likely to establish the kind of linkages with local firms that 
give rise to positive externalities. All of these factors increase the prospect of 
productivity gains for the host country.
Theories of FDI and multinational production predict that both the technology used by
MNE affiliates and the degree of export orientation will be influenced by a number of
host country factors. As a consequence, these theories also provide a link between host
country factors and the growth effects of FDI. First, it is well established that
technology transfer involves non trivial costs. Host country factors alter both these
costs and the benefits of technology transfer. Absorptive capacity, FDI policies and the
degree of market competition are all hypothesised to play a role. Second, theories of
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FDI predict that a variety of host country factors, including trade and FDI policies, will 
affect the prospect of a country attracting export oriented MNE production.
A limitation of the existing empirical literature is that it provides little systematic 
evidence on the role of host country FDI policies in influencing gains from FDI. A 
second weakness of many studies examining the growth effects of FDI is that they tend 
to focus on the role of individual factors, rather than considering multiple factors. In 
addition, most studies do not consider the possibility that host country factors have 
complementary effects, where the impact of one host country factor depends on another 
factor.
This thesis aims to deepen the current literature devoted to examining how host country 
factors impact on the growth effects of FDI. In order to provide a more comprehensive 
study, evidence from inter-related analyses of how host country factors affect both the 
nature of MNE production and also the growth effects of FDI is presented. In each case 
the role of a number of different factors is considered. However, building on the 
existing literature, particular attention is placed on trade and FDI policies as well as 
human capital.
The thesis makes four main contributions to the literature. First, it presents a new 
cross-country dataset on FDI policies. Second, these policy indicators are used to 
generate new evidence on the role of FDI policies in influencing both the nature of 
MNE production and the growth effects of FDI. Third, updated evidence is also 
presented on the impact of trade policies and human capital. Fourth, by focussing on 
the same host country factors and applying the same proxy variables throughout each 
analysis, the study provides coherent evidence linking host country factors, MNE 
production and the growth effects of FDI. In addition, the analysis of the growth effects 
of FDI examines evidence on complementarities between multiple host country factors, 
reflecting the importance of different factors in shaping the underlying nature of MNE 
production.
In each empirical analysis presented in the thesis careful attention is paid to appropriate
methodology, including model specification, samples used and estimation techniques.
In all cases cross-country panel data are used. While this type of data has limitations,
particularly with respect to comparability, it offers a number of advantages. First, it is
invariably more reliable making generalisations about results from studies using
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cross-country data than those focusing on particular countries. By their very nature 
country studies do not explicitly control for country specific factors which may be 
central to the findings.
Cross-country panel data also offers methodological advantages. This type of data often 
provides a far richer source of information on variables of interest which is important 
when undertaking any formal statistical analysis as sufficient variation is always a 
prerequisite for successful identification. Analysing many economic issues, including 
the determinants of growth, the data requirements are great because it is long run
2relationships that are of interest and many explanatory variables tend to evolve slowly. 
Panel data also enables an assessment of dynamic relationships and the use of more 
sophisticated techniques which have the potential to address some of the problems 
facing researchers, including endogeneity bias.
1.3 The importance of FDI
The importance of understanding the impact of FDI on host country growth is 
underscored by the growing role of FDI in the global economy. FDI flows have 
expanded rapidly over the past few decades, driven by a combination of more liberal 
policies, changes in technology and the emergence of large corporations with global 
interests. As a consequence, FDI represents an increasingly important facilitator of 
international economic integration. It is also a major source of external finance for 
many economies and plays an ever more important role in augmenting domestic capital 
formation and contributing to output.
Over the past few decades the value of global FDI flows has risen strongly (figure 1.2). 
Since 1970, the earliest year that FDI flows data are available for a large number of 
countries, global flows have grown at an average annual rate of over 15 per cent, rising 
from US$13.4 billion in 1970 to US$916.3 billion in 2005. Growth in FDI flows was 
particularly strong through the 1990s, driven in large part by merger and acquisition 
activity (UNCTAD 2004). In 2005 the global stock of inward FDI stood at just over 
US$10.1 trillion, up from around US$561.4 billion in 1980.
2 Indeed in the case of some variables, such as those relating to geographic factors, cross-country 
variation is the only form of variation.
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Figure 1.2: FDI inflows, 1980 to 2005
World — - Developing countries
Source: UNCTAD online FDI database.
Notes: based on annual net FDI inflows.
While the trend increase in FDI since 1970 has been strong, global FDI flows have 
exhibited volatility, not least in the years since 2000. After reaching US$1.4 trillion in 
2000, annual world FDI inflows fell by over 60 per cent in the period to 2003. Various 
factors are likely to have contributed to this decline. This includes a moderation from 
the unprecedented growth in flows around 2000, a sharp drop in the number of large 
privatisation projects and a slow down in the pace of FDI policy liberalisation 
(UNCTAD 2004). In the past two years FDI flows have recovered, although are yet to 
reach the peak levels of 2000.
Historically, FDI flows have been concentrated amongst industrialised countries and a 
small number of dynamic and or resource rich developing countries. Between 1970 
and 2005 industrialised countries accounted for around 70 per cent of FDI inflows and 
almost 90 per cent of all FDI outflows. Over this period some of the largest and most 
advanced economies, including the United States (US), Germany, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and later Japan, were the top source of FDI. However, although average FDI 
inflows were highest to the United States, relatively small but highly internationally 
integrated economies such as Belgium and the Netherlands were also amongst the top 
recipients of FDI.
3 The classification of developing countries in this chapter follows UNCTAD.
7
In recent years FDI flows have remained concentrated amongst industrialised 
economies. However, as illustrated in figure 1.2, since around 1990, the share of FDI 
flowing to developing countries has risen and key emerging economies are now 
amongst the top recipients of FDI inflows. Between 1990 and 2005, the developing 
country share of annual global FDI inflows increased from around 25 per cent to 40 per 
cent, leading to an increase in the developing country share of the world stock of inward 
FDI from around 20 per cent to just under 30 per cent.
The distribution of FDI amongst developing countries has also changed. During the 
1970s the value of FDI flowing to developing countries was relatively evenly spread 
amongst Africa, Asia and Latin America, with the Middle East comprising a smaller 
share. Since then, however, there has been a significant increase in the share of FDI 
going to Asia, especially East Asia. One driving force of this redistribution and the 
overall increase in FDI to developing countries is China. In recent years China 
accounted for around a quarter of all FDI inflows to developing countries and in 2005 
was host to a stock of US$317 billion of FDI, second only to Hong Kong amongst 
developing countries.
Another recent trend has been a strong rise in outflows of FDI from developing 
countries, which in total accounted for around 17 per cent of global outflows in 2005 
(UNCTAD 2006). The source of these flows is highly concentrated with the top five 
countries accounting for around two thirds of the stock of outward FDI from all 
developing countries. Excluding offshore financial centres, the most important sources 
of developing country FDI include Hong Kong, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan and Brazil.
The trend increase in FDI flows has outstripped growth in world output, thereby 
increasing the importance of FDI in the international economy. During the 1970s, FDI 
inflows accounted for around half of one per cent of world GDP and in recent years has 
risen to around 2 per cent of GDP. The share of FDI in GDP has increased for both 
industrialised and developing countries but slightly more so in the case of developing 
countries where FDI as a proportion of GDP rose above 3 per cent in 2005.
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Figure 1.3: FDI share of world GDP, investment and exports
o
1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005
FDI share of GDP 
FDI share of exports
FDI share of investment
Source: UNCTAD online FDI database.
Notes: based on net FDI inflows and averages of annual observations over ten year periods 
between 1976 and 2005.
Other indicators confirming the rising importance of FDI include the FDI share of world 
trade and total investment. During the 1970s the ratio of global FDI inflows to world 
exports averaged just over 3 per cent but rose to around 9 per cent by 2005. This 
upward trend was evident in both industrialised and developing countries. This increase 
highlights the importance of FDI as a facilitator of international economic integration. 
Since the 1970s, the FDI share of investment has also risen sharply, up from around 
2 per cent to over 10 per cent.
Some FDI presumably represents a substitute for trade by allowing firms to establish 
foreign production facilities to serve foreign markets. However, FDI also represents an 
engine of trade by allowing firms to establish international production networks that 
engage in international trade in intermediate goods. The evidence presented in 
chapter 5 indicates the relative importance of this type of FDI may have increased, 
suggesting that FDI and trade are increasingly complementary.
FDI is an important source of external finance, particularly for developing countries. 
Whereas FDI flows to developing countries have continued to trend upward since the 
1970s, other forms of private external finance have been erratic and have shown no 
clear tendency to increase. The growing importance of FDI relative to private debt and 
portfolio equity flows was particularly evident through the 1990s, when FDI soared and
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other private flows stagnated. As a result, in recent years the FD1 share of long term 
private external finance in developing countries rose to around two thirds (Nunnenkamp 
2004).
Finally, the sectoral composition of global FDI continues to change. Historically, FDI 
has concentrated in manufacturing and mining related activities, particularly in 
developing countries. However, since the early 1990s there has been a strong rise in 
service sector FDI, which in 2002 was estimated to account for around 60 per cent of 
the world inward stock of FDI (UNCTAD 2004). Once again, advances in technology, 
particularly with respect to information and communications technology, have played 
an important role in facilitating this expansion. However, the liberalisation of FDI 
policies, which in many countries have historically focused on protecting domestic 
service sectors from foreign participation, has also been critical.
Initially, this rise in service sector FDI was concentrated in industrialised economies, 
especially those of Western Europe and North America, where multinational trading 
companies and finance sector institutions expanded their international presence. 
However, the global share of services FDI locating in developing countries rose sharply 
through the 1990s, from 17 per cent in 1990 to around 27 per cent in 2002 (UNCTAD 
2004). The sectoral allocation of services FDI has also diversified in recent years, 
expanding fastest in electricity, telecommunications, water supply and business 
services. With the service sector accounting for the majority of output and employment 
in most economies, this increase in services FDI represents a sharp rise in the 
international economic integration of the most economically important sectors.
1.4 Structure of thesis
The thesis comprises six core chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview of theory 
and existing empirical studies, thereby providing an analytical foundation for the 
empirical analysis presented in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the concept 
of FDI and reviews general theories of economic growth and FDI as well as the 
intersection of these literatures. The discussion focuses on how FDI enables the transfer 
of technology and how this relates to endogenous growth theories, particularly those 
which focus on the process of technology diffusion. Chapter 3 builds on this by 
discussing theories of how host country factors shape multinational production and how
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this relates to host country gains from FDI. This chapter also provides a review of the 
existing empirical literature.
Although FDI policies have been a focus of debate for sometime, there is a distinct lack 
of comparable cross-country data on these policies, particularly for developing countries 
and over longer periods. This motivated the compilation of a new cross-country dataset 
on FDI policies which is presented in chapter 4. Data were compiled from a wide range 
of primary and secondary sources and provide information on the presence of joint 
venture requirements and restrictions on the international movement of FDI for 89 
countries over the period 1970 to 2000. The data are used throughout the empirical 
analyses presented in this thesis.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the determinants of MNE affiliate export orientation and 
technology transfer to MNE affiliates, thereby providing new evidence on factors which 
influence the nature of MNE production. Building on other studies of this nature, the 
dependent variable in each analysis draws on industry level data on the operations of US 
multinational affiliates operating in a number of countries. In both cases a wide range 
of explanatory variables are incorporated, including the FDI policy indicators 
introduced in chapter 4 and trade and human capital related variables.
Chapter 7 examines the growth effects of FDI, focusing on how host country trade and 
FDI policies, as well as human capital, influence this relationship. Following the 
approach adopted by a large number of studies, the analysis draws on cross-country data 
and a relatively diverse set of explanatory variables to evaluate the determinants of long 
run growth. The impact of host country policies on the growth effects of FDI is 
examined by experimenting with different samples and interaction terms.
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Chapter 2
Overview of foreign direct investment and growth theory
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews theoretical aspects of the FDI-growth nexus. The discussion first 
canvasses separate theories of FDI and growth before focusing on the intersection of 
these literatures which highlights the different mechanisms through which FDI 
generates host country growth. In conjunction with the following chapter, this chapter 
provides the analytical foundation for the empirical analysis presented in this thesis.
In contrast to other forms of international capital exchange, FDI provides investors with 
direct managerial control of foreign assets. This defining characteristic gives rise to 
unique international linkages which underpins much of the interest in studying the 
causes and consequences of FDI. The managerial control facilitated by FDI flows 
allows direct investors to establish foreign production facilities that are integrated with 
their existing suite of productive assets and which make use of proprietary technology at 
the disposal of the investor.
While theories of FDI provide an understanding of the motives of direct investors and 
what FDI represents, growth theory has evolved to explicitly identify the drivers of long 
run growth. The driving force of growth in these theories is knowledge, which is either 
disembodied or embodied in workers as human capital.4 Knowledge features a number 
of characteristics which differ from other productive inputs which has important 
consequences for how new knowledge is created and used in the production process.
By highlighting the role of knowledge accumulation and diffusion in the growth 
process, such theories dovetail theories of FDI which emphasise the importance of 
technology exchange through direct investors. In this way endogenous growth theory 
provides an ideal conceptual framework for examining the growth effects of FDI. FDI 
enables the establishment of more productive foreign affiliated firms which make a 
direct contribution to the productive capacity of the host country. More importantly, 
however, these firms may also promote productivity improvements amongst local firms.
4 Throughout the thesis the terms “disembodied knowledge” and “technology” are used interchangeably.
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents a discussion 
of FDI theories, emphasising how FDI differs from other international capital flows and 
how it provides a conduit for international knowledge diffusion. Next, section 2.3 
presents a review of endogenous growth theory. This begins with an overview of 
theories which are implicitly concerned with knowledge creation and growth in a closed 
economy, before turning to theories of international knowledge diffusion. In section 2.4 
theories of how FDI inflows generate growth in the host country are discussed while 
section 2.5 concludes. A brief overview of the Solow-Swan growth model is presented 
in appendix 2.1.
2.2 Theories of foreign direct investment
According to a widely applied definition, FDI is an investment in an enterprise outside 
the economy of the investor that represents a Tasting interest’ in the acquisition (IMF 
1993). The term lasting interest has critical connotations for what FDI represents, how 
it is distinguished from other types of international capital exchange and its effect on the 
recipient country. A lasting interest signals a long term commitment by the investor and 
the desire and ability to exert some degree of managerial control or influence over the 
acquisition. Moreover, direct investors are motivated by the opportunity to bring the 
acquisition within its managerial umbrella. This contrasts with other types of 
international capital exchange, including portfolio equity investments, where the 
investor does not generally seek nor gain the ability to exert any meaningful degree of 
control.
In practice an investment classified as FDI does not require full foreign ownership. In 
most countries a foreign ownership level of between 10 and 25 per cent is deemed 
sufficient (Dunning 1993). FDI comprises three types of capital exchange between the 
direct investor and the acquired entity: equity flows, reinvested earnings and intercom 
any loans. FDI may represent an investment to acquire a stake in an existing firm, 
through a merger or acquisition, or to establish a new entity, a greenfields investment. 
Nevertheless, in each case the investment will give rise to the unique managerial 
relationship between firms across international borders that characterises FDI.
As with any type of investor, direct investors aim to generate the maximum possible 
return on their collective portfolio of assets. However, because FDI is uniquely 
synonymous with managerial influence the manner in which this objective is achieved
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differs for direct investors. Managerial influence enables the use of knowledge related 
assets at the disposal of the direct investor, often referred to in the literature as propriety 
assets, in conjunction with the acquisition (Hymer 1976; Caves 1996, pp.2-6). Direct 
investors therefore seek to maximise the return on their portfolio through the direct 
management of assets.
Propriety assets refer to a potentially large class of assets which incorporate various 
aspects of knowledge used within the production process. They are synonymous with 
disembodied knowledge discussed in the context of endogenous growth theory in 
section 2.3 below and are likely to vary greatly in specificity and tangibility. To 
illustrate, they may include factors such as product designs, production techniques, 
marketing expertise as well as other managerial and administrative knowledge. 
Importantly, in order for such proprietary assets to be utilised in a foreign affiliated firm 
they must not be tied to a single physical site and must be internationally transferable, 
within the overall ownership framework created by FDI.
Foreign ownership not only enables the use of propriety assets across national 
boundaries but provides an incentive for such knowledge transfer. In establishing a firm 
in a foreign market, direct investors face costs that local investors do not. These costs 
relate to the management of the firm across national boundaries as well as poorer 
knowledge of local business networks, laws and consumer preferences. This 
disadvantage can be offset through the use of proprietary assets which provide a 
technological edge over domestic firms (Caves 1971; Hymer 1976).
Moreover, due to the dominance of MNEs in the creation and ownership of technology, 
foreign affiliated firms will often have access to leading technologies through their 
parent company, in addition to other proprietary assets. For example, according to 
United Nations (UN) estimates, in 2002 the 700 largest firms in the world, almost all of 
which were classified as MNEs, accounted for close to half of global research and 
development expenditure and more than two thirds of global business related research 
and development (UNCTAD 2005c). By providing the means and incentives for 
technology transfer from leading innovators, FDI represents a conduit for knowledge 
diffusion and facilitates the establishment or expansion of foreign affiliated firms that 
are invariably technologically superior to domestic firms.
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In some circumstances the most effective offshore use of proprietary assets may not 
require direct investment. Rather than establishing foreign affiliated firms through FDI, 
a direct investor may find it more effective to licence production to a foreign owned 
firm. Arrangements such as these allow for propriety assets to be made available to 
other firms under strictly controlled conditions. However, due to certain characteristics 
of propriety assets, and disembodied knowledge more generally, this will often be 
problematic or even infeasible, requiring firms to utilise proprietary assets directly in 
their production processes (Teece 2003).
First, due to the public good characteristics inherent in proprietary assets it may be 
impractical to devise a contract to protect every aspect of intellectual property. Second, 
even if these contractual problems can be overcome, certain proprietary assets may only 
be of value if used in conjunction with other proprietary assets for which it is not 
possible to devise contracts. Third, negotiating over the parameters for the commercial 
exchange of technology, particularly pricing, is difficult given the many intangible and 
tacit elements.
Building on the idea that FDI facilitates the use of proprietary assets, a number of 
theories have been proposed to explain the existence of MNEs and flows of FDI 
associated with their activity. Reflecting the particular motives of direct investors these 
theories are grounded in an international trade and industrial organisation paradigm. 
They therefore contrast with the traditional interest rate parity approach typically 
applied in macroeconomic theories of capital flows (Markusen and Maskus 2003).
Dunning (1993) argues that the decision to undertake FDI in lieu of an alternative mode 
of entry to a foreign market can be explained in terms of FDI conferring advantages 
along three separate dimensions: ownership, location and internalisation. First, FDI 
provides the means to maintain ownership, thereby ensuring synergies between the full 
set of assets controlled by a MNE including its human and physical capital as well as 
propriety assets. Second, FDI provides the opportunity to access and control 
location-specific resources such as low cost or highly skilled labour or natural resources 
that are unavailable in the home country. Third, FDI makes it possible to internalise 
production occurring in a foreign country. This enables proprietary assets to be used 
abroad without having to resort to outsourcing, making it easier for firms to protect 
proprietary assets and ensure quality and supply standards are met.
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An alternative way to represent the motives of direct investors is to note that by seeking 
control of a foreign enterprise the investor will be seeking either access to foreign 
markets or location specific factors of production. Direct investment undertaken to gain 
access to foreign markets is often referred to as horizontal or market seeking FDI. In 
contrast, direct investment aimed to secure access to factors of production is termed 
vertical or efficiency seeking FDI.
This distinction reflects the different ways in which assets acquired through FDI fit 
within the existing portfolio of productive assets controlled by a parent company. 
Foreign assets acquired for market access motives are aligned horizontally with existing 
MNE processes meaning these are used to replicate certain aspects of the production 
process associated with existing MNE assets. For example, a production facility located 
in one country may be replicated in another country to serve that market. In contrast, 
vertical or efficiency seeking FDI concerns the acquisition of foreign assets that form 
one part of a vertically integrated international production line.
An additional distinction is also typically drawn between FDI designed to ensure access 
to natural resources, often termed extractive FDI, and other types of vertical FDI.
While both extractive FDI and other vertical FDI are concerned with the incorporation 
of location specific resources into a global production chain, they differ in respect to 
how the foreign affiliated firm is integrated in to the host economy. Extractive FDI will 
often encompass capital intensive production, particularly where it is associated with 
mining, thereby employing production techniques that may not match the wider 
comparative advantage of the economy. Such investment projects may also operate in 
physical isolation to other areas of economic activity. Moreover, the flow of extractive 
FDI is determined primarily by endowments of natural resources whereas efficiency 
seeking FDI will potentially locate in any country.5
A number of general equilibrium theories, whose origins lie in trade theory, have been 
developed to explain the flow of FDI between countries. Early examples of these draw 
a sharp distinction between motivations for either horizontal or vertical FDI. Helpman 
(1984) devises a model of vertical FDI where the production of a single factor involves 
two activities that are geographically separable and differ in factor intensity. The first
5 Throughout this thesis the terms “horizontal FD r and “market seeking FDI” are used interchangeably, 
as are the terms “vertical FDI” and “efficiency seeking FDI”. Furthermore, vertical or efficiency seeking 
FDI excludes the special case of extractive FDI.
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activity, termed headquarter activity, relates to various managerial and design processes 
and requires skilled labour. The second activity, dubbed production line activity, 
requires only unskilled labour.
When factor costs differ between countries, and trade costs are sufficiently low, firms 
can reduce costs by undertaking vertical FDI and splitting production activities across 
countries. Headquarter activity will remain in the home country, assuming this is skill 
abundant. In contrast, production line activity will be relocated to labour abundant 
countries where wage costs are lower. In this scenario FDI enables the establishment of 
an offshore production facility which is aligned vertically in the firm’s supply chain and 
specialises in labour intensive production.
The simple vertical FDI model of Helpman can be generalised to explain more complex 
patterns of international production. Rather than establishing just one offshore, 
vertically integrated affiliated, firms may establish a supply chain of vertically 
integrated affiliates, each specialising in the production of a particular component 
(Hanson et al. 2005). This type of product fragmentation provides MNEs with the 
advantage of matching the requirements of different production processes to factor 
endowments in different countries.6
An alternative set of models, starting with Markusen (1984), aim to illuminate 
motivations for horizontal FDI. Rather than focussing on differences in factor costs, 
these models highlight the implications of trade costs and economies of scale. In the 
presence of sufficiently high trade costs firms may find it more cost effective to 
establish foreign affiliated firms to serve a foreign market, rather than through exports. 
In this way, FDI provides an opportunity for MNEs to circumvent trade costs. The 
presence of firm level economies of scale, where two plant firms have fixed costs less 
than double those of an equivalent single plant firm, strengthens the incentive to 
undertake horizontal FDI.
These theories, which draw a sharp distinction between the motives for horizontal and 
vertical FDI, provide a clear framework for understanding the underlying motives of 
investors. However, they do not always explain observed empirical regularities. First, 
FDI flows both between industrialised economies, with broadly similar factor costs, and
6 See Yeats (1998) for empirical evidence on the importance of global production sharing and Athukorala 
(2005) for an analysis of the growing trade in parts and components.
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between industrialised and developing countries, where factor costs differ considerably. 
Second, there is evidence that some firms adopt complex integration strategies that 
involve simultaneous vertical and horizontal FDI. For example, in an analysis of trade 
flows between US multinationals and their Canadian affiliates during the 1980s and 
1990s, Feinberg and Keane (2006) find that a majority of firms in their sample do not 
adopt simple vertical or horizontal strategies but rather engage in extensive intra-firm 
trade.
Motivated by these observations, recent theoretical advances aim to provide a more 
general framework for explaining patterns of FDI (Flelpman 2006).7 Markusen (2002, 
ch7-8) proposes a unifying theory dubbed the knowledge capital model which combines 
elements of earlier horizontal and vertical models of FDI. In this framework the choice 
between a firm engaging in domestic production only or horizontal or vertical FDI is 
determined endogenously, on the basis of the characteristics of production and factor
o
endowments across countries.
Yeaple (2003) proposes a theory in which the optimal pattern of international 
production for an individual firm may involve both horizontal and vertically integrated 
affiliates. In this model firms produce a final consumption good using labour and an 
intermediate good. The intermediate good can be produced offshore in a vertically 
integrated affiliate but this form of production involves fixed costs associated with 
establishing an international production structure. Flence the potential benefits to 
engaging in vertical FDI in the form of lower unit costs weigh against additional fixed 
costs. In this scenario the productivity of the firm and its scale of production play an 
important role in determining the optimal production configuration, which may 
simultaneously involve horizontally and vertically integrated affiliates.
In summary, the motives to undertake direct investment contrast with those that drive 
other types of international capital flows. Direct investors seek control or influence 
over a foreign entity in order to facilitate the best use of their collective assets, including 
propriety assets, in order to generate a maximum return on their portfolio. Investors 
who engage in other types of capital exchange are not driven by the same 
considerations. This distinction provides a basis for explaining flows of FDI through a
7 A related literature focuses on the decision to undertake arms length international outsourcing versus 
internalizing production through FDI (see for example Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004)). 
x See Carr et al. (2001) for an empirical assessment of the knowledge capital model.
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paradigm other than interest rate parity. Moreover, the motivations for FDI underpin 
the hypothesis that it represents a mechanism for transferring a range of productive 
knowledge, in addition to the usual stock of undifferentiated capital associated with 
other capital flows.
2.3 Endogenous growth theory
2.3.1 Endogenous growth theory in the closed economy
Following the negative finding in the Solow-Swan model that growth could not be 
driven by the accumulation of physical capital under the assumption of diminishing 
returns to investment emerged endogenous growth theory. The objective of this 
literature has been to explicitly identify the factors that allow for a perpetual expansion 
in economic output, rather than attributing this to some exogenously determined factor, 
as is the assumption in the Solow-Swan model.9
Two ideas characterise the endogenous growth literature. First, knowledge is generally 
assumed to be the driver of growth and sources of new knowledge are explicitly 
endogenised. Second, breaking with the neo-classical assumption, constant or 
increasing returns to factor accumulation are often incorporated. Assuming constant or 
increasing returns to scale in physical capital accumulation is likely to be problematic. 
However, this may not be so for other types of inputs, including a broader form of 
capital that incorporates human capital or disembodied knowledge. In the following 
section the case of non-diminishing returns to physical capital accumulation is briefly 
considered, before the key contributions in the endogenous, knowledge based growth 
theory literature are presented.
The AK model is a simple representation of the economy where output is a linear 
function of the stock of capital and a constant technology parameter (Rebelo 1991). 
With this representation of output, the Solow-Swan assumption of diminishing marginal 
returns to capital accumulation is replaced with an assumption of a constant marginal 
return to investment. Abstracting from the impact of depreciation, with a fixed savings 
rate that generates a continual expansion in the capital stock, under this formulation of 
output, capital accumulation alone is sufficient to generate perpetual growth. The
9 See appendix 2.1 for an overview of the Solow-Swan growth model.
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growth rate of output will simply equal the growth rate of the capital stock which in turn 
depends only on the savings rate (net of any depreciation).
Hence, unlike the Solow-Swan model, in the AK model changes in the savings rate have 
a permanent impact on the rate of output growth and exogenous improvements in 
technology are no longer required to drive growth. The obvious limitation of the AK 
model is the assumption of constant marginal returns to physical capital accumulation. 
Arguably, this is an unrealistic representation of the microeconomic foundations of 
production where, under most conceivable conditions, it is likely that eventually, 
additions to the capital stock will face diminishing marginal returns. Nevertheless, this 
simple representation is useful for highlighting the required conditions for capital 
accumulation to drive perpetual growth.
An important development in the evolution of endogenous growth theory was 
reconsidering the role of knowledge in the production process and precisely how 
advances in knowledge are generated. Part of this involved recognising that knowledge 
has characteristics that are fundamentally different from other inputs to production 
(Römer 1993). One characteristic of knowledge that sets it apart from other inputs is 
that it is non-rivalrous. This means that ideas and concepts relating to the application of 
a particular type of technology by one agent do not preclude the simultaneous use of the 
same technology by another agent. This contrasts with, for example, an individual piece 
of machinery which can only ever be used in one application at any point in time.
A second unique characteristic of knowledge is that it is only partially excludable, 
meaning that once a new innovation is realised, the innovator can not, under most 
circumstances, completely prevent others from copying and using the new technology. 
Further, once an innovation has occurred, imitation may incur almost no cost. Legal 
mechanisms such as patents are designed to restrict access to new innovations, so in 
some circumstances knowledge can be made excludable. However, in practice such 
legal protections operate for a limited period and may provide only partial coverage. In 
some cases patents may be completely ineffective, if for example their legal status is not 
recognised in some jurisdictions. These special characteristics of technology have 
important implications for how innovation contributes to the process of economic 
growth.
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An early exposition of a growth model which captures some of the key characteristics of 
knowledge in the production process is by Arrow (1962). A defining feature of this 
model is that all improvements in knowledge, which are assumed to be embodied in 
superior vintages of capital goods, are available to all firms. Implicitly, it is assumed 
that all new knowledge is a pure public good that is available to all agents at zero cost. 
As a result, rather than gains from knowledge accumulation being fully internalised by 
any one individual firm, knowledge inevitably diffuses or ‘spills over’ to other firms, 
thereby creating positive externalities from knowledge creation. This contrasts with a 
scenario where firms undertake investments in a production input with rival and 
excludable characteristics, such as undifferentiated capital goods where the returns on 
investment are fully internalised.
A limitation of the Arrow (1962) model is that, in the long run, growth is tied to the rate 
of population growth, which is assumed to be exogenous. Strictly speaking, therefore, 
this model does not fully characterise growth as an endogenously determined factor. 
Römer (1986) builds on the Arrow (1962) framework and the idea of knowledge 
spillovers to devise a model where the rate of growth is endogenously determined.10 
Citing evidence of rising productivity growth in leading economies over the past few 
centuries, he assumes increasing, rather than decreasing returns to knowledge 
accumulation. With this minor modification a simple framework for explaining 
endogenous growth is established.
Aside from specifying knowledge as the driver of growth, another notable feature of 
Arrow (1962) and Römer (1986) is the knowledge generation mechanism. In both 
models, rather than assuming knowledge is created through research and development, 
it is assumed to accumulate as a by-product of production or ‘learning by doing’. To 
support this idea, Arrow (1962) cites evidence from studies of productivity in the 
aircraft manufacturing industry. These show that the time taken to build a particular 
aircraft is inversely related to the number already built, suggesting that productivity
10 An important variation is that Römer (1986) assumes knowledge is disembodied rather than embodied 
in different varieties of capital goods.
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gains arise simply as result of greater familiarity with a particular design and production 
process.11
An alternative to assuming that new knowledge is disembodied or embodied in new 
vintages of physical capital is to assume new knowledge is embodied in workers 
(human capital). Considering human capital as a distinct input of production recognises 
heterogeneity in the capabilities of different workers which reflects different 
investments in education and other learning processes. Individual workers, and 
therefore human capital, do not share the same non-rival and non-excludable 
characteristics as disembodied knowledge. However, in placing human capital 
accumulation as an engine of endogenous growth, Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) 
argue that human capital has other unique properties that have important implications 
for how it is accumulated and how it enters the production process.
The first point of difference between human capital and physical capital is that higher 
levels of human capital make it easier to accumulate additional human capital. For 
example, people who are better at reading can learn more efficiently than those who are 
illiterate. A second point of difference is that human capital has external effects; people 
benefit from working and interacting with others who have high levels of human capital. 
As such, increases in the level of human capital of any one worker not only facilitates 
an increase in the productivity of that worker but also raises the level of productivity of 
all other workers.
Under these assumptions human capital accumulation has an external effect analogous 
to the knowledge spillovers advocated by Arrow (1962) and Römer (1986). Drawing on 
these two ideas Lucas (1988) devises a model where human capital alone can drive 
growth, even in the absence of new disembodied knowledge. In this model the rate of 
output growth is dependent on the rate of human capital accumulation, which is in turn
1 9dependent on the amount of resources devoted to education.
11 Strictly speaking Arrow (1962) suggested that in this context learning is a by-product of investing 
rather than producing since it is the process of investing that stimulates new processes and production, 
and therefore learning.
12 Lucas (1988) and Stokey (1991) rely in part on an external spillover effect from human capital to 
generate endogenous growth. However, as noted by Rebelo (1991), this is an unnecessary assumption, 
even if the specification of diminishing returns to inputs of capital is retained. With constant returns to 
scale production technology and differentiated types of capital inputs, including both physical and human 
capital, it is possible for human capital in tandem with physical capital accumulation to drive perpetual
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Arguably, there are limits as to how much knowledge any one person can accumulate, 
raising problems in asserting human capital accumulation as the engine of growth 
(Römer 1990b). A further problem is that the knowledge embodied within any one 
person is lost when they pass away. In contrast, neither of these limitations applies to 
disembodied knowledge. Assuming that the key facets of knowledge can be codified, 
any innovation can be stored in perpetuity. Countering this argument, Lucas (1988) 
argues that since education comes about through social interactions between people, 
human capital effectively passes through successive generations. Hence, the 
educational attainment of any given generation depends on the human capital of 
education providers in the preceding generation.
Following on Römer (1986) and Lucas (1988), from the late 1980s onwards a number 
of endogenous growth theories emerged with the aim of explicitly modelling sources of 
innovation and incorporating them into a fully specified model of aggregate supply.
One stream of this literature builds on the Arrow (1962) and Römer (1986) idea of 
learning by doing (see for example Stokey (1988) and Young (1991)). An alternative 
literature focuses on the role of deliberate and costly research and development effort as 
a driver of innovation. In these models, resources are combined in an innovation sector 
to produce new technology, rather than assuming this to be a by-product of production 
as in the learning by doing models. A major contribution of this literature has been to 
identify the circumstances which underpin the incentives to undertake innovative 
activity.
One of the first examples of an endogenous growth model based on research and 
development is Römer (1990a). As in Römer (1986), disembodied knowledge is 
assumed to grow without bound, is non-rival and is the ultimate driver of long run 
growth in output. In this model a representative economy features three sectors: a 
research and development sector, an intermediate goods sector and a final goods sector. 
New innovations originate in the research and development sector and are embodied in 
tradeable blueprints (designs). Production in this sector can be characterised by the 
following equation:
A,=SH„A, (2.1)
growth. Such a specification resembles the AK model discussed above with ‘K’ referring to an amalgam 
of capital rather than narrowly defined physical capital.
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where A represents the stock of knowledge, HA the amount of human capital allocated to 
research and development and the dot script the rate of change with respect to time.
Blueprints, protected from imitation by patents, are sold to firms in the intermediate 
goods sector, which combine the technology embodied in a particular blueprint with 
physical capital to produce a unique variety of durable intermediate good, xh Hence, in 
this framework new knowledge is initially embodied in blueprints and then later 
embodied in new varieties of intermediate goods. The idea that knowledge is 
non-rivalrous has an important implication for the use of blueprints by intermediate 
goods producers. Namely, once the producer of an intermediate good has purchased a 
design for a particular good, the volume of this good that can be produced is limited 
only by the availability of physical capital.
The last phase of production occurs in the final goods sector where firms combine 
differentiated intermediate inputs with labour and human capital. As is standard in 
growth theory, the final output good is assumed to be fungible and is either consumed 
by households or saved and then used as physical capital in the intermediate goods 
sector. Production in the final output sector can be characterised by:
Y, = H “Lß^ x ] ~ a~ß a > 0, ß > 0 and a + ß < 1 (2.2)
i = i
where Y is final sector output, L unskilled labour and Hy the amount of human capital 
allocated to the final goods sector. As denoted by the parameters a and ß, final goods 
production is governed by constant returns to scale and, at any point in time, final goods 
producers will use all available intermediate goods so as to minimise production costs. 
Since the stocks of labour and human capital are assumed to be constant, the only 
source of final sector growth in the model is increases in the variety of intermediate 
durable goods, driven by innovations in the research and development sector.
As noted, knowledge generated in the research and development sector is purchased by 
intermediate goods producers. This exchange is problematic if knowledge is assumed 
to be non-excludable (as in the case of theories featuring knowledge spillovers such as 
Römer (1986)) since no firms will be willing to pay for knowledge that is freely 
available. In order to allow for the transfer of resources to innovators, blueprints that 
embody new knowledge are covered by patents that prevent other firms from
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appropriating the commercially acquired knowledge. This in turn provides intermediate 
firms with market power which they exercise over final goods producers by selling 
intermediate goods at the monopoly price. Hence, intellectual property protection 
makes research and development, the driver of new knowledge and ultimately output 
growth, economically viable. Without such protection intermediate firms would be 
unwilling to pay firms in the innovation sector for their blueprints and innovation would 
cease.
There are two important assumptions regarding the process of knowledge accumulation 
in the Römer (1990a) model, described by equation 2.1. First, increases in knowledge, 
and therefore ultimately output, are governed by the allocation of resources, namely 
human capital, to research and development effort. Therefore, a larger stock of human 
capital yields a permanently higher rate of output growth. Second, the growth of 
knowledge is linearly increasing in the stock of existing knowledge. This specification 
is aimed to capture the idea that all advances in knowledge build on the existing stock of 
knowledge which represents the sum of every innovation that has occurred throughout 
history.
With the additively-separable treatment of durable intermediate goods in final sector 
production, the availability of new intermediate goods represents an increase in 
technology. Each new capital good does not affect the marginal productivity of existing 
capital goods, nor do they enhance the productivity of existing goods. As such, new 
capital goods are modelled so as not to displace existing intermediate goods, even 
though in reality many innovations are superior substitutes for existing products. The 
assumption that new capital goods do not replace existing goods may only be 
appropriate for major break throughs, rather than incremental improvements in 
technology (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). It could also be argued that, in many cases, 
new technologies enhance existing technologies by allowing them to be applied to new 
production processes.
An alternative representation of technical progress is that innovation provides the basis 
for improvements in the quality of existing products. This characterisation of 
innovation is represented in a number of endogenous growth theories which, like Römer 
(1990a), have increases in knowledge brought about through research and development 
as the driver of growth (see for example Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and
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Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)). In these types of models the number 
of intermediate goods is fixed but the quality (marginal productivity) of each type of 
good is increasing over time as better designs become available. Therefore, new 
intermediate goods are assumed to be close substitutes for existing intermediate goods.
This approach to modelling technical change has its genesis in the ideas of Schumpeter 
(1942), who argues that innovation represents a process o f ‘creative destruction’ where 
new and superior designs make existing products and techniques obsolete. As in the 
expanding product variety model of Römer (1990), the existence of patents allows 
research and development effort to be compensated, providing the incentive for 
innovation. However, in contrast to the expanding product variety approach, existing 
blueprints are eventually made redundant so that monopoly rents generated through the 
existence of patents are temporary rather than permanent.
As noted above, in research and development type endogenous growth models changes 
in the resources devoted to innovative effort have a permanent impact on the growth 
rate. In Römer (1990a) for example, an exogenous rise in the employment of skilled 
labour in the research and development sector will permanently raise the rate at which 
new technologies are invented and therefore final sector output growth. A similar result 
is evident in the simple AK model; a permanent increase in the savings rate will yield a 
permanent increase in the rate at which capital is accumulated and output grows.
As Jones (1995b) notes, such ‘scale effects’ appear to be at odds with the empirical 
evidence for industrialised economies. In many of these countries, the quantity of 
resources devoted to innovation, proxied for example by the number of scientists and 
engineers engaged in research and development, has risen sharply over an extended 
period. According to research and development type models this should imply a 
noticeable increase in the trend rate of output growth. In reality, however, over the past 
century or more the trend rate of growth in per capita output has been relatively stable in 
many industrialised economies. On the more direct link between innovative effort and 
changes in the stock of knowledge, Segerstrom (1998) notes that despite the large 
increase in resources devoted to innovation through the twentieth century the rate of 
growth in the number of patents has been stable.
The observation that in industrialised economies growth in knowledge and output
appears to be insensitive to increases in innovative effort has led to a reassessment of
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the knowledge creation process and attempts to devise endogenous growth models 
without scale effects. A core assumption of one such model, proposed by Jones 
(1995a), is that the production of new technology does not exhibit constant returns to 
scale. He specifies innovation as evolving according to the following equation:
A,=SHXAf (2.3)
Whereas Römer (1990a) assumes that the parameters (p and X are equal to one, Jones 
(1995a) argues that each of these parameters may be less than one. First, if the stock of 
all potential knowledge is fixed, then it is likely that innovations requiring the least 
effort to discover have been discovered first and that future innovation becomes 
increasingly difficult. This ‘fishing out’ effect, represented by the parameter <p being 
less than one means that for a given allocation of resources to research and 
development, the rate of increase in knowledge slows as the stock of knowledge 
increases. Second, the marginal productivity of workers engaged in innovation may not 
be constant, due to congestion that leads to duplication in research effort. This is 
represented by the parameter X being less than one. In this case, the creation of new 
knowledge will not be linear in the allocation of resources to research and development 
and again, ceteris paribus, the growth rate of new knowledge will decline over time.
Assuming decreasing, rather than constant returns in knowledge production has 
significant consequences for how knowledge and ultimately output growth is generated. 
Most notably, in the absence of increases in the amount of labour allocated to research 
and development, diminishing returns to knowledge accumulation will result in the 
stock of knowledge converging to a constant level. Permanent changes in the allocation 
of resources to research and development no longer have a permanent impact on the rate 
of output growth but rather result in changes to the level of the stock of knowledge and 
generate convergence dynamics similar to those exhibited by the Solow-Swan model.
In this revised formulation of knowledge creation, growth in knowledge and per capita 
output is dependent on world population growth which facilitates perpetual increases in 
the stock of labour working in research and development (Jones 2002).
2.3.2 Endogenous growth theory in the open economy
The endogenous growth models discussed in section 2.3.1 provide a theoretical 
framework for explaining a process of growth driven by knowledge accumulation, in a
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closed economy. The accumulation of knowledge, embodied in various forms, is 
assumed to occur domestically and there are no channels through which knowledge 
might be accessed from an external source. This characterisation of the knowledge 
accumulation, and therefore growth process is arguably inadequate. The non-rival and 
only partially excludable nature of knowledge suggests that it may diffuse widely.
Indeed, in the models discussed above, knowledge diffusion is explicitly assumed to 
occur between innovators operating within some ill defined border. However, given the 
wide range of international economic and financial linkages as well as means of 
communication, it would seem implausible to assume that at least some international 
diffusion does not occur.
If knowledge diffusion occurs at the global level then a natural characterisation of 
knowledge is that it is a global rather than national phenomenon. Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Römer (1991) explore this idea by devising 
knowledge based models of growth to assess the effects on output of international 
economic integration. They consider a scenario where two, previously isolated, 
economies establish channels of communication that enable the diffusion of knowledge. 
It is assumed that both representative economies are equally technologically advanced. 
However, the nature of the knowledge stocks in each economy differs, so there is no 
overlap in knowledge in the two economies.11
In this framework, the opening of channels of communication leads to an immediate 
exchange of knowledge that will result in a jump in the stock of knowledge available to 
producers in each economy and an associated increase in the level of output. More 
significant, however, is the impact that the opening of communication channels has for 
the process of knowledge accumulation in both economies. In an integrated world, 
researchers in each economy effectively work within a common (global) innovation 
sector. Assuming constant or increasing returns to scale production in this sector, the 
bringing together of resources into a global pool drives higher rates of growth in both 
economies by the same mechanism that drives higher growth in closed economy 
endogenous growth models. Namely, a greater stock of existing knowledge and a larger
13 In a product variety model of growth such as Römer (1990) this assumption is represented by each 
economy having access to the same number of intermediate goods but each set of intermediate goods 
representing different technologies (or varieties of intermediate goods).
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allocation of resources to the collective innovation effort allows for a faster rate of 
innovation.
These models illustrate how knowledge used in any individual economy might be 
viewed as a global good. In doing so they provide a framework for illustrating how 
knowledge diffusion might increase the global stock of knowledge and the rate at which 
it is accumulated. However, since technological capability is assumed to be 
homogeneous across countries, these models do not aid our understanding of the factors 
that might explain differences in access to knowledge and the implications of these 
differences. This question is the focus of models of knowledge diffusion.
Technological catch-up or convergence describes the process whereby countries acquire 
new knowledge from a more technologically advanced country.14 Therefore the notion 
of technological convergence is premised on the idea that there are differences in 
technological capability (a technology or knowledge gap) which reflect differences in 
access to knowledge. The possibility of technological convergence is especially 
significant for lower income countries which may suffer significant technology gaps 
and undertake very little innovative activity of their own. However, it is unlikely that 
any one economy has access to the full global pool of knowledge at any point in time 
and so technological convergence may be important, even for industrialised economies 
(Jovanovic 1997).
The idea of technological convergence predates the development of endogenous growth 
theory. Indeed, writing in the early part of the twentieth century, Veblen (1915) 
highlighted the importance of foreign innovation as a source of technological 
improvement during the period of early industrialisation in Germany. Other historical 
accounts of development and industrialisation also point to the importance of 
technological convergence. For example, Gerschenkron (1962) presents wide ranging 
evidence on phases of technological leadership and catch-up in explaining the changing 
economic fortunes of European powers over several centuries. In particular, he 
chronicles a number of advances in technology that were initially developed in one 
location and later imitated by producers in neighbouring countries. Rostow (1963) also 
refers to a role for technology diffusion in his theory of the phases of development.
14 Where there are intra-national differences in the available stock of knowledge, technological 
convergence may also occur at a sub-national level.
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Many formal theoretical models of knowledge diffusion and technological convergence 
emphasise the role of imitation rather than the commercial acquisition of new 
technology and while some consider specific channels for technology transfer, most aim 
to illustrate a generic process of diffusion. An early example of such a generic model is 
by Krugman (1979) who models the world as comprising two regions, one where 
innovation occurs (the North), and the other where innovations are imitated (the South).
Building on the theory of the product cycle by Vernon (1966), Krugman assumes that 
imitation occurs once the knowledge to produce a particular good becomes public, 
which simply occurs following the passing of a fixed period of time. Hence, the natural 
evolution of global production is for goods to be invented and initially produced in the 
North and then eventually for production to migrate to the lower cost South. A more 
recent incarnation of this idea is presented by Segerstrom et al. (1990) who construct a 
similar model except that innovations in the North are deterministic, arising from the 
result of research and development effort, rather than evolving at some exogenous rate 
as Krugman (1979) assumes.
A limitation of these generic models of technological convergence is that they cannot 
explain determinants of the rate of technology transfer to less advanced economies. As 
Arrow (1969) notes, if differences in access to technology explain much of the observed 
variation in global productivity levels and growth, then the natural presumption is that 
country specific factors must influence the diffusion and uptake of superior technology 
that has been invented and is utilised elsewhere. Therefore, the aim of a number of 
models of diffusion has been to provide greater insights on the precise mechanism for 
technology transfer and to consider impediments to diffusion rather than to assume this 
occurs through some simple, exogenous osmosis effect. Some specific issues 
considered in this literature include costs associated with the imitation or transfer of 
technology and host country policies and endowments that may constrain technology 
transfer and utilisation.
The imitation and use of an existing, superior technology appears to involve far more 
than a simple duplication process. In addition to devoting resources to understanding 
processes and products associated with new technologies, firms may also need to 
modify these to fit in with their existing organisation. Differences in the operating 
environment due to factors such as government regulation, legal frameworks or
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geography may also require modifications that impose additional resource costs. This 
suggests that one impediment to knowledge diffusion are costs associated with 
imitation, a hypothesis supported by empirical studies which imply these are non-trivial 
(see for example Mansfield et al. (1981), Teece (1977) and Szulanski (1996)).
A model that focuses on the process of knowledge diffusion in the presence of adoption 
costs is by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997; 2004).15 In this model there are two 
representative countries, a technological leader, which produces innovations and a 
follower, which seeks to imitate innovations. Following Römer (1990), each country 
comprises three sectors. These include a final and intermediate goods sector as well as 
either an innovation sector (in the lead country) or an imitation sector (in the follower 
country). As in many other endogenous growth models, advances in technology are 
represented by increases in the number of intermediate goods available.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997; 2004) assume that the lead country has access to a larger 
number of intermediate products than the follower country and that the costs of 
imitation in the follower country are lower than the costs of innovation. However, it is 
also assumed that adoption costs rise as the follower country gradually masters all 
available technology in the lead country and therefore closes the technology gap. As a 
result the rate of imitation, and therefore growth, in the follower country slows as it 
catches up to the technological leader.16
By modifying the assumptions regarding adoption costs in this framework, different 
patterns of growth and convergence across countries can be produced. For example, 
Papageorgiou (2002) assumes the cost of adoption is quadratic in the size of the 
technology gap between the follower and lead economy. This revised specification 
means that adoption costs are greatest if the technology gap is very large or very small.
As with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997; 2004), rising costs are assumed on account of 
the increasing difficulty that imitators face when trying to replicate technologies near 
the global frontier. In addition, it is hypothesised that very backward economies will 
face high costs of adoption due to a lack of capacity to replicate even basic forms of
13 See also Segerstrom (1991).
16 Rather than viewing the acquisition of new technology as a process of imitation, this model can also 
represent technological convergence as occurring through a process of acquiring new technology from 
abroad through commercial means such as technology licensing. Under this scenario, innovators in the 
lead country sell their blueprints to intermediate goods producers in the follower country, thereby 
enabling final sector producers in the follower country to access new varieties of intermediate goods.
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technology. Rather than predicting technological convergence for all developing 
countries, this model suggests that middle ranking developing countries will exhibit 
rapid convergence due to relatively low adoption costs while the poorest will grow 
slowly or stagnate due to high adoption costs.
Parente and Prescott (1994) devise a model of technology diffusion and catch-up 
focussing on specific factors that raise the costs of firms undertaking investments to 
implement new technology. These barriers to technology adoption encompass a wide 
range of factors such as legal and regulatory barriers, corruption and political instability. 
Using data from the US and Japan, the authors argue that low costs of adoption explain 
rapid convergence in incomes levels, such as that exhibited by Japan and Korea in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the model suggests that only small 
increases in adoption costs are required to explain the failure of many countries to move 
on to a convergence path. Expanding on this idea, more recently Parente and Prescott 
(1999; 2000) focus on how vested interests with legislative backing (including labour 
unions) might prevent the adoption and diffusion of new technologies in situations 
where they stand to lose economic rents.
Other factors that impede technological convergence aside from adoption costs have 
also be been examined in growth models. Pack (1993) departs from the traditional 
theoretical assumption that access to any technological improvement will necessarily 
raise productivity by arguing that some innovations may be unsuitable for some 
countries. In particular, he argues that the beneficial impact of new technology hinges 
on whether the technology is suited to a country’s factor endowment and stage of 
development.
Countries endowed with low capital labour ratios, including most developing countries, 
might only be expected to benefit from access to technologies relevant to labour 
intensive industries. If government interventions artificially raise the wage-rental
ratio, then firms may choose inappropriate capital intensive techniques, giving rise to 
unemployment, forgone output and welfare losses. In this case, access to new 
technology may be detrimental to development.
17 An exception to this rule might be technology and investments associated with resource extraction 
industries.
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Basu and Weil (1998) formalise the idea that capital intensive technology is unsuitable 
for developing countries. The primary implication of their model is that the diffusion 
and implementation of new technology is not immediate and automatic. Rather, it takes 
time, and only occurs as countries accumulate capital and achieve sufficiently high 
capital-labour ratios which enable them to benefit from more sophisticated and capital 
intensive production techniques.
Similar in spirit is a model by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). In this model it is 
assumed that some innovations can only be utilised by skilled workers owing to 
skill-technology complementarities. Since most research and development is 
undertaken in industrialised economies for countries abundant in skilled labour, 
innovations tend be biased towards skill intensive production. As a result, many 
innovations cannot be utilised in developing economies where skilled labour is scarce.
Earlier work by Nelson and Phelps (1966) argues human capital conditions the rate of 
technological convergence. They draw a distinction between two different effects 
human capital accumulation has on the ability of workers to perform a particular task. 
The traditional view of human capital is concerned with how education and training 
enables a worker to perform a particular routine. In this sense, the accumulation of 
human capital allows workers to produce more by undertaking a greater quantity of 
routine work. In addition, they argue that education also provides the means for 
workers to adapt to changes in routine which may arise due to advances in technology 
and other factors.
As a result, better educated workers, especially those involved in decision making 
processes such as managers, are more likely to incorporate advances in technology at a 
faster rate. To support their hypothesis Nelson and Phelps (1966) cite empirical 
evidence on the uptake of the latest pesticides in the agriculture sector. This showed 
that farmers with higher levels of education were more likely to have the capacity to 
appreciate the value of new technology and be better positioned to implement it faster 
and more effectively.
One interpretation of the Nelson and Phelps (1966) hypothesis is that inadequate human 
capital represents a constraint on the ability of agents to absorb new knowledge, or a 
lack of absorptive capacity. This issue is canvassed at length by Abramovitz (1986).
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He argues that absorptive capacity is difficult to define but is likely to relate to a wide 
range of supply side factors required to facilitate knowledge diffusion.
Pack (2003) elaborates on the role that human capital plays in facilitating technology 
diffusion by suggesting that this complementarity arises from the tacit elements of 
technology. Effective utilisation of superior technology requires judgement and 
expertise and cannot always be taken ‘offthe shelf. Therefore, it is possible that 
producers using the same material inputs may end up employing two distinct 
techniques, if the understanding of the tacit elements of technology differ (Evenson and 
Westphal 1995).
The possibility of complementarity between technology and human capital has also 
been examined in the labour economics literature with some arguing that this 
complementarity is the factor which drives the observed link between wage inequality 
and the speed of technological innovation (Acemoglu 2002). For example, Greenwood 
and Yorukoglu (1997), show that during periods of rapid innovation, firms need to hire 
highly educated workers to employ new technology embodied in machinery. This has 
the effect of driving up demand for relatively skilled workers and therefore wage 
differentials. 18
Easterly et al. (1994) and Keller (1996) devise theoretical models of absorptive capacity 
and technological convergence that link the speed of convergence to the rate of human 
capital accumulation. They treat all knowledge as a global public good but assume that 
the utilisation of more advanced technology requires sufficient local technical capability 
or absorptive capacity, which they define purely in terms of the stock of human capital. 
They hypothesise that entrepreneurs and workers need to acquire ever higher levels of 
human capital to attain the ability to work with more advanced technology. In this 
sense, human capital and technology are bounded complements so that the rate of 
technology diffusion and growth are ultimately a function of the rate at which human 
capital is accumulated.
The precise mechanism by which this complementarity is modelled differs between the 
two models. Easterly et al. (1994) simply assume that education represents attaining the 
ability to work with new types of technology that exist elsewhere. Keller (1996) takes a
ls See Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) for further empirical evidence.
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slightly more elaborate approach by incorporating what is essentially a sector for 
adopting and implementing domestically, foreign innovations. Increases in education 
play a vital role in this adoption sector since progressively more sophisticated foreign 
innovations require higher levels of human capital to adopt to domestic use.
To support his emphasis on the importance of ongoing investments in human capital, 
Keller (1996) cites weaknesses in the link between liberalisation and growth outcomes 
in some countries. He argues that in some cases reforms have been undertaken to 
liberalise trade and investment restrictions, thereby opening the channels of technology 
diffusion, but have failed to achieve significant productivity gains. He argues that in 
these countries inadequate investments in human capital have prevented the diffusion of 
technology from abroad, limiting the growth dividend from liberalisation.
Rather than highlighting the role of human capital in ensuring access to the global pool 
of knowledge, Howitt (2000) devises a multi-country growth model where 
technological convergence is conditional on all countries undertaking at least some 
domestic research and development. In this model, growth in each country is governed 
by domestic innovation that brings about new, higher productivity intermediate capital 
goods used in final sector production. It is assumed that intermediate goods are not 
tradeable. However, international knowledge diffusion plays a critical role since 
knowledge used to produce different intermediate goods in each country is sourced from 
a common global pool which grows in accordance with innovations that occur 
throughout the world. In other words, innovation in each country draws upon and 
contributes to the global stock of knowledge.
In each country productivity is influenced by two factors. The first is the frequency of 
innovation, represented by the duration between the introduction of new intermediate 
goods. The second is the size or importance of new innovations which reflects how 
superior a new intermediate product is compared with an existing vintage.
Howitt (2000) argues that these two effects are offsetting.
A country that undertakes little research and development will innovate infrequently.
However, when innovations occur, they will represent a relatively large improvement
over existing intermediate products. Conversely, a country that undertakes a greater
amount of research and development will produce innovations frequently but they will
represent relatively minor improvements over existing intermediate products.
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Therefore, the long run rate of productivity growth will be the same for all countries that 
undertake any amount of research and development. In contrast, countries that 
undertake no research and development will be unable to generate improvements in the 
productivity of intermediate goods and will therefore stagnate.
In summary, the hypothesis that knowledge diffuses across national boundaries has 
profound implications for how knowledge accumulation drives growth. First, if 
international knowledge diffusion occurs seamlessly then all countries can draw from a 
common global pool of knowledge, both as a direct input to production and as an input 
into the innovation process. More significantly, if underdevelopment is in part due to 
differences in access to knowledge then knowledge diffusion can contribute to 
convergence in productivity levels.
However, a number of contributions to this literature have suggested that various factors 
may limit the potential for knowledge diffusion. These include the existence of 
adoption costs, the possibility that not all technology is suitable for all countries and the 
possibility that vested interests may prevent domestic firms from utilising superior, 
foreign sourced technology. Another constraint on technology diffusion which, as 
argued in chapter 3, is likely to be particularly relevant for diffusion through FDI, is 
absorptive capacity. According to this hypothesis, the diffusion and utilisation of 
superior technology requires the availability of other factors of production, particularly 
human capital.
2.4 Growth effects of foreign direct investment
In this section three main mechanisms through which FDI drives growth in the recipient 
country are analysed. In the first sub-section a brief examination of theories that 
emphasise the role of generic international capital flows in promoting capital deepening 
is presented. These early theories of growth and international capital flows share some 
key features with the Solow-Swan model, including the assumptions that capital is 
undifferentiated and there is no explicit role for knowledge transfer. Therefore, 
although these models provide a starting point for examining the impact of capital flows 
on growth their use in examining the full impact of FDI is limited.
The other two mechanisms highlighted below reflect the role FDI as a conduit for 
knowledge transfer. The first concerns the impact of FDI on changes in the efficiency
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and structure of local production. This discussion emphasises the role of foreign firms 
in increasing domestic market competition, generating new supply linkages and 
enabling economies of scale. The second focuses on how FDI facilitates technology 
transfer to local firms through knowledge spillovers. Also presented are formal models 
of growth that feature FDI as the channel for knowledge transfer which build upon the 
endogenous growth theory literature discussed above.
2.4.1 Capital deepening
MacDougall (1960) presents a simple static analysis of the impact of capital inflows on 
host country output. In a representative economy the sole factors of production are 
fixed stocks of labour and capital, a proportion of which is owned by foreign investors.
In this framework domestic and foreign capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes and 
domestic and foreign investors face the same rate of return.
With a fixed labour supply, a marginal increase in the stock of foreign capital leads to a 
fall in the marginal product of capital and an associated decline in the rate of return on 
all capital. Therefore, new foreign investment drives down the return for domestic 
investors. However, this negative impact on national income will be more than offset 
by an increase in the return to labour arising from the process of capital deepening. An 
additional benefit will accrue to domestic households if the returns to foreign capital are 
subject to taxes. In summary, in this simple framework, foreign investment will 
generate a net increase in host country income, with or without taxes applying to foreign 
investors.
The process of capital deepening can also be considered in a dynamic framework.
Barro et al. (1995) devise an open economy extension of the Solow-Swan growth model 
that allows for international capital flows. In the closed version of the model, the 
capital labour ratio and level of assets per worker are always equal. This is because the 
capital stock is wholly owned by domestic households.
However, in the open economy extension, which allows for foreign borrowing and 
lending, this condition does not necessarily hold. Current account deficits (surpluses) 
and the associated build up of foreign debt (assets) reflect the difference between the 
amount of capital used in domestic production which is owned by domestic and foreign 
households. For a small economy that faces a given world interest rate, such differences
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are determined by the rate of time preference of households compared with the world 
interest rate.
The results generated from this seemingly simple extension to the Solow-Swan growth 
model are problematic. Unless the world interest rate equals the rate of time preference 
of households, agents will either run their capital stock and consumption levels to zero, 
or continue building their capital stock until they own the full global stock of capital. In 
addition, the speed of convergence to these unlikely scenarios is infinite so that 
adjustment is instant.
To address these problems the basic framework is modified to incorporate factors such 
as heterogeneity in the preferences of households across countries, credit constraints and 
investment adjustment costs. Therefore, a simple open economy extension of the 
Solow-Swan model provides limited insights on how international capital flows affect 
the speed of convergence to the steady-state. By retaining the assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns, such a framework also ultimately relies on exogenous 
technological improvement as the long run driver of growth. Moreover, there is no role 
for capital flows to facilitate knowledge transfer.
2.4.2 Efficiency and market structure
A consequence of the technological superiority of foreign affiliated firms is that their 
presence is likely to alter the domestic operating environment. This may have important 
implications for all firms operating within the same market, but especially local firms. 
Some, but not all of these changes will be beneficial for the performance of domestic 
industry.
One effect that foreign firms may have is to intensify market competition in the host 
country. This may lead to a boost in local firm productivity by forcing them to reduce 
any slack in factor utilisation, thereby increasing X-efficiency (Leibenstein 1966; Keller 
2001). Alternatively, it is possible that over the medium to long run the presence of 
foreign controlled firms with superior technical and financial resources may drive out 
local firms, resulting in greater industry concentration and, potentially, a fall in national 
income. This effect is likely to be exacerbated in the presence of trade barriers that 
restrict import competition and provide a more conducive environment for the rise of 
monopolistic foreign operators. It is also likely to be of greater significance where
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foreign firms enter industries with high fixed costs, where ‘market stealing’ reduces 
demand and raises average costs for local firms (Aitken and Harrison 1999).
Another way in which the presence of foreign firms may alter the domestic operating 
environment and generate productivity improvements amongst local firms is by 
stimulating additional demand for locally produced goods. This issue is examined in 
theoretical models by Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1991), Rodriguez-Clare (1996) 
and Markusen and Venables (1999). The key issue highlighted in these models is the 
positive impact on the productivity of local firms brought about from increases in the 
demand for their output generated by the presence of foreign affiliated firms operating 
in downstream markets.
In each of these models a two sector production framework is used where intermediate 
goods are supplied by local firms to a downstream market populated by foreign and 
local firms that produce a final consumption good. Given the dependency between 
locally owned upstream intermediate suppliers and downstream buyers, the entry of 
new, foreign affiliated firms spurs demand for local inputs. In the presence of 
increasing returns to scale in upstream markets, higher demand brings about 
productivity gains for local suppliers.
In the model by Rodriguez-Clare (1996) the magnitude of this positive external effect is 
dependent on the extent of linkages between local suppliers and foreign affiliated firms. 
In turn, linkages are determined endogenously according to the relative costs of foreign 
affiliates sourcing products abroad and locally. An implication of this setup is that 
greater benefits from FDI will accrue to local firms when they are competitive suppliers 
of intermediate products to foreign affiliated firms.
2.4.3 Technology transfer
A key consequence of FDI facilitating knowledge diffusion between MNE parent 
companies and their foreign affiliates is that it may give rise to local knowledge 
spillovers. Such spillovers are based on the same concept of knowledge diffusion which 
forms the cornerstone of endogenous growth theories outlined in section 2.3 above.
Like other international linkages such as trade and migration, FDI provides 
opportunities for firms to benefit from foreign innovations. There are, however, 
important differences in the mechanics of knowledge diffusion occurring through FDI
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which suggest that FDI might be a particularly effective conduit for international 
knowledge diffusion.
First, FDI spillovers involve local firms acquiring knowledge from a foreign firm 
operating within the same national boundary. Hence, FDI brings foreign innovators and 
users of new technology within close proximity of local firms. This is important if the 
potential for spillovers increases with proximity, as suggested by some empirical studies 
(see for example Jaffe et al. (1993), Bottazzi and Peri (2003) and Keller (2002)).
Second, as noted in section 2.3.2, some innovations may be unsuitable for some 
countries while others may require modifications to suit local conditions. This problem 
is likely to be particularly acute for firms in developing countries which face factor 
endowments and operating conditions that differ greatly from those faced by firms in 
industrialised countries, where the bulk of research and development is undertaken. 
However, as MNEs are directly engaged in foreign production, the technology supplied 
to MNE affiliates is more likely to be well suited to the operating environment of the 
host country and therefore beneficial to local operators.19
There are a number of channels through which FDI spillovers may occur (Blomstrom 
and Kokko 1998; Lipsey 2002). Recognising the importance of close economic 
linkages in promoting knowledge diffusion, each of these revolves around local workers 
and firms interacting with foreign affiliated firms. The first mechanism is referred to as 
demonstration effects. This simple mechanism operates by locally owned firms 
observing how foreign affiliated competitors undertake business and replicating their 
superior practices. This type of knowledge diffusion occurs between firms engaged in 
similar activities and, therefore, typically operating in the same sector. Spillovers 
occurring through demonstration effects therefore usually represent intra-industry or 
horizontal spillovers.
Second, where foreign affiliated firms trade inputs with local firms, FDI spillovers may 
also occur up and down the supply chain. This is particularly so where a foreign 
affiliate has an incentive to assist its local suppliers in upstream markets and customers 
in downstream markets. Such assistance may be forthcoming when the successful 
supply of foreign sourced equipment to local firms requires various forms of technical
19 Nevertheless, as discussed in section 3.2 of chapter 3, host country factors are likely to have a 
considerable influence on the nature of technology used by MNE affiliates.
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assistance. Alternatively, where foreign affiliates rely on local upstream suppliers, they 
may assist these suppliers in meeting quality and reliability standards. Indeed, where 
inputs are sourced locally, foreign affiliates are likely to have an incentive to promote 
knowledge diffusion widely amongst local firms to ensure quality improvements and 
competition amongst local suppliers (Pack and Saggi 2001).
The third channel is labour mobility. Local workers employed by foreign affiliates may 
learn about new production technologies before departing to work for a locally owned 
firm or establish their own business. Knowledge may be acquired through formal 
training provided by the firm or simply through learning by doing. In this way foreign 
sourced knowledge becomes embodied in local workers before diffusing more 
broadly.20
The knowledge diffused through FD1 is potentially diverse (Todaro 1985; Blomstrom 
and Kokko 1998). Rather than only comprising ‘hard’ technology of the type often 
embodied in capital goods, FDI may also enable the transfer of a wide range o f ‘soff 
technology embodied in proprietary assets. Such knowledge refers to a broad array of 
practical business knowledge which may not be available through commercial means 
due to contractual problems or through other diffusion channels such as international 
trade.
An important example o f ‘soff knowledge spillovers facilitated through FDI are 
‘market access’ spillovers which refer to the process of local firms learning how to 
export from the presence of MNE affiliates (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; Greenaway et 
al. 2004). As Keesing (1983) notes, the task of exporting requires additional expertise 
from producing for local markets. Exporters need to know about differences in the 
preferences of foreign consumers, negotiate different regulations concerning the sale of 
goods and learn how to make the best use of international transport and logistics 
services. With MNE affiliates engaged in international production and distribution they 
are a potentially rich source of knowledge for local firms facing practical constraints to 
exporting.
20 Fosfuri et al. (2001) also argue that even if MNE technology does not spillover to local firms pecuniary 
spillovers in the form of higher wages for local workers may occur. If foreign affiliates fear the loss of 
technology to local rival firms through labour mobility they may be more inclined to pay higher wages to 
reduce turnover.
21 The tenninology ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ technology is taken from Baily and Solow (2001) who, drawing on 
micro level studies, argue that the former represents an important determinant of international differences 
in productivity levels.
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A theoretical model illustrating the mechanics of FDI spillovers is presented by Wang 
and Blomstrom (1992). Here, a game theory approach is used to investigate the 
interaction between foreign affiliates and local firms which produce differentiated, but 
substitutable, goods. The model therefore examines market interactions that give rise to 
horizontal spillovers between rival firms. In this framework, it is assumed that local 
firms possess superior knowledge of local conditions, including consumer preferences, 
while the subsidiary has an advantage in respect of general production technology. To 
ensure they can compete against the local firm, MNE parents undertake costly 
investments to transfer superior technology to their affiliate.
The local firm has the option of responding to the technological superiority of the 
foreign affiliate by undertaking its own costly investments to learn the superior 
technologies used by the foreign firm. (In effect this investment represents a partial cost 
associated with learning by observing that is assumed to be below the full resource cost 
of acquiring knowledge under license or through innovation.) The investment and 
acquisition of technology through spillovers raises the productivity of the local firm, 
making it more competitive. The MNE parent company then has the choice to 
undertake further investments to ensure its affiliate maintains a technological edge and 
through this, market share. An equilibrium level of technology transfer from the MNE 
parent to the affiliate and then on to the local firm through the spillover mechanism is 
determined on the basis of the costs associated with each firm undertaking investments 
to acquire superior technology.
There are two important implications from this model. First, in order to benefit from 
spillovers, local firms may need to invest in a costly learning process. As a result, 
spillovers are not pure positive externalities in the sense of benefits being conferred at 
zero cost. Second, the magnitude of the spillover is determined in part by the response 
of local firms and in part by the willingness of the MNE parent to undertake costly 
technology transfer. A more competitive operating environment for the foreign affiliate 
as well as lower costs for transferring technology will both induce greater technology 
transfer from the parent to the affiliate. Equally, the more willing and able local firms 
are to undertake learning, the greater will be spillovers to locals firms.
A small number of theoretical models embed FDI related knowledge spillovers within 
an aggregate growth framework. By assuming that knowledge accumulation underpins
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the growth process, these models resemble endogenous growth theories discussed in 
section 2.3. In knowledge based models of FDI and growth the precise role attached to 
FDI differs. In one formulation FDI drives growth through a process of technological 
convergence. Therefore in the terminology used by Römer (1993), FDI spillovers are 
assumed to fill knowledge gaps in the host country. An alternative representation is that 
FDI spillovers augment the capacity of the host country to innovate, rather than just 
mimic existing technologies.
An early contribution, which emphasises technological convergence, is by Findlay 
(1978). In this model the rate of output growth is specified as a simple function of 
knowledge accumulation. The model abstracts from the role of innovation in generating 
new knowledge and assumes that knowledge accumulation occurs solely through 
transfers of existing knowledge from technologically advanced countries. Drawing on 
the concept of FDI spillovers, diffusion is modelled as a function of the presence of 
foreign capital in the economy.
The rate of knowledge diffusion is specified as increasing in the proportion of the 
capital stock owned by foreigners. This assumption is justified on the basis that a 
greater proportional representation of foreign entrepreneurs gives rise to greater 
opportunities for spillovers. Another important feature of the model is that knowledge 
diffusion is increasing in the size of the technology gap between the host economy and 
the global technology frontier. This assumption is made on the basis that a larger gap 
provides the greatest opportunities for catch up.
A more recent theoretical contribution by Baldwin et al. (2005) emphasises the role of 
FDI in generating knowledge spillovers in the innovation process. A feature of the 
model is that it combines elements of traditional endogenous growth theory and FDI 
theory, outlined above in sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. The result is a holistic 
framework in which both the growth mechanism and the decision of firms to 
internationalise production and become MNEs is endogenised.
The model comprises two representative economies, which each feature two sectors of 
production. The first is an innovation sector where knowledge capital is created and the
22 Wang (1990) builds on this model by integrating the spillover concept into a general equilibrium 
framework where FDI flows between two representative economies are determined by arbitrage 
conditions.
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second a final goods sector. The production of final goods is assumed to require 
knowledge capital which is not readily tradeable in international markets. Therefore, in 
order to supply particular products to foreign markets, firms must either export finished 
products or undertake FDI to establish foreign production facilities. The intermediate 
option of licensing production knowledge to foreign firms is not considered.
The decision by a MNE to enter a foreign market depends on the profitability of 
choosing to remain a local firm and supply the home market only, compared with 
supplying international markets through exports or a foreign production facility. For a 
given level of demand in both the home and foreign markets, the profitability of selling 
abroad is determined by two competing factors. On the one hand, firms face fixed costs 
in establishing foreign production facilities that reduce the profitability of selling to the 
foreign market through FDI. On the other hand, high export costs, which may reflect 
transport costs as well as policy induced trade barriers, reduce the profitability of 
exporting. In summary, there is a two stage decision making process faced by firms; 
first whether to supply the foreign market and if so through exports or the establishment 
of a foreign affiliate.
As in the model of endogenous technological change by Römer (1990), growth is 
assumed to arise solely from the accumulation of knowledge generated in the innovation 
sector. Building on the FDI spillovers hypothesis, the creation of new knowledge 
capital is assumed to be a function of the inputs of labour as well as existing knowledge 
capital owned by both domestic and foreign investors. Therefore, the presence of 
foreign firms is assumed to support local innovation capacity by making available 
foreign knowledge for the domestic innovation process. Spillovers occurring in the 
innovation sector are assumed to take two forms. The first relate to within sector 
spillovers, characterised by Arrow (1962) and Römer (1986), and the second, cross 
sector spillovers advocated by Jacobs (1969). The latter reflect learning by local firms 
from foreign producers in other sectors.
An unresolved issue highlighted by the different approaches to modelling the growth 
effects of FDI by Findlay (1978) and Baldwin et al. (2005) is whether FDI augments 
domestic innovation or merely aids technological convergence. If the Findlay 
‘convergence’ specification is correct then one might expect significant FDI spillovers 
in technologically laggard countries but not necessarily in industrialised countries where
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most local firms are presumably operating close to the global frontier. In contrast the 
Baldwin et al. (2005) approach assumes that all countries will always benefit from FDI, 
irrespective of their technological status, by virtue of FDI related spillovers supporting 
domestic innovation.
As discussed in section 3.5 of chapter 3, the empirical evidence suggests that FDI can 
have a productivity enhancing effect in both developing and industrialised countries, 
consistent with Baldwin et al. (2005). Nevertheless, it is not possible to refute the 
Findlay (1978) hypothesis on the basis of these results. If technologies are firm 
specific, it is possible that firms in some less developed countries will have access to 
technologies unavailable to firms in more developed countries. In this case FDI may 
facilitate productivity convergence at the firm level.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter discusses key aspects of generic FDI and growth theory, as well as theories 
of how FDI contributes to growth. It was noted that FDI represents a unique form of 
international capital exchange which provides the means for an investor to gain 
managerial control of a foreign firm. Theories seeking to explain FDI focus on the 
advantages of maintaining managerial control of firm assets. They also illustrate how 
market seeking or cost minimisation motivates give rise to multinational affiliates that 
are aligned vertically or horizontally within a MNE’s supply chain.
The discussion of growth theory focused on theories of knowledge accumulation and 
diffusion. Motivated by the inadequacies of the Solow-Swan model, the aim of 
knowledge based endogenous growth models is to provide an analytical framework that 
aims to identify sources of new knowledge and the manner in which this is used to drive 
growth. In models of disembodied knowledge, new knowledge is hypothesised to flow 
from either a learning by doing process or research and development. Since knowledge 
is only partially excludible and non-rivalrous in consumption, knowledge may diffuse 
from the source of innovation to other innovators and final users. There are, however, 
likely to be many barriers to knowledge diffusion, especially across national boundaries.
Since FDI provides managerial control of assets across national boundaries, it facilitates 
international knowledge diffusion. This has profound implications for how FDI affects 
host country production and enhances host country productivity. Like other forms of
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international investment, FDI facilitates capital deepening. Unlike other international 
capital exchanges, FDI gives rise to the presence of MNE affiliates that bring about 
many changes in the operating environment of the host country. These include 
increasing the intensity of market competition and providing new opportunities for local 
suppliers to expand the scale of production. In addition, MNE affiliates provide 
opportunities for the transfer of new technology to local firms, including through 
spillovers which come about through a variety of market interactions.
Having provided a broad review of relevant theory, the next chapter focuses on 
hypotheses relating to heterogeneous patterns of MNE production and growth effects of 
FDI, including the existing empirical evidence.
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Appendix 2.1 The Solow-Swan growth model
The neo-classical model of economic growth developed by Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956) provides the cornerstone of growth theory. Despite its simple construction, it 
provides a framework for analysing the dynamics of output, including how an economy 
evolves to a steady-state equilibrium and balanced growth path. The model also 
generates two key hypotheses which continue to be debated today. First, in the long 
run, the accumulation of physical capital will only generate changes in the level, rather 
than growth of output per worker. Second, the model provides one possible theoretical 
basis for the notion of conditional convergence, a hypothesis that is found to have 
considerable empirical support.
To begin, a representative economy produces output Y using inputs of physical capital 
K, labour L, and technology A. Output is assumed to feature constant returns to scale 
and diminishing marginal returns to each input. In per worker form, the output function 
can be expressed as:
y t =A,k,a 0 < a < 1 (A2.1)
where y  represents output per worker and k capital per worker. From equation A2.1 it is 
evident that per worker output can only be increased through changes in the technology 
parameter or the capital-labour ratio.
Labour and technology are both assumed to grow at constant, exogenously determined 
rates of n and g respectively. The single good produced in the economy is assumed to 
be fungible, used for both consumption and investment, and in each period a fixed 
amount of output (s) is saved. Each unit of saved output is then assumed to yield one 
unit of new capital, but in each period a fixed percentage of the existing capital stock is 
lost to depreciation. Hence, the evolution of the stocks of capital, labour and 
technology can be represented by the following differential equations:
K, = sYt -  5Kt (A2.2)
II 3 (A2.3)
boII
•^f (A2.4)
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where S is the constant depreciation rate and the dot script represents the rate of change 
with respect to time. From equation A2.2 we can derive the following expression for 
the evolution of the capital labour ratio:
{A,k ° )~ (n + S + ^ )K (A2.5)
To understand how the rate of savings is determined a utility maximising decision is 
added to the production side of the economy (Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and 
Koopmans (1965)). For simplicity, it can be assumed that consumers seek to maximise 
the objective function:
where c represents consumption and p a discount factor or rate of time preference. It is 
assumed that p is a positive constant, meaning that future consumption is valued less 
than consumption today. Output is either consumed by households or saved. By 
assuming a constant depreciation rate S, growth of the per worker capital stock can be 
expressed by:
This equation represents the constraint faced by households. By choosing to consume 
more today, agents reduce the level of savings and therefore the amount of capital 
available for future production, which in turn implies lower future consumption. 
Conversely, by deferring consumption today, agents generate greater savings and higher 
future levels of production and consumption.
Together, equations A2.6 and A2.7 define the dynamic optimisation problem faced by 
households. To solve this problem a present value Hamiltonian can be defined as 
follows:
(A2.6)
o
(A2.7)
(A2.8)
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From this the following first order conditions for utility maximisation are derived:
dc, ct
(A2.9)
dH At(ak?- '-S-p)=-A (A2.10)
dk,
This system of equations can be simplified by taking the logs of equation A2.9 and 
differentiating with respect to time. Further manipulation yields the following 
expression for the optimal growth rate of consumption (the Euler equation):
The first two terms on the right hand side of equation A2.11 represent the marginal 
product of capital net of depreciation. Therefore, the optimal path of consumption 
represents the difference between the net marginal productivity of capital and the 
discount rate of households. When the discount rate and net marginal product of capital 
are equal, the optimal consumption path will be flat. That is, the optimal growth of 
consumption through time will be zero. Households will only move from this path if 
their discount rate differs from the net marginal product of capital. For example, if the 
discount rate is higher (lower) than the net marginal product of capital, it will be optimal 
for household consumption to fall (increase) through time.
Returning to the determinants of the capital labour ratio and output, the first term on the 
right hand side of equation A2.5 represents savings per worker while the second term 
represents net depreciation. Net depreciation is the combined negative impact on the 
level of capital per worker brought about by depreciation, technological change and 
population growth. The steady-state equilibrium is defined by a constant capital labour 
ratio, which in equation A2.6 is the point at which the savings rate is sufficient to 
exactly offset net depreciation. In the steady-state, aggregate output and the stocks of 
capital and labour grow at a constant rate, defined by the rate of population growth plus 
the rate of technological change. This implies that in the steady-state the rate of growth 
of output per worker is equal to the rate of technological change.
—  =  ak“ 1 -  S -  p (A2.ll)
c
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Holding the level of technology constant, changes in the capital labour ratio will be 
brought about through changes in the savings rate. Specifically, when savings per 
worker is greater (less) than net depreciation the capital labour ratio will rise (fall), 
leading to a rise (fall) in output per worker. Significantly, this growth effect resulting 
from an increase in the savings rate is not permanent. Upon reaching the new steady- 
state equilibrium, growth in the capital labour ratio and therefore output per worker, 
returns to zero.
The result that in the long run, increases in the capital labour ratio brought about by 
capital accumulation will only generate changes in the level, rather than growth of 
output per worker is one of the most significant implications of the Solow-Swan model. 
This result provides the theoretical underpinning for the hypothesis that capital 
accumulation, brought about through savings and investment, cannot alone provide a 
source of long run growth. An expansion along a balanced growth path requires 
exogenous growth in technology. With technology growing at a constant rate g, output 
per worker will also grow at this rate. Hence, in the long run growth in output per 
worker in the Solow-Swan model depends on the rate of exogenous technological 
change.
According to the Solow-Swan model, all economies will converge to a steady-state 
growth rate dependent on the rates of population growth and exogenous technological 
change. The model does, however, predict different growth rates during the transition 
to steady-state equilibrium following changes in the capital labour ratio. From equation 
A2.5 the rate of change of the capital labour ratio depends on the magnitude of the 
difference between the savings rate and net depreciation. Therefore, the larger this 
difference, the faster will be the rate of increase of the capital labour ratio and rate of 
increase of output per worker.
This result provides the theoretical basis for the notion of classical conditional 
convergence, which states that the rate of growth during the move towards the steady- 
state will be proportional to the difference between the current capital labour ratio and 
its steady-state equilibrium level. However, conditional convergence does not imply 
that low productivity countries will necessarily experience faster transitionary growth.
It is possible that a low productivity country will grow slowly, even compared with a
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higher productivity country, if its steady-state equilibrium is achieved at a low level of 
per capita output that reflects a low savings rate.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous multinational production and growth effects 
of foreign direct investment: theory and empirical evidence
3.1 Introduction
Many generic theories of FDI and growth implicitly assume that every dollar of 
investment generates precisely the same impact on the host economy. There is, 
however, a growing body of literature which argues that different patterns of 
multinational production, determined by prevailing host country factors, will have 
heterogeneous growth effects on the host country. This thesis aims to present new 
empirical insights on these issues and the objective of this chapter is to articulate the 
relevant theories and present a review of the existing empirical literature.
The first insights on how host country policies could affect MNE production and the 
growth effects of FDI were provided by Bhagwati (1973; 1978; 1985). He argued that 
trade policies alter the incentives for import substitution production which affects the 
allocative efficiency of MNE production. Later, using a static analysis framework 
Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), showed that it is possible for an expansion in 
import competing production driven by FDI to lead to a net reduction in national 
income.
More recently, a number of contributions including Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), 
Borensztein et al. (1998) and Moran (1998; 2001), argue that other differences in 
multinational production, influenced by a broader range of host country factors, can 
influence the growth effects of FDI. These analyses draw on theories of FDI to 
highlight how host country factors influence the nature of MNE production. They also 
draw on elements of endogenous growth theory, to explain the consequences of these 
different forms of production for the host country. Many host country factors shape 
MNE production and therefore influence the growth effects of FDI. However, host 
country trade and FDI policies, along with investments in human capital, are 
particularly important.
23 Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) refer to the hypothesis linking trade polices with the growth effects of 
FDI as the ‘Bhagwati hypothesis’. However, the precise mechanisms linking policies with gains from 
FDI articulated by Bhagwati differ from the more recent contributions. Most notably, earlier work by 
Bhagwati does not canvass FDI related spillovers which are central to understanding how FDI impacts on 
the host economy.
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As discussed in chapter 2, the role of FDI as a conduit for technology transfer is at the 
cornerstone of many theories of FDI and growth. Drawing on this idea, one hypothesis 
concerning heterogeneous growth effects of FDI contends that host country factors 
affect the flow of technology transfer through FDI. Absorptive capacity alters the costs 
of technology transfer to MNE affiliates and therefore the quantity of technology 
transfers. Absorptive capacity also affects the ability of local firms to learn from the 
presence of technologically superior foreign affiliates. In addition, it is argued that host 
country trade and FDI policies influence incentives for technology transfer to 
multinational affiliates by altering the degree of host country market competition the 
risks that MNEs face when transferring proprietary assets abroad.
A second hypothesis is that higher export orientation amongst MNE affiliates is more 
conducive to promoting host country growth and that host country policies influence the 
export orientation of MNE production.24 Export oriented multinational production is 
hypothesised to be more beneficial to the host country owing to technological 
superiority, larger scale operations and higher quality linkages with local suppliers, all 
of which increase the prospect of FDI spillovers. At the same time, theories of FDI 
suggest that more liberal trade and FDI policies, amongst other factors, will tend to 
increase the export orientation of multinational production by deterring horizontal FDI 
and encouraging vertical FDI.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section focuses on 
theories and empirical evidence on technology transfer occurring through FDI, 
focussing on the role of host country factors. Section 3.3 discusses why MNE export 
production is particularly beneficial for the host country while section 3.4 examines 
theories and empirical evidence of how host country factors impact on MNE export 
orientation. In section 3.5 a review of empirical studies of FDI spillovers and growth is 
presented, focussing on those which consider the role of host country factors. Section 
3.6 concludes while the results from a number of FDI spillover and growth studies are 
summarised in an appendix.
24 The export orientation of FDI reflects the quantity of vertical FDI a country receives relative to the 
quantity of horizontal FDI. Similarly, the export orientation of multinational production refers to the 
magnitude of multinational affiliate output exported relative to the magnitude of affiliate output sold to 
the host country market.
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3.2 Determinants of technology transfer to MNE affiliates
The discussion in the previous chapter highlights technology transfer as an important 
channel linking FD1 and growth. FDI gives rise to the presence of technologically 
superior and more productive MNE affiliates which may facilitate technology spillovers 
to local firms. This section focuses on how host country factors might influence these 
links by examining the determinants of technology transfer associated with FDI.
Understanding the factors that influence flows of technology is important for two 
reasons. First, the magnitude of technology transfer to MNE affiliates will influence the 
productivity of affiliates and the scope for spillovers to local firms, by determining the 
pool of new technology potentially available (Findlay 1978). Second, host country 
absorptive capacity influences the ability of local firms to access a given stock of 
technology used by MNE affiliates. The following discussion examines theory and 
empirical evidence and is organized around three sets of host country factors cited in 
existing studies as influencing technology flows. These are absorptive capacity, FDI 
policies and host country market competition.
3.2.1 Absorptive capacity
The idea that absorptive capacity influences technology transfer to MNE affiliates and 
spillovers to local firms can be viewed as one particular element of the broader 
absorptive capacity hypothesis concerning growth and knowledge diffusion discussed in 
the previous chapter. In the context of FDI, however, absorptive capacity has a distinct 
interpretation. Namely, supply side factors may constrain the diffusion and utilisation 
of superior technology made available through MNEs. This includes both constraints 
on the ability of MNE affiliates to introduce new technology available from the parent 
company and constraints on the ability of local firms to acquire new technology from 
MNE affiliates. Accordingly, while FDI flows may provide a potential conduit for 
international technology diffusion such transfers may not occur without sufficient 
absorptive capacity.
As noted in chapter 2, a common interpretation of absorptive capacity is premised on 
the complementarity between human capital and disembodied technology. This arises 
from better educated workers being more adept at using new technology and being more 
likely to incorporate technological advances in to their working routine at a faster rate.
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As a consequence the greater availability of educated workers is likely to reduce the 
cost of technology transfer to MNE affiliates (Wang and Blomstrom 1992).
More specifically, higher absorptive capacity may diminish the need to invest in special 
training for local workers when introducing new production techniques, or such training 
may be less costly. Alternatively, it may mean that required technical services sourced 
by foreign affiliates from local firms are less costly and more readily available.
Likewise, for local firms sufficient absorptive capacity will mean that local 
entrepreneurs and their workers have the ability to learn and implement new technical 
aspects of foreign affiliated production more readily and at a lower cost.
The role of human capital in facilitating the introduction of new technology from 
foreign investors is formalised in a model of knowledge driven growth by Borensztein 
et al. (1998). Employing a product variety approach, the rate of growth in final output 
is contingent upon the rate at which new varieties of intermediate capital goods are 
introduced. It is assumed that no domestic innovation is undertaken so all new varieties 
are sourced from abroad by foreign investors. The process of sourcing and installing 
new technology is assumed to be costly and the decision to install is based on a 
profitability condition. Human capital helps to facilitate technology transfer by raising 
the marginal product of new varieties of intermediate goods and therefore the number of 
varieties that meet the profitability condition.
In a model that employs a similar setup Glass and Saggi (1998) highlight a role for local 
research and development capacity rather than the embodied knowledge of local 
workers. Technology transferred through FDI is disaggregated into low and high 
technology. MNE investments associated with the former can be located anywhere but 
high technology investments can only viably be located in countries with at least a basic 
research and development capacity where the costs associated with technology transfer 
are lower. Hence, this approach is premised on the idea that a threshold level of 
indigenous technological capability is required before the introduction of new 
technologies is viable.
Building on the social capability idea of Abramovitz (1986), recent studies have
suggested that other supply side factors, in addition to human capital and research and
development capability, influence absorptive capacity for FDI. For example,
Alfaro et al. (2004) argue that financial sector development is important in ensuring
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technology diffusion through FDI. They present a model where local entrepreneurs 
establish new indigenous enterprises which utilise newly acquired technology from 
MNE affiliates. The establishment of these new enterprises requires venture capital, 
borrowed through domestic financial markets. If borrowing costs are prohibitive due to 
a lack of local financial sector development, new enterprises will fail to emerge and 
technology diffusion amongst local firms will not occur.
Evidence from both case studies and formal econometric analysis supports the notion 
that higher human capital enhances technology transfer to multinational affiliates. Case 
studies support the importance of human capital for technology transfer by highlighting 
the role of human capital in allowing both MNE affiliates and their local suppliers to 
introduce new innovations and establish new production facilities. McKendrick et al. 
(2000) argue that the availability of adequate human capital was an important factor in 
attracting US electronics firms to establish production in Singapore. In addition, a 
strong human capital base allowed foreign manufacturers to diversify the nature of 
production in to more complex and technologically sophisticated lines.
Rasiah (1994) highlights the importance of local subcontractors upgrading their 
technical and human capital base in order to supply foreign affiliates in the Malaysian 
electronics industry. This was especially true for many local suppliers that began as 
small family run businesses and maintained an owner-manager structure. As the 
presence of foreign operators expanded through the 1980s these small operators were 
required to expand their technical capabilities to maintain contracts to supply 
increasingly sophisticated products and meet more exacting standards.
Formal empirical analysis using firm or industry level data also supports the absorptive 
capacity hypothesis with a number of studies reporting a statistically significant effect 
from various measures of human capital on technology transfer to MNE affiliates. 
Blomstrom et al. (1994a) examine the determinants of technology transfer to MNE 
affiliates in Mexico. Using technology payments by MNE affiliates as a proxy for 
technology transfer they find that alternative measures of human capital including 
wages and the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar workers both exert a positive influence 
on technology transfer. Urata and Kawai (2000) also find that the level of technology 
transfer from Japanese MNEs to their foreign affiliates is robustly correlated with the 
level of host country human capital.
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3.2.2 Foreign direct investment policies
Restrictive FDI policies reduce incentives for technology transfer by weakening 
managerial control of MNE affiliates. In this respect, one of the most detrimental 
policies for technology transfer highlighted in a number of industry and firm level 
studies are joint venture requirements. These policies require that foreign affiliates 
comprise a proportion of local equity and therefore prohibit MNEs from establishing 
wholly foreign owned affiliates. Foreign investors may be less willing to transfer 
propriety assets to joint ventures for two reasons. First, the parent company may have 
concerns about knowledge leaking from the affiliate to a rival firm. This idea is 
consistent with the internalisation motive for FDI where direct investment is undertaken 
specifically to limit the potential for rival firms to gain access to their propriety 
knowledge (Beamish 1988).
Second, technology transfer may be less profitable under a joint venture arrangement 
(Ramachandran 1993). In considering whether to undertake costly technology transfer a 
parent company faces a trade off between these costs and the higher revenue stream 
generated by giving an affiliate a greater technological advantage. Where technology 
transfer costs are fixed and profits diluted due to shared ownership, there will be less of 
an incentive to undertake technology transfer.
There is considerable evidence that joint ventures receive less technology compared 
with wholly foreign owned MNE affiliates, supporting the hypothesis that joint venture 
requirements deter technology transfer. More limited direct evidence is also reported on 
the adverse impact of other forms of restrictive FDI policies. One of the first empirical 
studies to consider these issues is Mansfield and Romeo (1980) who examine how the 
ownership structure of MNE affiliates affects the timing, and therefore vintage of 
technology transferred by MNE parent companies.
In this study data on technology transfer is compiled from interviews with managerial 
personnel employed by a sample of US MNEs. They report that the average lag for 
technology transfer to foreign production facilities is significantly lower for wholly
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owned affiliates as compared with joint ventures. Hence, the results suggest that wholly
9 cforeign owned affiliates benefit from new innovations faster.
A more formal assessment of this issue, which controls for other determinants of 
technology transfer, is provided by Ramachandran (1993) who uses Indian firm level 
data. In this study, technology transfer from the parent company to the affiliate is 
proxied using the number of staff exchanges occurring between the MNE parent and its 
affiliate each time an agreement relating to technology transfer takes place. More staff 
exchanges reflect greater resources and effort on behalf of the parent company to 
transfer technology to the affiliate. Using this proxy, she finds that fully foreign owned 
MNE affiliates are the beneficiaries of more technology transfer from their parent 
companies.
Similar findings are reported in studies using cross-country MNE affiliate data.
Desai et al. (2004) use data on technology related payments for US foreign affiliates 
operating in a number of different countries. They find that the degree of foreign 
ownership of the affiliate is an important explanatory variable with higher levels of 
foreign ownership in the affiliate exerting a positive impact on the magnitude of 
technology transfer.
Urata and Kawai (2000) use firm level data to examine the determinants of technology 
transfer from Japanese MNEs to their foreign affiliates. Rather than use technology 
related payments data they proxy technology transfer by estimating differences in the 
parent and affiliate productivity levels, for comparable production processes. They 
control for a number of factors including the share of ownership in the affiliate by the 
parent company. For the full sample they report that the coefficient on the share of 
ownership is positive and statistically significant, again suggesting that higher levels of 
foreign ownership encourages greater technology transfer.
25 In a related study, Smarzynska (2000) examines the determinants of entry mode by MNEs and finds 
that the choice of a wholly owned affiliate is favoured by higher technology firms. Vishwasrao and 
Bosshardt (2001) also provide evidence that the liberalisation of FDI policies to allow majority foreign 
ownership of affiliates spurred a rise in the amount of innovative activity undertaken by foreign affiliated 
firms in India. Although not technology transfer per se research and development by foreign affiliates is 
likely to involve the use of parent company technology. Therefore, evidence that policy reforms 
encourage greater innovative activity provides some indirect evidence that such changes also encourage 
technology transfer.
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Finally, evidence from Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) suggests that FDI policies other 
than joint venture requirements also affect technology transfer to MNE foreign 
affiliates. FDI policies are assessed using survey responses from MNE affiliates who 
report being subjected to a range of specific policy restrictions by local authorities.
These include requirements to have access to parent company patents, undertake 
training of local workers, conduct local research and development, use minimum levels 
of locally produced intermediate inputs and employ minimum levels of local workers. 
The results from different specifications show that interventionist FDI policies either 
have no impact or reduce technology transfer to MNE affiliates.
3.2.3 Market competition
In addition to absorptive capacity and FDI policies, host country market competition is 
hypothesised to influence technology transfer to MNE affiliates. The theoretical model 
of technology transfer by Blomstrom and Wang (1992) discussed in chapter 2 shows 
that an underlying motive for MNE parent companies to transfer technology to their 
affiliates is to ensure a competitive advantage over rival firms. On this basis, affiliates 
operating within a more competitive environment will receive more technology. There 
are many factors that influence market competition, including market structure and 
competition related policies. In addition, trade policies will influence the level o f 
domestic market competition by altering exposure to international competitors 
(Helpman and Krugman 1989, pp.27-46).
Empirical studies by Blomstrom et al. (1994a) and Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) 
provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that increased market competition 
encourages technology transfer to MNE affiliates. Both o f these studies use US data on 
technology payments as a proxy for technology transfer. Given the difficulties 
associated with accessing data that accurately reflects the degree of competition facing 
foreign affiliates these studies employ a range o f alternative proxies including changes 
in levels of investment and changes in the market share of domestic firms. The results 
consistently show a positive link between these proxies and levels of technology 
transfer to MNE affiliates.
3.3 The benefits of MNE export production
‘Export platform’ MNE affiliate production features a number of characteristics that
make this form of production particularly conducive to generating increases in host
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country productivity. This section outlines these arguments, drawing on a number of 
analytical contributions but especially Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) and Moran 
(1998; 2001). In section 3.4 the discussion goes further by examining how host country 
factors influence the export orientation of MNE production. Together, therefore, these 
two sections outline how host country factors impact on the growth effects of FDI by 
influencing the export orientation of MNE production.
One reason why MNE export production may be particularly beneficial to the host 
economy is technological advantage. Export oriented affiliates are more likely to have 
access to the full stock of propriety knowledge held by the MNE parent company. Like 
all exporting firms, these affiliates produce for foreign, possibly global, markets and are 
therefore likely to face more intense competition. In contrast, foreign affiliates oriented 
towards serving the local market are likely to enjoy some form of protection from 
foreign competitors, owing to trade policies or other barriers to trade
As a consequence, for export platform MNE affiliates the incentives to draw on every 
competitive advantage, including that offered by technological resources, is particularly 
strong. In addition, where these affiliates form part of an international supply chain 
their importance to the parent company increases. This provides further incentives for 
the parent company to maintain maximum managerial control and ensure that all 
resources, including the best available technology and human resources, are made 
available to each affiliate. These ideas are consistent with the model of FDI spillovers 
by Wang and Blomstrom (1992) which, as noted above, predicts that MNE affiliates 
facing the most intense market competition will receive more technology from MNE 
parent companies.
Case study evidence supports the notion that export oriented multinational production is 
more technologically advanced. Nunez (1990), for example, examines changes in the 
pattern of production in the Mexican auto industry during the 1970s and 1980s when 
production transformed from being primarily domestic oriented to a platform for 
exporting to the US market. As a result of this reorientation new foreign controlled 
facilities were established while others were either closed or modernised, to make use of
26 Here, export platform production excludes the special case of resource extraction and is therefore 
assumed to be associated with efficiency seeking FDI.
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the latest technology and product designs required to compete in the competitive US 
market.
The technological superiority of export oriented MNE production in the East Asian 
electronics industry paints a similar picture. Borrus (1994) argues that MNE affiliates 
exporting to the US were regularly upgraded to keep pace with rapid technological 
improvements and a short product cycle. In contrast, Japanese MNE affiliates that were 
established to produce for local markets tended to be much slower in responding to 
innovations. Balcat and Cornaglia (2002) also show that export oriented foreign
97affiliates in Italy tend to undertake more innovative activity.
Aside from technological superiority, export oriented affiliates will also invariably 
introduce innovations and techniques better suited to the host country. As discussed in 
chapter 2, not all innovations will necessarily benefit producers in every country. In 
particular, firms in labour abundant countries may not benefit from innovations 
designed to improve capital intensive production processes. However, in establishing 
export platform facilities, MNEs will naturally seek to locate production in countries 
with suitable factor endowments. As a consequence, export oriented FDI is more likely 
to facilitate transfers of the most suitable forms of technology.
A second factor favouring larger gains from MNE export oriented production relates to 
linkages with suppliers. Where export oriented affiliates source inputs locally, they may 
be more likely to establish the type of linkages with local firms that give rise to 
knowledge spillovers than foreign affiliates serving the host market only (Blyde et al. 
2004). For export oriented affiliates, ensuring a reliable supply of local inputs and 
maintaining quality standards are especially important within the context of 
international production. Therefore, export oriented affiliates may have a particularly 
strong desire to establish close commercial relationships with local suppliers which give 
rise to knowledge spillovers. In addition, since export oriented affiliates are less likely 
to be in direct competition with local firms, these types of affiliates are less likely to be 
apprehensive about sharing knowledge with local suppliers.
27 A detailed analysis of the nature of linkages between the parent company and a vertically integrated 
foreign affiliate is presented by Terwiesch et al. (2001). They detail extensive transfer of equipment and 
personnel for the case of a US computer manufacturer establishing a new production line at a wholly 
owned, export based production affiliate located in Singapore. To ensure the smooth introduction of the 
new product line a number of Singapore based managers and engineers spent several weeks with 
designers at the head office in the US prior to the commencement of production and was followed by a 
team of US engineers spending time in Singapore at the commencement of production.
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This hypothesis is supported by Giroud (2003) who examines backward linkages 
between MNE affiliates and local suppliers in Malaysia. Using survey information 
collected from a sizeable sample of foreign affiliated firms she identifies various types 
of cooperation between affiliates and local firms which give rise to knowledge transfer 
to local firms. These include the direct provision of training for workers employed by 
local suppliers as well as the provision of advice to technical personnel.
A binary indicator of whether foreign affiliates actively undertake some form of 
knowledge transfer is constructed and then used as the dependent variable in formal 
regression analysis. Two characteristics of foreign affiliates which are found to be 
positively correlated with the propensity to undertake knowledge transfer are the size of 
the affiliate, measured by the total number of employees, and the degree of export 
orientation, measured as the share of total output exported by the firm. Therefore, these 
results suggest that export oriented firms are more likely to establish the type of 
linkages most conducive to generating knowledge spillovers.
A final reason why multinational export platform production may be more beneficial for 
the host country is scale. As noted in chapter 2, theories of FDI and host country 
market structure emphasise the importance of MNE affiliate demand for locally 
supplied inputs as a means of facilitating productivity gains amongst local suppliers. 
Whereas affiliates established to serve the host market will be limited by the size of the 
host country market, export platform affiliates may potentially serve as the global 
production facility for an entire product line.28 Therefore, export platform production is 
likely to provide greater opportunities for local suppliers to reap economies of scale and 
introduce new varieties of intermediate inputs.
3.4 Determinants of MNE export orientation
The overall export orientation of multinational production within a given country 
represents the magnitude of MNE affiliate production engaged in exporting relative to 
local market production. MNE export orientation therefore increases (decreases) when 
export production increases (decreases) relative to local market production. Theoretical 
models of FDI discussed in chapter 2 explain the motives for MNEs establishing an 
affiliate to engage in either export platform or local market production. Therefore, by
2S For example, the rise of export based electronics manufacturing affiliates in South East Asia by US 
companies through the 1980s and 1990s saw many of them establish facilities that supplied the bulk of 
their global market (McKendrick et al. 2000, p. 136).
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pooling the predictions of these different theories it is possible to identify host country 
factors that influence the export orientation of MNE production.
To briefly recap from chapter 2, theories of vertical FDI provide the rationale for MNE 
export platform production (Helpman 1984). In this framework, elements of a vertically 
separable supply chain are relocated offshore, giving rise to vertically integrated 
affiliates which export their output. The primary motive for establishing this type of 
production facility is to enable access to lower cost factors of production which are not 
readily tradeable, especially labour. Importantly, however, since this type of production 
is not tied to a particular location it will also be attracted to countries which offer 
advantages in respect to the broader operating environment.
An alterative set of theories highlights the motives for establishing MNE affiliates to 
produce for the local market (Markusen 1984). Where trade costs are sufficiently high 
and where firm level economies of scale sufficiently large, it will be more cost effective 
for the parent company to serve a foreign market through locally owned production 
facilities, rather than exporting from the home country. When the predictions of these 
theories are pooled it is evident that three broad sets of variables are likely to influence 
the overall export orientation of multinational production. These are market size and 
factors costs, trade costs and the operating environment. The following section 
considers these factors in more detail and canvasses the existing empirical evidence.
3.4.1 Market size and factor costs
Horizontal models of FDI predict that larger markets will attract more local market 
MNE production. In contrast, there are no fundamental reasons why export production 
should be influenced by host country size. Together, this suggests that larger host 
market size will tend to reduce the export orientation of MNE production.
However, the empirical evidence on the impact of host country market size on export 
orientation is mixed. Using data on the export orientation of US MNE affiliates, and 
GDP as a proxy for market size, Kumar (1998) and Markusen and Maskus (1999) report 
a strong negative effect, consistent with theory. Hanson et al. (2001) report that GDP is 
also negatively correlated with export orientation although the significance of this effect 
disappears when additional explanatory variables are added. Counter intuitively, in a 
study focussing on MNE affiliates located in developing countries, Shatz (2004) finds
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some evidence of a positive impact between export orientation and GDP. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that factors relating to export capacity in developing 
countries, including infrastructure, are positively correlated with GDP.
As noted, vertical models of FDI predict that countries with lower factor cost will attract 
more export platform production. While local market production may also be attracted 
by lower costs at the margin, the impact is argued to be weaker owing to the primacy of 
market access for this type of production compared with the footloose nature of export 
platform production. For example, if production costs in a particular host country rise 
relative to production costs in other countries the parent company may opt to serve the 
local market through exports, rather than a local affiliate. Flowever, exporting may not 
always be viable, not only because of trade barriers but also because gaining effective 
market access may require a local presence by the MNE. Therefore, lower factor costs 
are expected to exert a stronger influence on export production and increase overall 
export orientation.
In an early study employing data on US MNE affiliates, Kravis and Lipsey (1982) 
examine the determinants of export platform production. They control for labour costs 
using a measure of unit labour costs and report that this is positively correlated with 
export production, contrary to the predictions of models of vertical FDI. Braconier et 
al. (2005) examine the impact of wages for both low and high skilled worker wages on 
local market and export production. Surprisingly, like Kravis and Lipsey (1982), they 
find a positive relationship between high skilled wages and all forms of production. 
However, the coefficient on low skilled workers is negative and larger for export 
production. This is consistent with models of vertical FDI and the hypothesis that 
export production is more sensitive to wage costs than local market production. Further 
support for this hypothesis is provided by Kumar (1994; 1998) and Shatz (2004) who 
report that alternative wage based proxies of labour costs exert a negative impact on 
MNE export orientation.
An important counterpart to labour costs is labour quality and a number of studies 
include human capital related control variables. In addition to controlling for wages 
Shatz (2004) includes a measure of the average level of host country educational 
attainment. Surprisingly, he reports weak evidence that this variable exerts a negative 
influence on export orientation. Hanson et al. (2001) find that export orientation tends
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to be lower in higher skilled industries, indicating that export production may be 
focussed in labour intensive sectors. Therefore, it is possible the findings by Shatz 
(2004) reflect the effects of industry composition.
3.4.2 Trade costs
Models of horizontal FDI predict that higher trade costs will encourage local market 
production. At the same time, higher trade costs are likely to deter export platform 
production, some of which relies on imported inputs, including intermediates produced 
by other vertically integrated affiliates. Therefore, higher trade costs, which reflect both 
transport costs and trade policies, will tend to reduce export orientation.
Consistent with theory, many empirical studies report strong evidence that greater 
openness to trade increases MNE export orientation. Using US data, studies report that 
trade to GDP ratio based measures of openness are positively correlated with both 
exports and export orientation (Kravis and Lipsey 1982; Kumar 1998). Studies using 
different measures of trade policies report similar findings. This includes Shatz (2004), 
who employs the composite measure of trade openness by Sachs and Warner (1995), 
and Hanson et al. (2001) who apply data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Kumur 
(1998) also reports evidence that export processing zones encourage export orientation 
while Shatz (2004) finds mixed evidence on the impact of free trade agreements.
Various proxy variables have been used to capture trade costs. Hanson et al. (2001) 
proxy trade costs faced by US MNE affiliates using distance to the US and find no 
evidence of a significant effect. Shatz (2004) experiments with two different proxies 
which produce statistically significant results. The first is a trade cost measure based on 
the difference between free on board and freight and insurance inclusive trade values. 
This variable is negatively correlated with export orientation, as expected. The second 
measure is a geographic based proxy which reflects access to sea transport. This 
variable is positively correlated with export orientation, again consistent with the 
prediction that lower trade costs increase export orientation.
3.4.3 Operating environment
Like lower factor costs, a superior operating environment, including a commitment to 
liberal FDI policies, is expected to attract MNE export production. This factor is likely 
to be particularly important where export platform affiliates form part of a complex
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international supply chain. Under this arrangement, the success of the entire production 
line hinges on the reliable functioning of each and every affiliate. Therefore, the parent 
firm will want to locate affiliates where the prospect of production disruptions and 
managerial interference is lowest.
A superior operating environment might also attract greater host country market 
production, at the margin. However, as with the impact of lower input costs, the effect 
is expected to be stronger for export platform production owing to the primacy of 
market access for host country market production and the footloose nature of export 
platform production. Hence, superior operating environments are expected to increase 
MNE export orientation.
The impact of a range of factors that shape the broader operating environment on MNE 
export orientation has been assessed in empirical studies. As with many other studies of 
MNE export orientation, these draw on data for US MNE affiliates. Hanson et al.
(2001) and Shatz (2004) both report some evidence that higher corporate taxes are 
associated with lower export orientation. However, Kumur (1994) finds little evidence 
of broader incentives, including fiscal incentives, impacting on export orientation.
FDI policies also constitute an important element of the operating environment for 
MNE affiliates. However, relatively few studies examine this issue closely. Kumar 
(1994) employs a general indicator of policy restrictions based on the survey responses 
of US MNE affiliate management. These provide information on whether local 
authorities prescribe measures such as local content requirements and restrictive 
employment regulations. Surprisingly little evidence is found to suggest these policies 
affect MNE export orientation. However, using a broader indicator of investment 
policies, Shatz (2004) reports evidence that more restrictive FDI policies reduce 
multinational export orientation.29
29 Indirect evidence of ownership restrictions reducing export orientation is provided by Asiedu and 
Esfahani (2001), who examine the determinants of the ownership structure of foreign affiliates. After 
controlling for several production characteristics and host country factors they find that vertically 
integrated foreign affiliates, that is those involved in exporting, are more likely to be wholly foreign 
owned.
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3.5 Host country factors and heterogeneous growth effects of foreign direct 
investment: empirical evidence
The empirical literature which examines the impact of FDI on host country productivity 
can be divided in to three broad groups.30 All studies are, implicitly at least, linked by 
the theories of FDI and productivity growth outlined above and in the previous chapter. 
The first aims to identify FDI spillovers, by examining the impact of FDI on the 
productivity of local firms using firm or industry level data. The second uses 
aggregated national data to examine the impact of FDI on the economy at large.
A third group of studies examine FDI spillovers using a framework pioneered by Coe 
and Helpman (1995). This involves regressing national productivity levels on foreign 
research and development expenditures, weighted by bilateral FDI flows. This 
methodology aims to capture the idea that spillovers occurring through FDI will be 
larger where FDI originates in high innovation countries (see for example Lichtenberg 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001)).
The general picture from both micro- and macro-level studies is that while there is some 
evidence in support of FDI enhancing productivity, this effect is not uniform. In some 
cases evidence of highly significant productivity effects have been reported while in 
others the evidence is much weaker. Some studies even report evidence of a negative 
impact on local productivity, consistent with a market stealing or growth immiserizing 
hypothesis. This general picture of heterogeneous growth effects from FDI is consistent 
with the hypotheses outlined above that emphasise the importance of host country 
factors and a growing number of studies have attempted to evaluate these, with mixed 
results. A brief overview of both micro- and macro-level studies is presented in the 
following section.
3.5.1 Microeconomic level empirical evidence
In recent years there has been a surge in the number of studies examining the existence 
of FDI spillovers using firm or industry level data. The most common methodology
30 A recent empirical study which employs a different approach altogether is by Branstetter (2006).
Rather than inferring the presence of FDI spillovers through a productivity effect, this study directly tests 
whether foreign investment aids knowledge production using data on patent citations. The methodology 
is based on the idea that if FDI facilitates knowledge diffusion then local firms should be more exposed to 
the innovative activities of foreign firms and be more likely to cite the patents of foreign investors when 
lodging their own patent applications. Using firm level data for Japanese foreign affiliates located in the 
US, Branstetter (2006) reports evidence that FDI facilitates knowledge diffusion both from foreign 
affiliates to local firms and from local firms to foreign affiliates.
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used involves testing whether the presence of foreign affiliated firms has any significant 
impact on the productivity performance of locally owned firms, controlling for other 
determinants of productivity.31 In studies of this nature the proxy used to capture 
foreign presence varies but is usually measured using the foreign share of employment, 
assets or sales within an industry. Evidence of a positive impact on local firm or 
industry productivity arising from the presence of foreign operators is interpreted as 
evidence supporting the existence of productivity enhancing FDI spillovers. A 
summary of studies employing this methodology is presented in the appendix.
This field of research was pioneered by Caves (1974) and Globerman (1979) who found 
evidence of positive FDI spillovers using data on MNE affiliates located in Australia 
and Canada respectively. Later, Blomstrom and Persson (1983) found evidence of 
positive spillovers using data for Mexico, representing the first examination of FDI 
spillovers in a developing country context. These and many studies that followed 
employed cross section data, often using aggregated industry level data.
A limitation of using cross section data is that it does not allow for the consideration of 
dynamic relationships which may be important in the context of identifying spillovers. 
Linkages between domestic and foreign firms that give rise to spillovers may take time 
to establish while learning by doing associated with knowledge spillovers may not be 
instantaneous (Liu forthcoming). In addition, panel data provides the usual benefits of 
allowing for the control of unobservable firm or industry heterogeneity.
Seeking to exploit these advantages, a number of studies have built on the early 
literature by employing panel data. A noticeable pattern in the results reported from 
these panel data studies compared with the early cross-section studies is that evidence of 
positive spillovers is generally less pervasive. Indeed some panel studies report 
evidence of negative spillovers. These include Haddad and Flarrison (1993), Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) who use data from Morocco, 
Venezuela and the Czech Republic respectively.
31 Other studies have used a variant on this approach to examine how a foreign presence has other indirect 
effects on local firms, including plant survival (Gorg and Strobl 2003) and the propensity for local firms 
to export (Greenaway et al. 2004).
32 For surveys of this literature see Caves (1996), Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), Lipsey (2002) and Gorg 
and Greenaway (2003). Gorg and Strobl (2001) draw on a number of studies to undertake a meta­
analysis of results.
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Aside from the use of panel data, an important recent development in this literature has 
been attempts to separately identify the existence of spillovers within sectors (horizontal 
spillovers) and across sectors (vertical spillovers). By examining the impact of foreign 
presence on the productivity of local firms operating within the same sector earlier 
studies restrict the analysis to examining the presence of horizontal spillovers only.
This represents a considerable methodological limitation given the motives of direct 
investors.
As discussed in chapter 2, one of the primary motives for undertaking FDI is to limit 
diffusion of proprietary knowledge to rival firms which will typically operate within the 
same sector. This suggests affiliates will work hard to prevent horizontal spillovers. At 
the same time, however, there may be sound reasons for affiliates to share knowledge 
with suppliers and customers in other sectors, if for example doing so leads to 
improvements in the quality or variety of locally supplied intermediates (Pack and Saggi 
2001). On this basis, one might expect stronger evidence of knowledge spillovers 
across sectors compared to within sectors (Javorcik 2004).
Testing for vertical spillovers involves an extension of the method used to test 
horizontal spillovers outlined above. However, rather than merely assessing the impact 
on local firm productivity of foreign affiliates operating within the same sector, the 
presence of foreign affiliates located in other sectors is also examined. To proxy the 
strength of inter-sector linkages, data on inter firm trade from input-output matrices are 
used to weight the foreign presence in upstream or downstream sectors. Therefore this 
approach captures the idea that inter-sector spillovers will be larger where inter-sector 
trade between foreign affiliates and local firms is largest, and where the presence of 
foreign affiliates is most pervasive.
To date, studies employing this technique have used data for developing countries 
including Lopez-Cordova (2003) for Mexico, Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania, Kugler 
(2006) for Columbia, Bwalya (2006) for Zambia, and Liu (forthcoming) for China. For 
industrialised countries, Driffield et al. (2002) examine vertical spillovers using UK 
data. Significantly, these studies consistently report evidence of vertical spillovers, in 
many cases for both forward and backward linkages. In contrast, evidence of horizontal 
spillovers is invariably weaker.
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A small but growing number of empirical studies test the absorptive capacity hypothesis 
outlined above in section 3.2.1. These studies use a simple extension to the spillover 
methodology pioneered by Caves (1974). This involves testing whether spillovers are 
contingent on the technology gap between local and foreign firms, which is often 
proxied using the relative productivity levels of domestic and foreign firms.
One of the first studies to apply this method is Kokko (1994). He reports a negative 
coefficient on an interaction variable comprising the technology gap and a foreign 
presence measure. The analysis is then extended to assess whether this result might be 
due to foreign affiliates using highly advanced technology. This is done by examining 
the interaction between foreign presence and technological sophistication of the foreign 
affiliate. This second interaction term is found to be insignificant suggesting that the 
use of advanced technology by foreign affiliates does not per se prevent spillovers but 
rather sufficient local firm absorptive capacity is the key.
Other studies which examine the impact of technology gaps include Sjoholm (1999b), 
who uses data for Indonesia, and Jordaan (2005), who draws on Mexican data. Both of 
these studies report that spillovers are maximised where large productivity gaps exist, 
consistent with Findlay’s (1978) idea that greater technological backwardness provides 
greater opportunities for spillovers. Finally, using UK data, Girma (2005) reports that 
positive spillovers are largest for local firms with a medium size technology gap. This 
intermediate result can be interpreted as providing mutual support for the absorptive 
capacity and advantage of backwardness hypotheses.
Recent studies have also examined whether the ownership structure of foreign affiliates 
affect the prospect of FDI spillovers. Using Indonesian data, Blomstrom and Sjoholm 
(1999) report that both minority and majority foreign owned affiliates generate 
spillovers of a similar magnitude. However, in a study using Romanian data, Javorcik 
and Spatareanu (forthcoming) report that both vertical and horizontal spillovers are 
larger with joint ventures. This result is somewhat surprising given the evidence cited 
in section 3.2.2 that wholly owned foreign affiliates tend to be more technologically 
sophisticated. The authors argue that the finding may suggest less advanced technology 
may be more readily absorbed by local firms.
Another study which examines how firm characteristics affect spillovers is by
Blyde et al. (2004) who examine the role of affiliate export orientation using firm level
70
data for Venezuela. As in other recent studies of spillovers they examine evidence of 
both horizontal and vertical spillovers and go further by dividing foreign affiliates in to 
two groups, based on whether a majority of firm output is exported. The results provide 
direct support that export oriented affiliates facilitate larger spillovers. The presence of 
all types of foreign firms is found to boost local firm productivity but the presence of 
export oriented affiliates provides an additional boost. This effect is particularly strong 
in the case of vertical linkages, consistent with the hypotheses that export oriented firms 
facilitate strong spillovers to local suppliers.
Relatively few empirical studies have directly examined whether spillovers are affected 
by the policy environment. Using data for Uruguay Kokko et al. (2001) assesses the 
impact of the host country trade regime. This is done by separating foreign firms on the 
basis of the trade regime prevailing at the time of their establishment. Specifically, 
whether firms were established before or after trade barriers were liberalised in the early 
1970s. In this way, firms are classified as being motivated by either import substituting 
or export producing considerations. Counter intuitively, the results indicate that only 
firms established under a relatively closed trade regime generate positive spillovers.
However, inferences from this result need to be made carefully. It is possible that 
differences in spillovers reflect the fact that more established firms generate higher 
spillovers due to older and more extensive relationships with domestic firms. A study 
that investigates the relevance of the trade regime using a contemporaneous approach is 
Kohpaiboon (2006). Using data for Thailand, this study examines whether trade 
barriers applying across different industries affect the prospect of spillovers.
Alternative measures of trade barriers are interacted with a measure of foreign presence 
and this term is found to be negative and statistically significant in a range 
specifications. Therefore, this result suggests higher trade barriers reduce spillovers.
3.5.2 Macroeconomic level empirical evidence
Complementing spillover studies which use micro-level data are studies which use 
aggregate FDI data to examine the economy wide impact of FDI. These studies follow 
the same general approach adopted by many growth studies of regressing some measure 
of long run growth on FDI and other relevant control variables. The role of host
33 A brief review of this literature is presented in chapter 7.
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country factors in conditioning the growth effects of FD1 has been incorporated in a 
growing number of studies which adopt this general methodology, with mixed results.
The relevance of host country factors is examined using one of two approaches. First, 
the FDI variable is interacted with a variable capturing some particular host country 
factor. Second, data on host country factors are used to divide a universal sample in to 
sub-samples of countries which are then used to derive alternative estimates using the 
same generic growth specification. In general, the results from studies adopting these 
methods tend to suggest that host country factors do matter with a number of studies 
reporting significant interaction terms and or different results from different 
sub-samples. Flowever, as is the case with many empirical growth studies, the results 
are by no means conclusive. Indeed some studies generate contradictory results. In the 
following section the key contributions in this literature are discussed while a summary 
of results is presented in the appendix.
Blomstrom et al. (1994b) test the relevance of host country absorptive capacity by 
estimating general growth equations using different country samples. They argue that a 
country’s level of development will be strongly correlated with a range of factors that 
shape absorptive capacity, including stocks of human capital. This in turn makes broad 
indicators of development such as per capita output a valid proxy for overall absorptive 
capacity. On this basis, they apply growth specifications to two groups of developing 
countries, one low and the other high income. The results support the absorptive 
capacity hypothesis with the coefficient on the FDI variable positive and statistically 
significant for the higher income group only. They also refer to tests using interaction 
terms incorporating human capital and FDI but find no significant effects using this 
approach.
Using a developing country sample Borensztein et al. (1998) find that the interaction 
between FDI and human capital is positive and significant while the FDI variable by 
itself is negative and insignificant. Consistent with the absorptive capacity hypothesis, 
these results suggest that human capital and FDI are complementary drivers of growth 
and that sufficient human capital may be a precondition for countries to benefit from 
FDI. Balasubramanyam et al. (1999) and Lipsey (2000) also report some support for 
the importance of absorptive capacity, as determined by human capital but other similar 
studies report less conclusive results.
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Blonigen and Wang (2005) extend the analysis of Borensztein et al. (1998) by adding 
industrialised countries to the sample. The results change considerably, with neither the 
FDI variable or the interaction with human capital significant for the full sample. 
Finally, Ram and Zhang (2002) focus on a sample for the 1990s, a period that saw rapid 
growth in global FDI flows, and find general support for the growth enhancing effects 
of FDI but little support for the absorptive capacity hypothesis.
In addition to human capital, other factors that might broadly reflect absorptive capacity 
have been assessed. For example, Alfaro et al. (2004) test the role of financial sector 
development. In various specifications, the FDI variable is interacted with different 
proxy measures of financial development such as domestic commercial bank assets and 
private credit. They report that the coefficient on each interaction term is positive and 
significant, supporting the importance of financial sector development. In a similar 
exercise, Hermes and Lensink (2003) also report a positive interaction. Finally,
Durham (2004) tests the relevance of institutional factors by incorporating interactions 
using proxies for the strength of property rights, the sophistication of business 
regulations and the extent of host country corruption. The interaction between FDI and 
the first two of these factors is found to be positive and significant.
The first cross-country empirical assessment of the relevance of host country policies is 
by Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) who take the approach of applying general growth 
specifications to different samples of developing countries based on the nature of the 
prevailing trade regime. Two different methods are used to divide countries into 
different sub-samples. First, countries in the full sample are ranked according to trade 
openness proxied using the ratio of trade to GDP. Next, growth rates are regressed on 
this measure of openness and structural breaks in the relationship between growth and 
openness used to identify countries with relatively open and relatively closed trade 
regimes. As an alternative to this approach, countries are also divided in to two 
sub-samples based on a World Bank classification of trade regimes.
The results suggest that trade policies are important in conditioning the growth 
enhancing effects of FDI. The coefficient on the FDI variable is found to be positive 
and statistically significant for the full sample and the sub-sample comprising countries 
with more open trade policies. In contrast, it is not statistically significant in any of the 
results based on the sub-sample comprising countries with relatively closed trade
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policies. Greenaway et al. (2007) build on this study using updated data and report 
similar findings. Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) also test the relevance of trade 
openness, as well as absorptive capacity, using panel data and interaction terms. They 
find that FD1 flows are correlated with growth and that greater openness to trade 
strengthens this relationship. In contrast, no evidence was found to support the 
absorptive capacity hypothesis.34
Carkovic and Levine (2005) argue that many empirical studies of FDI and growth are 
based on methods that do not adequately address a number of technical problems 
highlighted in the growth empirics literature. One of these is adequately controlling for 
growth determinants. The application of parsimonious specifications which fail to 
account for the wide range of factors that drive growth may generate misleading results. 
A second problem overlooked in many studies is endogeneity bias. It is easy to 
conceive of a scenario where FDI and growth might be simultaneously determined. In 
fact formal investigations suggest causality does indeed run both ways between FDI and 
growth (Choe 2003; Li and Liu 2005).
Using a technique that aims to address many of these methodological problems, 
Carkovic and Levine (2005) examine the impact of FDI on growth and also assess the 
relevance of a wide range of host country factors. The results from this analysis are 
mixed but in general do not show any robust correlation between FDI and growth, with 
the significance of the FDI variable susceptible to the choice of specification. Likewise, 
interaction terms incorporating FDI along with human capital and trade openness are 
found to be significant in a minority of specifications only. Therefore, one of the most 
recent empirical studies of FDI and growth, which is arguably at the current frontier of 
the literature, reports little evidence that FDI exerts a positive, exogenous impact on 
growth and it finds no evidence supporting the relevance of host country factors.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter surveys different theories that link host country factors and the growth 
effects of FDI which are tested in this thesis. Early contributions argue that trade 
policies affect the allocative efficiency of FDI while more recent contributions highlight 
factors more closely aligned with endogenous growth theory, including knowledge
34 In a related study, Athukorala and Chand (2000) use operational data for US MNE affiliates and find 
that trade openness exerts a positive impact on the productivity of affiliates.
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spillovers. First, absorptive capacity, FDI policies and host country market competition 
are likely to influence the introduction and diffusion of new technology through MNE 
affiliates. Second, trade and other policies that shape the operating environment will 
influence the nature of MNE affiliated production with more dynamic export oriented 
production attracted by more liberal policies.
In addition to outlining relevant theories, the chapter also presents a review of existing 
empirical evidence which demonstrates how host country factors affect both the flow of 
technology to MNE affiliates and the export orientation of MNE production. Consistent 
with theory, this evidence suggests that more open trade policies and a superior 
operating environment are associated with increased export orientation. Higher 
absorptive capacity, measured using a range of variables, appears to enhance technology 
transfer. Evidence from a number of studies also indicates that wholly owned MNE 
affiliates are the beneficiaries of higher technology transfer, suggesting FDI policies 
such as joint venture requirements are likely to impede technology diffusion.
The final section of the chapter examines the existing empirical literature on the growth 
effects of FDI. One set of studies employs firm or industry level data to examine 
evidence of FDI spillovers. Although results are far from uniform, the weight of 
evidence supports the existence of positive spillovers from foreign to local firms. A 
complementary literature examines the impact of FDI at the macroeconomic level using 
cross-country data and again the results are mixed.
Many existing studies seek to examine whether host country factors condition the 
growth effects of FDI. While a considerable number of studies produce results 
consistent with the relevance of host country factors, there is no clear picture on which 
of these are most important. A limitation of these studies is that they focus on host 
country factors relating to either absorptive capacity or trade policies, thereby ignoring 
broader factors which are likely to be relevant including FDI policies. One of the 
objectives of this thesis is to fill this gap by examining the role of FDI policies in 
conjunction with trade policies and human capital.
Having provided the analytical background to the thesis, the next chapter presents a new
cross-country dataset of FDI policy indicators. These and measures of trade policies
and human capital are then applied to three separate empirical analyses focusing first on
the nature of MNE production and then the growth effects of FDI.
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Appendix 3.1 Empirical literature summary
Table A3.1: Summary of empirical FDI spillover studies, developing countries
A u th o r(s ) C o u n try P erio d D ata R esu lts
Blom strom  and Persson (1983) Mexico 1970 CS +
Blom strom  (1986) Mexico 1970 & 1975 CS +
Blom strom  and W o lff (1994) Mexico 1970 & 1975 CS +
Haddad and Harrison (1993) M orocco 1985-1989 Panel -
Kokko (1994) Mexico 1970 CS +
Kokko et al. (1996) Uruguay 1988-1990 CS +
Blom strom  and S joholm  (1999) Indonesia 1991 CS +
Chuang and Lin (1999) Taiwan 1991 CS +
Sjoholm  (1999a) Indonesia 1980 & 1991 CS +
Sjoholm  (1999b) Indonesia 1980 & 1991 CS +
A itken and Harrison (1999) Venezuela 1976-1989 Panel -
D jankov and Hoekm an (2000) Czech Rep. 1992-1996 Panel -
Kathuria (2000) India 1976-1989 Panel ?
Kokko et al. (2001) U ruguay 1988 CS +
Konings (2001) Bulgaria, Poland and 1993-1997 Panel -
Romania
Li et al. (2001) China 1995 CS +
Dam ijan et al. (2003) Bulgaria, Czech 
Repub., Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak
1994-1998 Panel ?
Repub. and Slovenia
Lopez-C ordova (2003)* Mexico 1993-2000 Panel ?/+
Javorcik (2004)* Lithuania 1996-2000 Panel ?/+
S inani and M eyer (2004) Estonia 1994-1999 Panel +
Jordaan (2005) Mexico 1993 CS +
Kohpaiboon (2006) Thailand 1996 CS ?
Kugler (2006)* Colum bia 1974-1998 Panel ?/+
Liu (forthcom ing)* China 1995-1999 Panel +
Bwalya (2006)* Zam bia 1993-1995 Pane) ?y+
Notes: the symbols (+) and (-) denote main results reported in paper show the existence o f positive 
or negative spillovers respectively while (?) denotes very mixed or insignificant results. Multiple 
symbols summarise results from alternative specifications. ‘CS’ and ‘Panel’ denote the use o f a 
cross section or panel data respectively, while (*) denotes the study examines the presence o f both 
horizontal and vertical spillovers.
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Table A3.2: Summary of empirical FDI spillover studies, industrialised countries
A u th o r(s ) C o u n try P eriod D ata R esu lts
Caves (1974) Austra lia 1962/66 CS +
Globerm an (1979) Canada 1972 cs +
Liu et al. (2000) UK 1991-95 Panel +
Driffield (2001) UK 1989 & 1992 CS ?/+
Girm a et al. (2001) UK 1991-96 Panel ?
D im elis and Louri (2002) Greece 1997 CS +
Haskel et al. (2002) UK 1973-1992 Panel +
Driffield et al. (2002)* UK 1984-1992 Panel +
Castellani and Zanfei (2003) France, Italy and 1992-1997 Panel ?
Spain
Keller and Yeaple (2003) US 1987-1996 Panel +
Ruane and Ugur (2004) Ireland 1991-1998 Panel ?/+
Girm a (2005) UK 1989-1999 Panel ?
Notes: as for table A3.1
Table A3.3: Summary of empirical FDI and growth studies
A u th o r(s ) C o n d itio n a l e ffe c t  
tes ted
D ata R esu lts
Blom strom  et al. (1994b) Absorptive capacity CS +
Balasubram anyam  et al. (1996) Trade openness CS +
Borensztein et al. (1998) A bsorptive capacity Panel +
Balasubram anyam  et al. (1999) A bsorptive capacity CS +
Lipsey (2000) Absorptive capacity CS +
Nair-Reichert and W einhold (2001) A bsorptive capacity Panel -/+
and trade openness
Ram and Zhang (2002) Absorptive capacity CS -
Hermes and Lensink (2003) Financial developm ent CS +
A lfaro et al. (2004) Financial developm ent CS +
Durham (2004) Absorptive capacity CS +
and financial
developm ent
Blonigen and W ang (2005) Absorptive capacity Panel -
Carkovic and Levine (2005) Absorptive capacity, Panel -
trade openness and
financial developm ent
G reenaway et al. (2007) Trade openness CS +
Notes: the second column refers to the host country factor(s) tested to condition the growth effects 
of FDI. The symbols (+) and (-) denotes the main results do or do not respectively support the 
relevance of the host country factor(s) while multiple symbols denote mixed results.
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Chapter 4
FDI policy indicator database
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 3, FDI policies, along with trade policies, constitute an 
important element of the overall policy environment that may influence gains from FDI. 
However, assessing the impact of FDI policies is difficult due to the dearth of data that 
measures these policies in a systematic way, especially in a cross-country context. This 
lack of data motivated the compilation of a new dataset on host country FDI policies 
using qualitative information from a wide range of sources. The dataset is introduced in 
this chapter and applied in the empirical analyses presented in chapters 5 to 7.
The dataset comprises binary indicators for three different aspects of FDI policies which 
indicate the presence or otherwise of particular FDI policy restrictions. The first 
concerns a prohibition on the full foreign ownership of an enterprise (a joint venture 
requirement) while the other two relate to controls on the transfer of FDI related capital. 
Although these three variables do not capture the full gamut of relevant policies, they do 
represent important elements of the overall FDI policy regime. Importantly for the 
application of this data to the empirical analysis in this thesis, they each represent 
aspects of the policy environment that are likely to influence the nature of MNE 
production and therefore the gains from FDI. Specifically, the presence of these 
restrictions is likely to deter export MNE production and technology transfer to MNE 
affiliates.
Since the application of this data is concerned with long run issues it was necessary to 
compile data over an extended period of time. Furthermore, since much of the variation 
in FDI policies occurs across countries, the aim was to develop a dataset that 
incorporated a large sample of diverse countries, thereby maximising cross-sectional 
variation. Reflecting these concerns, the dataset contains annual observations for the 
period 1970 to 2000 for 89 countries. This coverage is significantly larger than existing 
FDI regime datasets.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section contains a brief 
discussion of the nature of FDI policies that have been adopted in different countries.
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An overview of existing cross-country datasets that provide information on any aspect 
of FDI policies, including their limitations, is also presented. Section 4.3 follows with 
details on the variables included in this dataset, and the method used to compile the 
data. Also included in this section is a simple analysis aimed at verifying the accuracy 
of the compiled indicators and an overview of the key features of the dataset. Section 
4.4 concludes. In addition, appendix 4.2 contains a brief description of how each of the 
variables included in the dataset were coded for each country, including references to 
the sources used.
4.2 FDI policies and existing datasets
4.2.1 The nature o f FDI policies
In almost all countries, the establishment and operation of foreign enterprises, and the 
flow of FDI related capital, are subject to a range of special legislative provisions. 
Typically, capital account policies will feature a provision that regulates the inflow of 
new FDI and the outflow of FDI related capital. In addition, special statutes, often 
referred to as foreign investment codes, detail particular arrangements that apply to 
foreign enterprises, over and above legislation governing the operation of domestically 
owned enterprises.35
The aim of these codes is to enlarge the scope for domestic control of foreign assets in 
the belief that doing so can bring about additional benefits for the recipient country.
The nature of foreign investment codes vary considerably, ranging from those which 
provide general guidelines on a narrow range of operational matters to others which are 
highly prescriptive and wide ranging in their coverage. Together with FDI related 
provisions in capital account policies, bilateral investment treaties, and an emerging 
multilateral framework, foreign investment codes provide the policy framework for 
international direct investment flows and the operation of foreign affiliated enterprises.
Policy restrictions relating to the transfer of FDI related capital, including earnings 
accruing to foreign capital and proceeds from the liquidation of foreign assets may be 
set out in either capital account policies and or foreign investment codes. For example, 
some codes may include guarantees for the full repatriation of profits and liquidated
35 For descriptive information on the content of investment codes across countries and through different 
periods see for example Parra (1999), UNCIT (1988), UNCTAD (1994) and UNCTC (1978b; 1983a; 
1983b; 1988).
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capital. Alternatively, codes may stipulate restrictions such as limitations on the 
amounts that can be transferred in any particular period, waiting periods that apply to 
the transfer of any capital (for example within the first year a foreign enterprise is in 
operation), or special taxes that apply specifically to capital transfers. Where such 
provisions exist, transfers will also invariably be subject to general exchange controls. 
Often capital transfers are screened by monetary authorities and may also require prior 
authorisation. In some countries, transfers of FDI related capital have also been 
temporarily suspended by monetary authorities due to capital account imbalances.
Foreign investment codes typically specify entry and establishment conditions for 
foreign investors that apply over and above capital account policies regulating the 
inflow of foreign capital. Invariably, countries subject all or at least some foreign 
investment proposals to a screening process. This involves investors providing details 
on the nature of their investment to a prescribed authority and to demonstrate that any 
specific entry regulations, such as capitalisation requirements, have been met.
Entry and establishment provisions also prescribe areas where foreign investment is 
restricted or prohibited (often a ‘negative list’). Nowadays, with governments adopting 
a more open attitude to FDI, these restrictions normally only apply to the most 
politically sensitive areas such as defence, natural resources, some services such as 
health, education, transport, utilities and media, as well as other socio-cultural activities. 
Historically, however, these provisions have been far more wide ranging and rather than 
adopt a ‘negative list’, some countries have instead prescribed a ‘positive list’ of areas 
where foreign investment was allowed.
Foreign investment codes also often include ownership restrictions which explicitly 
regulate the share of foreign equity allowed in an enterprise and often require that 
domestic residents or the state hold a controlling interest. As documented in appendix 
4.2, some countries have imposed such ownership restrictions across all sectors. In 
other instances restrictions are imposed selectively, usually in politically sensitive 
sectors or where monopolies tend to operate.
As an alternative to prescribed levels of domestic equity, authorities may impose a more
general requirement for foreign investors to offer unspecified amounts of equity to local
residents at the commencement of a project. Another way in which national authorities
impose ownership restrictions is by specifying a ‘fade out’ requirement for foreign
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investors to divest all or a share of their equity to local residents over a certain period. 
These requirements may apply to all FDI, in some sectors or even to specific projects, 
and will often form part of the entry requirement. Typically such fade out requirements 
apply over a long period such as ten or more years.
Aside from ownership restrictions, foreign investment codes may prescribe various 
performance and operational requirements. Like ownership restrictions these provisions 
are designed to enhance domestic control and may apply to all or selected sectors. 
Performance requirements often relate to minimum levels of employment, or to the 
generation of foreign currency earnings or minimum export volumes. Operational 
requirements may include local content requirements, where final products must 
comprise a minimum level or value of locally produced intermediate inputs. A 
commitment to share technology, or employ or train a certain number of local workers 
is also sometimes specified. In addition, foreign investment codes may articulate 
restrictions on access to local finance, including borrowing from local banks and a 
prohibition against listing on local stock exchanges.
Finally, incentives to attract foreign investors, as well as special dispute resolution 
mechanisms, are spelled out in foreign investment codes. Incentives usually include 
some combination of tax concessions and subsidies, access to special economic zones 
such as industrial parks or export processing zones, guarantees to limit market 
competition and commitments to provide new infrastructure. Often these will only 
apply for investments in particular industries or with certain characteristics that are 
deemed by authorities to be particularly attractive such as capital intensive, high 
technology or export oriented production. Furthermore, incentives may be linked to a 
particular geographic region as part of regional development objectives. Special 
provisions for dispute resolution and guarantees regarding property rights are designed 
to alleviate fears that foreign investors might hold regarding the expropriation of their 
assets, particularly in countries where expropriation has occurred in the past.
4.2.2 Existing FDI policy datasets
Existing cross-country indicators of FDI related policies are sparse. Furthermore, of the 
data that are currently available, these are less than ideal for long run analysis due to 
limited coverage or because they poorly target some of the most important aspects of 
FDI policies. Three datasets have been developed which use qualitative information to
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assign numerical values to indicators of national FDI policies for a sizeable number of 
countries.36
First, the Index o f Economic Freedom is produced by the US based think tank the 
Heritage Foundation. In this dataset, a score between one and five is assigned to 
different aspects of FDI policy to indicate the strength of any restrictions that may 
apply. Areas covered include differential legal treatment of foreign investors, 
administrative procedures for undertaking FDI, the range of sectors closed to foreign 
investment and restrictions on FDI related capital transfers. A second dataset, by Shatz 
(2000), provides similar information, again drawing on qualitative information. Finally, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) produces the 
Investment Compass database using information gleaned from surveys issued to national 
authorities. While all of these datasets provide numerical indicators of different aspects 
of the FDI regime for a sizeable sample of countries, the period for which data are 
available is limited to around one decade, which is arguably insufficient for long run 
analysis.
Aside from these broad indicators of FDI policies, a number of datasets provide 
information on official or de jure capital controls. In representing one particular form 
of restriction on the freedoms of foreign investors, capital controls on the movement of 
FDI related capital form one element of the overall FDI regime. However, 
notwithstanding the limitation that capital control indicators lack information on broader 
aspects of the FDI regime, the available indicators of capital controls are of limited use 
in assessing controls on FDI in a long run context. This is because they either do not 
target the pertinent aspects of capital controls that apply to foreign direct investors, or 
like the datasets discussed above, suffer from limited coverage. For example, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) produces a binary indicator of broad capital account 
restrictions for a large sample of countries from the 1960s onwards. However, since 
many countries adopt heterogeneous approaches towards controlling different types of 
capital this broad indicator is unlikely to accurately reflect restrictions applying 
specifically to direct investors (Eichengreen and Mussa 1998).
36 A data source containing information on FDI policies faced by US MNE foreign affiliates is provided 
by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. See section 5.2.1 of chapter 5 for further details.
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Some researchers have made use of text descriptions of capital account related policies 
presented in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) to compile indicators for specific types of capital control. For 
example, Miniane (2004) presents a dataset containing indicators of different capital 
controls starting in 1983, but for only 34 countries. A far more comprehensive dataset 
is by Brune et al. (2001) who compile different capital control indicators for 173 
countries over the period 1973 to 1999. This dataset provides information on 
restrictions on both inflows and outflows for a number of different transactions 
including a category relating to direct investment. However, the category on FDI 
related transfers groups together restrictions on the liquidation of investments by 
non-residents in the recipient country as well as the liquidation of investments made by 
residents abroad. Since some countries adopt different policies with respect to inward 
and outward FDI, it is not possible to use this particular indicator to accurately gauge 
restrictions imposed on inward FDI.
A further limitation of the dataset by Brune et al. (2001) is that while it contains 
information on restrictions relating to payments for invisible transactions, including 
payments relating to income earned on foreign capital, no distinction is made between 
the types of payment falling under this category. This limits the suitability of this 
dataset to measure specific FDI related restrictions. A similar limitation applies to the 
Freedom of the World Index compiled by the Canadian based think tank the Fraser 
Institute which provides data starting in 1970. The variable concerned with FDI flows 
in this dataset is an aggregate indicator which may reflect restrictions on either or both 
the inflow and outflow of FDI related capital.
4.3 New FDI policy indicators
4.3.1 Definitions and methodology
In light of the limitations of existing FDI policy indicators, a new dataset has been 
compiled which provides improved coverage suitable for longer run analysis of the type 
presented in this thesis. The dataset has been compiled using a wide range of qualitative 
information and for almost all of the 89 countries included in the dataset annual 
observations for three different policy indicators are available from 1970 to 2000. This 
period was selected on the basis that it represents a period when official attitudes
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towards foreign investment ranged widely and because data on FDI flows and other 
variables of interest are widely available for these years.
In order to devise a dataset that provides an indication of the prevalence of FDI policy 
restrictions while also ensuring the task of compiling the data remained feasible, 
indicators relating to three aspects of FDI policies have been compiled. Given the 
importance of ownership restrictions in shaping the operating environment for foreign 
investors, the first indicator (Ownership restrictions) reflects whether countries prohibit 
outright the establishment and operation of wholly foreign owned enterprises. Put 
another way, this variable indicates whether countries impose a joint venture 
requirement on all FDI. A further two indicators reflect restrictions on capital flows 
specifically affecting foreign direct investors. These are restrictions on the rights of 
foreign investors to remit earnings on capital, including profits (.Profit restrictions), and 
restrictions on the liquidation and repatriation of foreign owned capital (Liquidation 
restrictions).
These three policy indicators target some pertinent aspects of the overall FDI regime 
and are suitable for analysing the role of FDI policies in affecting the nature of MNE 
production and conditioning the growth effects of FDI. First, as noted in chapter 3, 
export platform FDI, more than other forms of direct investment, is expected to be 
discouraged by the presence of all three types of policy restrictions. This is because this 
type of investment is more footloose and investors undertaking this type of investment 
will be attracted to countries offering a superior operating environment. This will 
include a regulatory environment that does not prevent investors from establishing 
wholly foreign owned affiliated or hinder the free movement of capital between the 
affiliate and the parent company. Second, the presence of ownership limits will reduce 
the incentive for technology transfer to MNE affiliates. This may be due to concerns 
over the loss of propriety knowledge to rivals and or because shared ownership may 
reduce the financial return on costly technology transfer.
Ideally, other policies outlined in section 4.2, such as performance requirements, would 
also be covered by the dataset, as these are also expected to impact on the nature of 
MNE production. However, good information relating to these policies is particularly 
difficult to assemble for a large sample of countries as precise details are often not 
prescribed in foreign investment codes. For example, a code may outline general
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principals regarding performance requirements but provide authorities with the 
discretion to make decisions on a case by case basis.
Moreover, it is argued that not every aspect of the FDI regime need be included in order 
for a numerical policy indicator to be suitable for the applications described above. A 
comprehensive FDI policy indicator might incorporate details on sectors closed to 
foreign investors or detail regulations that apply to particular areas of activity.
However, such special provisions are most likely to apply to politically sensitive areas. 
These may be of little interest to direct investors, especially those seeking to establish 
export platforms which are of central interest in the empirical analysis presented in this 
thesis.
For example, with the exception of natural resources, regulated sectors often relate to 
the production of non-tradeable goods and production that does not reflect the 
comparative advantage of the host country. Many types of services including health and 
utilities fall in to this category, as do media, entertainment and defence. For this reason 
a more detailed FDI regime dataset may well be redundant for assessing many FDI 
related issues, including those of interest in this thesis.
Each of the three indicators included in the dataset are binary variables, signalling the 
presence or otherwise of each type of policy restriction. A scale system that accurately 
reflects the severity of restrictions offers the advantage of providing a richer source of 
information. However, compiling this type of data is a more resource intensive 
endeavour requiring detailed descriptions of prevailing policies. In addition, a scale 
approach inevitably requires the exercise of a good deal more judgement when 
converting qualitative information in to quantitative information. In this way a scale 
variable may suffer from greater measurement error.
The criterion used to code the Ownership restrictions indicator was whether full foreign 
ownership of an enterprise was prohibited in every sector. This included a requirement 
for new investments to be joint ventures from the outset or an obligation for an initially 
fully foreign owned venture to incorporate local equity within a specified time frame. 
That is, whether any requirement for a dilution of ownership, such as a fade out 
provision, existed. Applying this strict standard enables, in principle, the inference that
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all FDI flowing to countries with this type of restriction either represents equity in a
37joint venture or in an enterprise that is destined to become a joint venture.
An alternative approach to coding the Ownership restrictions indicator would be to 
define some criterion to capture the existence of ownership restrictions in some, rather 
than all, sectors. However, this may not provide any useful indication of the proportion 
of direct investment that is subject to ownership restrictions. As noted above, many 
countries, including some industrialised, have historically imposed foreign equity limits 
in sensitive sectors that may be of little interest to foreign investors. Therefore, 
countries that selectively impose limits on foreign ownership may actually impose 
ownership restrictions on a very small proportion of total FDI.
A considerable challenge in coding the Ownership restrictions indicator is that some 
countries have historically adopted foreign investment codes which on the surface 
appear liberal but subject investment proposals to a screening process that may 
unofficially favour joint ventures. To address this problem, Ownership restrictions 
were also coded where there was clear evidence of a de facto requirement for local 
participation. This inevitably requires exercising judgement to distinguish between 
authorities holding a preference for joint ventures but adopting a pragmatic approach on 
the one hand, and on the other, taking a hostile and dogmatic view of foreign investment 
and insisting on joint ventures.
To ensure consistency with the stringent criterion outlined above, de facto ownership 
restrictions were assumed to exist where governments adopted an overtly hostile 
attitude to foreign investment. The signal used to identify such a stance was the rise to 
power of a socialist regime, as defined by Komai (1992), or clear evidence of 
widespread actions by a government to nationalise foreign enterprises. Often such 
episodes occurred in conjunction with declarations of nationalist intentions by regimes 
swept to power through revolutionary means. Where ownership restrictions were 
coded on the basis of this information, it was assumed that such restrictions existed until
37 In a small number of instances countries have assigned special status to other countries, allowing some 
foreign investors to bypass ownership restrictions. For example, members of the Andean Community 
imposed ownership limits for much of the 1970s and 1980s but exempted investors from other 
Community countries. Similar provisions existed in some Arab countries. Since these provisions 
typically apply to only a very select group of countries, ownership restrictions were assumed to apply in 
these circumstances.
38 This occurred in some African, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, especially during the 
1970s and 1980s.
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there was a clear indication of a change in official attitudes. Invariably this was 
assumed to occur when authorities introduced a new foreign investment code that did 
not stipulate blanket ownership restrictions, as described above.
For the two capital control related indicators, the decision to code restrictions was based 
on the presence of controls that impinge on the rights of investors to transfer FDI related 
capital. This includes overt restrict ions as well as the existence of ceilings on the 
amounts that could be transferred in any one period, requirements to phase capital 
transfers over some period or special taxes that applied to transfers. Restrictions were 
also coded where a requirement to seek prior authorisation or approval existed.
However, exceptions were made where there was clear evidence that as a matter of 
practice, approval was invariably given automatically. One concern in the context of 
the Liquidation restriction indicator is that waiting period requirements might not 
actually represent any meaningful impediment for direct investors given that FDI is 
associated with long term commitments. Nevertheless, to ensure consistency, 
restrictions were coded for this indicator wherever any waiting period applied.
Following the approach adopted by others who have compiled data on de jure capital 
controls including Miniane (2004) and Brune et al. (2001), the first step in compiling 
the new dataset was to review capital account policy descriptions contained in the IMF 
AREAER series, for each country from 1970 to 2000. The AREAER contains text 
descriptions of trade and exchange related policies prevailing in most IMF member 
countries and has been produced annually since 1950 as part of a requirement set out in 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.
In general, the descriptions provided in the AREAER include details on matters such as 
exchange rate arrangements, payments for imports of goods and invisible items as well 
as proceeds from exports and restrictions on capital flows, both inward and outward. 
The coverage of policy descriptions has largely remained unchanged since the inception 
of the series, although the presentation format changed in 1996 to provide some 
additional detail. The description of policies contained in each report are based on 
information provided by national authorities, media reports and other sources and the 
final version is agreed to by both IMF staff and authorities in member countries as 
reflecting an accurate account of policies prevailing at any point in time.
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Text descriptions in the AREAER under the heading o f ‘capital’ cover any special 
arrangements or limitations attached to the inflow or outflow of capital. These 
descriptions were the primary source of information used to code each of the three FDI 
policy indicators. Guidelines provided in each edition of the AREAER report that 
regulations governing the transfer of income derived from foreign capital (including 
dividends and profits), are also usually described under this sub-heading.
However, in many instances regulations relating to the transfer of income derived on 
foreign capital are detailed under the heading o f ‘payments for invisibles’. Therefore 
information provided under both of these sub-headings was used. If details for any 
country entry under these sub-headings contained a reference consistent with the above 
criteria for each policy indicator then a value o f ‘one’ was recorded to indicate the 
presence of a particular restriction, otherwise ‘zero’ was recorded.
A limitation of the AREAER series is that the level of detail provided on FDI policies 
(and indeed other trade and exchange related policies) varies considerably from country 
to country. While descriptions for some countries are comprehensive, for others they 
are sketchy or absent altogether. This is especially true for information relating to 
de jure ownership restrictions. Moreover, the AREAR series provides no information on 
de facto ownership restrictions, as defined above.
Hence, while the AREAER provided a good starting point, and also complete coverage 
of relevant FDI policies for some countries included in the dataset, there was a need to 
use a variety of supplementary sources. Unfortunately, no other single source contains 
consolidated information on FDI policies, necessitating the need to drawn upon a wide 
variety of sources. These included various published volumes, reports by the World 
Bank, UN and Economist Intelligence Unit, commercial country guides by the US 
Government and a range of other material.
4.3.2 Assessing FDI policy indicators
Legislative frameworks in many countries provide authorities with considerable 
discretion for applying restrictions on FDI flows and associated MNE activities. As a 
consequence, the true application of FDI policies may differ from the policy position 
identified in relevant statutes. By using information on how policies are applied in 
practice, in addition to information on de jure policy settings, the chances that each of
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the indicators reflects the true application of policies is enhanced. Nevertheless, where 
judgments are made to assign values to the indicator variables there is an inevitable 
possibility that errors will be made.
This possibility of error prompts the need to assess the accuracy of the three FDI 
indicator variables. However, this task is made difficult by the lack of a benchmark 
with which to make comparisons. Further, as noted above, existing data sources on FDI 
policies are much more limited in their coverage. Indeed, the time coverage of the most 
comparable datasets is around one third of the coverage in this dataset.
An indirect method of assessing the FDI policy indicators is to examine whether they 
are correlated with observed FDI flows. As argued in chapter 3, FDI associated with 
export oriented production is expected to be particularly sensitive to FDI policies as 
prospective investors seek out the best operating environment. Nevertheless, it is likely 
that, ceteris paribus, other forms of investment will also be influenced by FDI policies. 
Therefore, liberal FDI policies are expected to have a positive influence on all forms of 
FDI.
Table 4.1 below, reports the results from regressing inward FDI flows, expressed as a 
proportion of GDP, on the new FDI policy indicators. All results are derived using 
annual data and fixed effects which allows for the control of time invariant country 
characteristics. Similar results were obtained using five year averages rather than 
annual observations.
The first three regressions report the results from regressing FDI flows on each of the 
three policy indicators separately. In regression four all three policy variables are 
included while in regressions five and six composite variables comprising combinations 
of the three indicators are used. The first, Capital restrictions, indicates the presence of 
either Profit restrictions or Liquidation restrictions. The second, Regime, is an average 
of all three policy indicator variables.
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Table 4.1: FDI policy indicators and FDI flows, 1970 to 2000
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ownership restrictions -0.019***
(0.002)
-0.015***
(0.002)
-0.015***
(0.002)
Profit restrictions -0.016***
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
Liquidation restrictions -0.016***
(0.002)
-0.01***
(0.002)
Capital restrictions -0.012***
(0.002)
Regime -0.026***
(0.002)
Obs. 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04
Source: UNCTAD online FDI database and author’s calculations. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses while ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level 
respectively.
Notes: dependent variable is annual net FDI inflows as a proportion of GDP, all data measured in 
nominal US dollars. Results derived using fixed effects estimation technique with annual data.
Overall, the results provide some assurance that the three indicator variables reflect 
useful information about the status of prevailing FDI policies. When entered 
individually, the coefficients on each of the three policy indicators feature the expected 
negative sign and are highly significant. This indicates that the existence of all three 
policy restrictions reduces aggregate FDI flows.
When all three indicators are included together, in regression four, the coefficient on 
Profit restrictions is insignificant while the other two remain highly significant. A 
likely explanation for the insignificant coefficient is the high degree of correlation 
between the Profit restrictions and Liquidation restrictions indicator variables causing 
multicollinearity. Combining the different indicator variables does not appear to result 
in any significant changes. The coefficient on Capital restrictions is significant and 
negative when entered alongside Ownership restrictions, while the coefficient on 
Regime is also negative and highly significant when used independently.
4.3.2 Overview o f  FDI policy indicators
The sample of countries included in the dataset was determined by two factors. The 
first was the availability of data on FDI flows and other variables of interest in the 
analyses presented in this thesis. The second was sufficient qualitative information on 
prevailing FDI policies to enable the coding of the three FDI policy indicators. A total
of 89 diverse countries passed both of these criteria and were included in the dataset.
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The sample comprises a broad geographic and economic representation with 20 
countries classified as industrialised, 13 located in the Middle East or North Africa, 21 
in sub-Sahara Africa, 20 in Latin American or the Caribbean region and 15 from Asia 
and the Pacific.39
There are four dominant features in the data, the first of which is the persistence of 
prevailing policies. In most countries the three FD1 policy restrictions have either never 
been adopted or imposed for an extended period. In this way, FDI policies appear to 
mirror trade policies which, at a general level at least, are also highly persistent (see for 
example Sachs and Warner (1995)). Out of the full sample, 23 countries have never 
imposed any of the three policy restrictions. While this group is dominated by 
industrialised countries it also includes a small number of developing countries.
Figure 4.1 below highlights the persistence of policy restrictions using kernel density 
estimates which are a smoothed representation of a standard histogram (Pagan and 
Ullah 1999). For each policy indicator, the frequency of episodes where restrictions 
have been continuously imposed is plotted according to the duration of the episode.
The clear pattern that emerges from this illustration is that where FDI policy restrictions 
have been imposed they have generally remained in place for at least a decade and often 
more than two decades. This is especially true for the Profit restrictions and 
Liquidation restrictions indicators where episodes of restrictions have most often lasted 
over 25 years. This reflects the fact that in many countries where these types of 
restrictions were imposed were invariably in place in 1970 and were not liberalised until 
the late 1990s.
39 Industrialised countries are defined by membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) prior to its expansion in the 1990s when Mexico and several former Soviet block 
countries were admitted.
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Figure 4.1: Duration of episodes featuring FDI policy restrictions, 1970 to 2000
Years
Ownership — - Profit Liquidation
Source: author’s calculations.
There is clear evidence that the incidence of all forms of FDI policy restrictions fell 
markedly between 1970 and 2000, consistent with other evidence. As with the general 
move towards international trade liberalisation, the dominant global trend regarding 
these particular FDI policies since the 1970s has been for countries to adopt a more 
liberal stance. Furthermore, once liberalisation has occurred, instances of policy 
reversal have been rare, thereby reinforcing the persistence of policy settings. The 
general trend towards liberalisation is highlighted in figure 4.2 below, which plots the 
evolution of the three policy variables across time for the full sample. In general the 
incidence of restrictions was quite stable during the 1970s and early 1980s before 
widespread liberalisation occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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Figure 4.2: Incidence of FDI policy restrictions, 1970 to 2000
§1-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
i ------------------------------------------------------1------------------------------------------------------ 1-----------------------------------------------------
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
------------Ownership -------------- Profit ..............  Liquidation
Source: author’s calculations.
Regarding the pattern of liberalisation within individual countries, some countries 
introduced restrictions after 1970. However, in general instances of liberalisation 
followed by the reimposition of restrictions are rare. Indeed no country has a record of 
reinstating ownership restrictions following liberalisation. For the two capital control 
indicators there are a few instances where countries liberalise and then temporarily 
reintroduce Profit restrictions or Liquidation restrictions during periods that coincide 
with capital account crises (for example Turkey), but these are rare. As with Ownership 
restrictions, the dominant trend is to liberalise and retain a liberal policy stance.
Another dominant feature of the dataset is the greater incidence of capital control 
related restrictions compared with Ownership restrictions (figure 4.2). A total of 45 
countries, none of which are classified as industrialised, have imposed ownership 
restrictions at some point. In comparison, a total of 55 countries have at some point 
imposed Profit restrictions and 61 imposed Liquidation restrictions.
In many cases countries adopted multiple FDI related capital controls, particularly 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, there is a clear positive global correlation 
between the Profit restrictions and Liquidation restrictions indicator variables. 
Furthermore, in general countries which have adopted Ownership restrictions have also 
imposed one or both type of capital control restriction. However, the reverse is not true
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with many countries adopting some form of capital control restriction without imposing 
Ownership restrictions.
The incidence of all types of FDI policy restrictions varies across major country 
groupings.40 The incidence of all types of restrictions is generally highest in African 
and Middle Eastern countries and, not surprisingly, the lowest in industrialised 
countries. There are no Ownership restrictions coded for the 20 industrialised countries 
included in the sample and only 3 have ever imposed Profit restrictions or Liquidation 
restrictions. The incidence of restrictions across Asian and Latin American and 
Caribbean countries falls somewhere in between. Hence, liberal FDI policies are 
somewhat correlated with levels of development.
The timing of liberalisation is similar within major country groups. This regional 
concentration of controls to some extent reflects formal regional economic associations 
of some form. For example, former French colonies in Africa, which have adopted 
common exchange arrangements in conjunction with the CFA Franc, tended to adopt 
the same approach to regulating the movement of FDI related capital. Likewise, South 
American countries which formed part of the Andean Community, adopted similar 
policies regarding Ownership restrictions and Profit restrictions through the 1970s and 
1980s.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a new cross-country dataset on FDI related policies to be used 
in various empirical analyses in this thesis. Although the dataset does not include 
information on the full range of relevant FDI policies it summarises policy settings on 
some important aspects of the FDI regime relevant to the analyses presented in this 
thesis. The dataset comprises three variables which indicate the presence of particular 
FDI related policy restrictions. The first relates to restrictions on the foreign ownership 
of enterprises while a further two relate to restrictions on the transfer of FDI related 
capital. An attempt was made to compile indicators that reflect the true application of 
policies and to validate them by examining correlations with FDI flows.
The compiled indicators show a number of distinctive characteristics including a high 
degree of time persistence. The dataset also points to a global trend towards the
40 See figures A4.1, A4.2 and A4.3 in appendix 4.1 for graphical representations of the incidence of 
restrictions by country group.
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adoption of more liberal FDI policies, particularly since the late 1980s. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, restrictive FDI policies are concentrated in developing countries, 
especially in the Middle East and parts of Africa. Restrictions on the transfer of FDI 
related capital are also far more predominant than Ownership restrictions.
In the following three chapters the newly compiled data are applied to three empirical 
analyses. The next chapter focuses on determinants of MNE export orientation 
followed by the determinants of technology transfer to MNE foreign affiliates. This 
leads to an analysis of the growth effects of FDI in chapter 7.
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Appendix 4.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure A4.1: Incidence of ownership restrictions by country group, 1970 to 2000
------------Mid East and North Africa --------------  Sub-Saharan Africa
..............  Asia ------------Latin America
------------Industrialised
Source: author’s calculations.
Figure A4.2: Incidence of profit restrictions by country group, 1970 to 2000
------------Mid East and North Africa --------------  Sub-Saharan Africa
..............  Asia ------------Latin America
------------Industrialised
Source: author’s calculations.
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Figure A4.3: Incidence of liquidation restrictions by country group, 1970 to 2000
1-0 _ _
------------Mid East and North Africa -------------- Sub-Saharan Africa
..............  Asia ------------Latin America
------------Industrialised
Source: author’s calculations.
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Appendix 4.2 FDI policy descriptions, coding details and 
sources
This appendix provides a brief description of FDI policies between 1970 and 2000 for 
each country included in the dataset. In addition, the years, if any, in which restrictions 
were coded for each of the three policy indicators Ownership restrictions, Profit 
restrictions and Liquidation restrictions are noted. The appendix also details the 
references used to compile the dataset, for each country, in addition to the IMF 
AREAER series. As noted above, for each country in the dataset, each addition of the 
AREAER from 1970 to 2000 was reviewed as the first step in compiling the dataset for 
all countries.41
In providing the following descriptions of prevailing FDI policies an attempt was made 
to use uniform terminology. In describing ownership related restrictions, the term 
‘blanket ownership restriction’ refers to a prohibition on the establishment or 
acquisition of an enterprise that solely comprises foreign capital in all sectors. 
Equivalently, this term describes a policy mandating joint ventures in all sectors. The 
term ‘fade out requirement’ is used to describe a policy that requires divestment by 
foreign investors within a particular timeframe across all sectors. In contrast the term 
‘liberal policy regarding ownership’ refers to a situation where neither a fade out 
requirement or blanket ownership restriction exists across all sectors. It should be noted 
that this terminology does not imply an absence of ownership restrictions; in almost all 
countries such restrictions have applied in at least some sectors at some point in time.
In describing restrictions on the transfer of FDI related capital, the term ‘authorisation 
requirement’ refers to a general requirement for all or most transfers to be approved by 
a prescribed authority before the transfer can proceed. The term ‘restrictions’ signals a 
policy of disallowing capital transfers under most circumstances. The term ‘special 
taxes’ refers to the existence of taxes that apply specifically to capital transfers. The 
terms ‘ceilings’ and ‘waiting periods’ respectively refer to a policy of allowing capital 
transfers only in limited amounts or over specified periods. In contrast, the term ‘liberal 
policy regarding capital transfers’ signals a policy of generally allowing the transfer of 
FDI related capital at the discretion of the investor.
41 The exception is Taiwan which is the only country in the dataset that is not a member of the IMF and is 
therefore not covered by the AREAER series.
98
1. A lg e r ia T h e  1 9 8 6  fo r e ig n  in v e s tm e n t  c o d e  is d e s c r ib e d  a s  c o n s id e r a b ly  
le s s  r e s tr ic t iv e  th a n  e a r l ie r  r e g u la t io n s  b u t  m a in ta in e d  b la n k e t  
o w n e r s h ip  r e s t r ic t io n s  ( U N C I T  1 9 8 8 , p .2 6 7 ) .  A  n e w  c o d e  in  
1 9 9 3  r e m o v e d  th is  r e q u ir e m e n t  (U S  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  S ta te  1 9 9 8 a ; 
U N C T A D  2 0 0 3 a ) .  R e s t r ic t io n s ,  in c lu d in g  c e i l in g s ,  a p p l ie d  to  
c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s t r i c t i o n s : 1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 3  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 3  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 3
2 . A r g e n t in a G e n e r a l ly  l ib e ra l  p o l i c y  r e g a r d in g  fo r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  ( U N C T C  
1 9 7 8 b , p . 2 19; G r o s s e  1 9 8 9 , p p .7 4 -7 7 ) .  R e s t r ic t io n s ,  in c lu d in g  
s p e c ia l  t a x e s  a n d  w a i t in g  p e r io d s ,  a p p l ie d  to  c a p ita l  t r a n s f e r s .  
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s ',  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 6  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 3
3 . A u s t r a l ia G e n e r a l ly  l ib e ra l  p o l i c y  r e g a r d in g  f o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  ( H a m m e r  
e t  al. 1 9 8 3 , p p .5 - 1 2 ) .  A u th o r i s a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n t  f o r  c a p ita l  
t r a n s f e r s  e x is te d  in  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  e a r ly  1 9 8 0 s  b u t  a p p r o v a l  n o r m a l ly  
g iv e n .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s ',  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s ',  n o n e  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e
4 . A u s t r ia G e n e r a l ly  l ib e ra l  p o l i c y  r e g a r d in g  f o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  ( H a m m e r  
e t  al. 1 9 8 3 , p p . 1 3 -1 4 ) . L ib e ra l  p o l i c y  r e g a r d in g  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s .  
O w n e r s h ip  r e s t r i c t i o n s : n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e
5 . B a n g la d e s h 42 B la n k e t  o w n e r s h ip  r e s t r ic t io n s  a p p l ie d  u n t i l  th e  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  a  
n e w  f o r e ig n  in v e s tm e n t  c o d e  in  1 9 8 0  a l lo w e d  fu ll  fo r e ig n  
o w n e r s h ip  in  s o m e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  in c lu d in g  fo r  e x p o r t  o r ie n te d  
p r o d u c t io n .  A u th o r i s a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n t  a p p l ie d  to  c a p i ta l  
t r a n s f e r s .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 0  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 3 -1 9 9 4  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 3 -2 0 0 0
6 . B e lg iu m L ib e r a l  p o l ic y  r e g a r d in g  f o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  a n d  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s  
( H a m m e r  e t  al. 1 9 8 3 , p p .2 1 - 2 6 ) .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e
42 Coded as for Pakistan prior to 1973.
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7. B e n in F o r e ig n  in v e s tm e n t  c o d e  o f  1 9 7 2  in c lu d e s  p r o v is io n s  e n t i t l in g  
th e  s ta te  to  a  m in im u m  2 0  p e r  c e n t  s ta k e  in  p r o je c t s  r e c e iv in g  
a n y  in c e n t iv e s  ( U N C T C  1 9 7 8 b , p .7 6 ) .  R e g im e  a ls o  c la s s i f ie d  a s  
s o c ia l is t  f r o m  1 9 7 2  b y  K o r n a i  ( 1 9 9 2 ,  p p .6 -7 ) .  P ro c e s s  o f  
s t r u c tu r a l  a d ju s tm e n t  in c lu d in g  p r iv a t i s a t io n  b e g a n  in  la te  1 9 8 0 s  
( W o r ld  B a n k  1 9 9 4 , p p .6 - 7 ) .  N o  g e n e r a l  l im its  o n  o w n e rs h ip  in  
1 9 9 0  c o d e  (U S  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  S ta te  2 0 0 1 a ) .  A u th o r is a t io n  
r e q u ir e m e n t  a p p l ie d  to  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s t r i c t io n s : 1 9 7 2 -1 9 9 0  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic tio n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 9  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 9
8. B o l iv ia A n d e a n  P a c t  r e g u la t io n s  w h ic h  s t ip u la te d  b la n k e t  o w n e r s h ip  
r e s t r ic t io n s  a n d  fa d e  o u t  r e q u ir e m e n ts  a p p l ie d  f ro m  1 9 7 0  u n t i l  
1 9 8 7 . In  a d d i t io n ,  fa d e  o u t  p r o v is io n s  a p p e a r  to  h a v e  b e e n  
m a in ta in e d  fo r  a  s h o r t  p e r io d  a f te r  th is  ( U N C T C  1 9 8 6 , p p . 1 2 3 - 
1 2 5 ; P f e f f e r m a n n  1 9 8 8 ; G r o s s e  1 9 8 9 , p p .7 4 -7 7  a n d  p p . l  1 3 -1 1 5 ) . 
A  n e w  c o d e  in t r o d u c e d  in  1 9 9 0  d o e s  n o t  s t ip u la te  a n y  b la n k e t  
o w n e r s h ip  r e s t r ic t io n s  o r  fa d e  o u t  r e q u ir e m e n ts  ( IA D B  1 9 9 7 ). 
A u th o r i s a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n t  a n d  r e s tr ic t io n s ,  in c lu d in g  s p e c ia l  
ta x e s ,  a p p l ie d  to  c a p ita l  t r a n s f e r s .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 0  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic tio n s '.  1 9 7 0 -2 0 0 0  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 8 3 -1 9 9 6
9. B o ts w a n a L ib e r a l  p o l ic y  r e g a r d in g  fo r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  ( U N C T C  1 9 8 6 , p p .4 -  
6 ; H a r v e y  a n d  L e w is  1 9 9 0 , p p . l 5 9 -1 8 5 ;  A i lo la  2 0 0 0 ) .  
A u th o r i s a t io n  r e q u i r e m e n t  a p p l ie d  to  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s ',  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic tio n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 2  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 9
10. B ra z il N o  b la n k e t  o w n e r s h ip  r e s t r ic t io n s  p r e s c r ib e d  in  e a r ly  f o r e ig n  
in v e s tm e n t  c o d e s  (U N C T C  1 9 7 8 b , p . 2 19). H is to r ic a l ly ,  
a u th o r i t ie s  h a v e  p r e f e r r e d  j o in t  v e n tu r e s  b u t  in s u f f ic ie n t  
e v id e n c e  to  p r e s u m e  d e  f a c t o  o w n e r s h ip  r e s t r ic t io n s  e x is te d  
( H a m m e r  e t  al. 1 9 8 3 , p p .2 9 - 3 2 ;  G ro s s e  1 9 8 9 , p p .7 4 -7 7 ) .  
R e s t r ic t io n s ,  in c lu d in g  s p e c ia l  t a x e s  a p p l ie d  to  p ro f it  
r e m it ta n c e s .  A u th o r i s a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n t  a p p l ie d  to  c a p ita l  
r e p a t r ia t io n  b u t  n o  r e q u e s ts  d is a l lo w e d  s in c e  1 9 9 0  ( U N C T A D  
2 0 0 5 a ) .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s ',  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic tio n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 0  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s '.  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 0
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11. Burkina Faso
12. Cameroon
13. Canada
14. Central African 
Republic
15. Chile
16. China
Blanket ownership restrictions stipulated in investment 
regulations dating from 1970s (UNCTC 1988, p.6).
Authorisation requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions'. 1970-2000 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
No evidence of blanket ownership restrictions in investment 
regulations dating from 1965 or 1990 (UNCTC 1978b, p.79; 
Ndongko 1986; Worldmark Encyclopaedia of the Nations 
2006a). Authorisation requirement applied to capital transfers. 
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership and capital transfers 
(Hammer et al. 1983, pp.33-36; UNCTC 1983b, pp.300-303). 
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Regulations dating from 1960s which appear to have applied 
through the 1990s stipulate ownership restrictions. This 
requirement could be waived but only for a specified period 
(UNCTC 1988, pp. 19-25). Authorisation requirement applied to 
capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-2000 
Profit restrictions'. 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
Andean Pact regulations which applied from 1973 stipulated 
blanket ownership restrictions and fade out requirements. This 
policy was abandoned in 1976 (UNCTC 1978b, pp.219-220; 
Grosse 1989, pp.74-77 and pp.l 13-115). Waiting periods 
applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1976 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1976 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
Effectively closed to foreign investment until early 1970s and 
first foreign investment code introduced in 1979 stipulated 
blanket ownership restrictions. Partial liberalisation allowing 
full foreign ownership in some circumstances occurred in 1986 
(Zhang 1999, pp.l3-19). Authorisation requirement and taxes 
applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1986 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
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17. Colombia
18. Congo, 
People's Republic
19. Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic (Zaire)
20. Costa Rica
Andean Pact regulations which stipulated blanket ownership 
restrictions and fade out requirements applied from 1970 until 
1987. However, fade out provisions appear to have been 
maintained for a short period after this (Pfeffermann 1988; 
Grosse 1989, pp.74-77 and pp.l 13-115). A new code introduced 
in 1991 does not stipulate blanket ownership restrictions or fade 
out requirements (IADB 1997). Restrictions including waiting 
periods and authorisation requirement applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1991 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1993 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1998
Classified as socialist from early 1960s by Komai (1992, pp.6- 
7). Liberalisation commenced in late 1980s and continued 
through 1990s, accompanied by wide ranging constitutional 
reform (World Bank 1994, pp.43-44). A new foreign investment 
code was established in 1992 which does not appear to contain 
any blanket ownership restrictions (Worldmark Encyclopaedia 
of the Nations 2006b). The late 1990s marked renewed civil 
unrest but no evidence of reversal of liberalisation effort (EIU 
1992; 1998). Authorisation requirement applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1992 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
During 1970s government adopted hostile attitude to foreign 
investment resulting in widespread nationalisation of foreign 
assets (Marsden and Belot 1989). In 1979 a new foreign 
investment code was introduced which did not stipulate blanket 
restrictions on ownership. However, under the new code 
authorities had the right to equity participation and the official 
attitude to foreign capital remained antagonistic through the 
1980s and 1990s (UNCTC 1983b, pp.37-38; US Department of 
State 2001b). Authorisation requirement applied to capital 
transfers which were also subject to delays.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-2000 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership (Willmore 1976; 
Hammer et al. 1983, pp.53-55; UNCTC 1983b, pp.145-146). 
Authorisation requirement and special taxes applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1992
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21. Denmark
22. Dominican 
Republic
23. Ecuador
24. Egypt
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership and capital transfers 
(Hammer et al. 1983, pp.59-61).
Ownership restrictions', none 
Profit restrictions', none 
Liquidation restrictions', none
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership (EIU 1972; Hammer 
et al. 1983, pp.63-67; UNCTC 1988, pp.257-259).
Authorisation requirement and ceilings applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions'. 1970-1995 
Liquidation restrictions'. 1970-1995
Andean Pact regulations which stipulated blanket ownership 
restrictions and fade out requirements applied from 1970 until 
1987. However, fade out provisions appear to have been 
maintained for a short period after this (Pfeffermann 1988; 
Grosse 1989, pp.74-77 and pp.l 13-115). A new code introduced 
in 1991 does not stipulate any blanket ownership restrictions or 
fade out requirements (IADB 1997). Restrictions, including 
waiting periods, applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions'. 1970-1991 
Profit restrictions'. 1970-1991 
Liquidation restrictions'. 1970-1991
Blanket ownership restrictions applied through 1960s and early 
1970s. A new foreign investment code introduced in 1974 
included a requirement for a specified amount of local equity 
unless an exemption was provided by a majority vote of the 
prescribed authority. Evidence suggests authorities maintained a 
strong preference for joint ventures through the 1970s and 
1980s. In 1989 an amendment formally lifted this ownership 
requirement (UNCTC 1978b, p. 167; Esfahani 1993; Springborg 
1993; UNCTAD 1999). Ceilings and waiting periods applied to 
capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions'. 1970-1989 
Profit restrictions'. 1970-1987 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1997
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25. El Salvador
26. Ethiopia
27. Fiji
28. Finland
29. France
Legislation introduced in 1969 disallowed foreign ownership of 
small enterprises but no evidence of blanket ownership 
restrictions (E1U 1969). Junta government that seized power in 
1979 embarked on program of widespread nationalisation (EIU 
1980). In 1988 a new, more liberal, foreign investment code that 
does not stipulate blanket ownership restrictions was introduced 
(World Bank 1996). Ceilings and authorisation requirement 
applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1979-1988 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1992 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1992
Classified as socialist by Komai (1992, pp.6-7) from 1974 and 
extensive state intervention and nationalisation throughout the 
1970s (Marsela and Belot 1987). Blanket ownership restrictions 
later enshrined in regulations. Restrictions and authorisation 
requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1974-2000 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership (Hammer et al. 1983, 
pp.79-81). Restrictions, including ceilings, and authorisation 
requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1999 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1999
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership. For a period capital 
transfers required approval but evidence suggests this was freely 
given (Hammer et al. 1983, pp.83-85).
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership. For a period capital 
transfers required approval but evidence suggests this was freely 
given (Hammer et al. 1983, pp.87-89; UNCTC 1983b, p.319). 
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
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30. G abon B lanket ow nersh ip  restric tio n s in m ajo r industrial p ro jects 
p rescribed  in v ario u s fo re ign  investm en t co des in 1960s and 
1970s and an in d ig en isa tio n  decree  in troduced  in 1975 (U N C T C  
1978b, p .76). A fo reign  investm en t code in troduced  in 1989 
requires foreign  co m p an ies  investing  in G abon  to offer shares to 
locals. A u th o risa tio n  req u irem en t app lied  to cap ital transfers. 
O w nersh ip  re str ic tio n s : 1970-2000 
P ro fit restrictions: 1970-2000 
L iqu ida tion  restrictions:  1970-2000
31. G erm an y L iberal po licy  reg ard in g  o w n ersh ip  and cap ita l transfers 
(H am m er et al. 1983, pp .91 -93).
O w nersh ip  restric tions: none 
P ro fit restrictions: none 
L iq u ida tion  restrictions:  none
3 2. G hana From  early  1970s g o v ern m en t ad o p ted  hostile  a ttitude to w ards 
fo reign  investm en t resu ltin g  in b lanket ow nersh ip  restric tions 
being  ensh rined  in leg isla tion . A new  fo reign  investm ent code 
in troduced  in 1985 a llow ed  full fo re ign  ow nersh ip  for 
en terp rises g enera ting  fo re ign  exchange  (M arsela  and B elot 
1987; U N C IT  1988, p .266; U N C T A D  2003b). R estric tions and  
au tho risa tion  req u irem en t app lied  to cap ital transfers. 
O w nersh ip  restrictions:  1972-1985 
P ro fit restrictions: 1970-1995 
L iq u ida tion  restrictions:  1970-1995
3 3 . G reece L iberal po licy  reg a rd in g  fo re ig n  ow nersh ip  (H am m er et al. 1983, 
p p .95-98). W aiting  periods and  ce ilings app lied  to the transfer 
o f  capital.
O w nersh ip  restrictions:  none 
P ro fit restrictions: 1970-1990 
L iq u ida tion  restrictions:  1970-1990
34. G u a tem ala L iberal po licy  reg ard in g  fo re ign  ow nersh ip  (W illm o re  1976; 
H am m er et al. 1983, p p .99 -101 ; US D epartm ent o f  State 1998b). 
R estric tions and  taxes app lied  to  cap ital contro ls.
O w nersh ip  restrictions: none
P ro fit restrictions: 1970-1973 and 1981-1984
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions:  1970-1973 and 1981-1984
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35. Guinea
36. Guyana
37. Honduras
38. Hong Kong, 
China
39. India
From independence authorities adopted a hostile attitude towards 
foreign investment. Major liberalisation effort commenced in 
mid 1980s. This included widespread privatisation and 
introduction of a new foreign investment code in 1985 that 
allowed lull foreign ownership of large projects (Marsela and 
Belot 1987; World Bank 1994, pp.82-83). Authorisation 
requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions'. 1970-1985 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
Socialist style policies which included widespread 
nationalisation of foreign assets adopted from around 1970. 
During early 1970s government stated foreign investment only 
allowed in projects which were majority owned by the 
government. Foreign investment code dating from late 1970s 
stipulates a joint venture requirement (UNCTC 1983b, pp.163- 
165; Thomas 1984; Pantin 1990; Gafar 1996). Abandonment of 
socialist policies and major liberalization effort commenced in 
1988. Evidence suggests that from the early 1990s blanket 
ownership restrictions were lifted (McFeeters 1992). 
Authorisation requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1990 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1990 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1990
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership (Willmore 1976; 
Hammer et a\. 1983, pp. 103-105; 1ADB 1997). Authorisation 
requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1993 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1994
Liberal policy regarding ownership and capital transfers 
(Hämmeret al. 1983, pp. 107-108).
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Various blanket ownership restrictions enshrined in foreign 
investment codes from early 1970s until 1991. These included 
prescribed limits on foreign participation and dilution 
requirements where an expansion of a foreign enterprise 
required local participation (UNCTC 1978b, pp. 128-129; 
Hammer et al. 1983, pp. 109-116). Authorisation requirement 
and restrictions including ceilings applied to capital transfers. 
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1991 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
106
40. Indonesia P residen tia l d ec ree  in 1974 resu lted  in w idesp read  ow nersh ip  
restric tio n s and  in stitu ted  a fade ou t requ irem ent. H ow ever, 
w hile  the an n o u n cem en t ap p ears to have had som e effect 
th ro u g h  the late  1970s, th ere  are  doubts as to how  strongly  the 
m easu res w ere  en fo rced  a fte r this. T he ind igen isa tion  decree 
rem ain ed  o ffic ia l p o licy  th ro u g h  the 1980s and 1990s but the 
tim efram e u n d e r w h ich  firm s w ere  forced  to ind igenise w ere 
leng thened  in 1986 and  1994 (H ill 1989, p p .28-33; 
S astro m ih ard o  1990, p p .80-89; P angestu  and A zis 1994). Som e 
cap ital tran sfe rs  sub jec t to  ceilings.
O w nersh ip  re s tr ic tio n s: 1974-1986 
P ro fit restrictions', none 
L iq u id a tio n  re s tr ic tio n s : 1970-1977
41. Iran B lanket o w n ersh ip  restric tio n s ap p ear to have applied  before and 
afte r 1976 rev o lu tio n  (C B I 1972; U N C T C  1978b, p .167). 
R estric tions app lied  to  cap ita l transfers.
O w nersh ip  restrictions'. 1970-2000 
P ro fit restrictions'. 1970-2000 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions'. 1970-2000
42. Ire land L iberal p o licy  reg a rd in g  ow n ersh ip  (H am m er et al. 1983, 
pp. 121 -124). A u th o risa tio n  req u irem en t applied  to capital 
transfers  un til ea rly  1990s bu t w ere  freely  g iven  th ro u g h o u t the 
1980s.
O w nersh ip  restrictions', none 
P ro fit restrictions'. 1970-1981 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions'. 1970-1981
43. Israel L iberal po licy  reg a rd in g  o w n ersh ip  (U N C T C  1983a, p. 138; 
O E C D  2002). R estric tio n s ap p lied  to  som e cap ita l transfers. 
O w nersh ip  restric tions:  none 
P ro fit restrictions:  none 
L iq u id a tio n  restric tions: 1970-1979
44. Ita ly L iberal p o licy  reg a rd in g  o w n ersh ip  and cap ital transfers 
(H ä m m e re t  al. 1983, pp. 125-134; U N C T C  1986, pp .57-58). 
O w nersh ip  restric tions:  none 
P ro fit restric tions:  none 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions: none
4 5 . Japan O w nersh ip  restric tio n s ap p lied  to  a num ber o f  secto rs until 
refo rm s im p lem en ted  during  1980s (H am m er et al. 1983, 
pp. 145-147). L iberal p o licy  reg ard in g  cap ita l transfers. 
O w nersh ip  restric tions:  none 
P ro fit restric tions:  none 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions: none
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46. Jordan
47. Kenya
48. Korea
49. Kuwait
50. Madagascar
Program of liberalisation, including widespread privatisations 
began during 1970s. However, full foreign ownership 
prohibited until 1985 (Joffe 1993). Restrictions applied to 
capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1985 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1992 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1994
No blanket ownership restrictions enshrined in foreign 
investment code. Historically, authorities have preferred joint 
ventures, particularly during the 1970s, but insufficient evidence 
to presume de facto ownership restrictions existed (UNCTC 
1978b, pp.77-78; Rweyemanu 1987; UNCTAD 2005b). 
Authorisation requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1994 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1989
Joint ventures were required in a number, but not all, sectors 
during the 1970s. Full foreign ownership allowed for export 
oriented production. Over time the trend has been gradual 
liberalisation (UNCTC 1978b, pp. 130-131; UNCTC 1986, 
p.200). Restrictions, including ceilings applied to some capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1981
Liberal policy regarding capital transfers but blanket ownership 
restrictions applied (UNCTC 1978b, p. 168; Joffe 1993). 
Ownership restrictions: 1970-2000 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Socialist revolution in the early 1970s resulted in adoption of 
state-led development policies and widespread nationalisation 
(Schraeder 1995). Constitutional reform commenced during mid 
1980s and included a new foreign investment code in 1985. 
Details of this code are unclear and indications are that official 
attitudes towards foreign investment remained ambivalent 
around this period (Pryor 1990, pp.314-315). In 1990 a new 
foreign investment code was introduced, seeking to attract 
export oriented investment in particular. Evidence suggests this 
code did not stipulate blanket ownership restrictions (World 
Bank 1994, pp. 103-104; 1995). Restrictions applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1972-1990 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1996 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
108
51. Malaysia
52. Mauritius
53. Mexico
54. Morocco
55. Nepal
Some ownership restrictions applied but policy allowed for full 
foreign ownership in export oriented enterprises and under other 
circumstances (Robinson 1976, pp.38-43; UNCTC 1978b, 
p. 129). Authorisation required for large capital transfers but 
freely given.
Ownership restrictions', none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Regulations dating from 1970s allow full foreign ownership in 
export oriented industries (US Department of State 1998c). 
Authorisation required for some capital transfers but normally 
given.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Foreign investment code from early 1970s stipulated blanket 
ownership restrictions. This policy was abandoned in 1986 
when new guidelines allowing full foreign ownership under 
various conditions was allowed (UNCTC 1978b, pp.22D222; 
Grosse 1989, pp.74-77; Nunez 1990, pp.39-45). Restrictions 
applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1973-1986 
Profit restrictions: 1983-1985 
Liquidation restrictions: 1983-1985
Indigenisation degree introduced in 1973 resulted in blanket 
ownership restrictions until partial removal for some sectors 
including manufacturing in 1983 (Haddad and Harrison 1993). 
Authorisation requirement and waiting periods applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1973-1983 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1992 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1992
Effectively closed to foreign investment during the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Industrial regulations introduced in 1987 marked a 
move towards a more open attitude to foreign investment and 
allowed for full foreign ownership in large exported oriented 
projects (Chitraker 1994, pp.34-39; Dabadi 1999; UNCTAD 
2003c). Authorisation requirement and ceilings applied to 
capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1987 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1987 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
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56. Netherlands
57. New Zealand
58. Nicaragua
59. Nigeria
60. Norway
61. Oman
Liberal policy regarding ownership and capital transfers 
(Hämmeret al. 1983, pp. 195-199).
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions', none 
Liquidation restrictions', none
Liberal policy regarding ownership (Hammer et al. 1983, 
pp.205-208). Authorisation requirement applied to some capital 
transfers, which was normally given.
Ownership restrictions', none 
Profit restrictions', none 
Liquidation restrictions', none
Historically authorities have adopted liberal policy regarding 
foreign ownership (EIU 1955; Willmore 1976). However, 
classified as socialist from 1979 by Kornai (1992, pp.6-7). 
Reformist government undertook major reforms from 1991 and 
introduced new investment related legislation allowing full 
foreign ownership in most sectors (1ADB 1997; US Department 
of State 1998d). Restrictions and authorisation requirement 
applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions'. 1979-1991 
Profit restrictions'. 1979-1995 
Liquidation restrictions'. 1979-1995
Indigenisation decrees mandating local participation in foreign 
projects declared throughout the 1970s (UNCTC 1978b, pp.78- 
79). Full foreign ownership not allowed until introduction of a 
new foreign investment code in 1989 (Riddell and Cockcroft 
1991). Authorisation requirement applied to capital transfers. 
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1989 
Profit restrictions'. 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions'. 1970-2000
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership and capital transfers 
(Hammer et al. 1983, pp.217-219).
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions', none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Liberal policy regarding capital transfers but blanket ownership 
restrictions applied (Joffe 1993; US Department of State 1999). 
Ownership restrictions: 1970-2000 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
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62. Pakistan
63. Panama
64. Paraguay
65. Peru
66. Philippines
Widespread nationalisation in industrial sector occurred during 
1970s but sharp policy reversal occurred shortly after. A new 
foreign investment code introduced in 1976 did not stipulate 
blanket ownership restrictions (UNCTC 1978b, p. 130; Hammer 
et al. 1983, pp.221-224; UNCTC 1983b, p.92). Authorisation 
requirement applied to some capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions'. 1970-1976 
Profit restrictions'. 1985-1987 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Ownership restrictions have applied in a limited number of 
sectors. Generally liberal policy regarding capital transfers 
(Hammer et al. 1983, pp.225-227; UNCTC 1983b, pp. 175-176). 
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Foreign investment regulations dating from 1960s do not appear 
to limit foreign equity participation in all sectors (Pincus 1968, 
pp.247-254; Hammer et al. 1983, pp.235-237). Restrictions, 
including waiting periods and taxes, as well as an authorisation 
requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none
Profit restrictions: 1970-1987 and 1995-1996
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1996
Andean Pact regulations which stipulated blanket ownership 
restrictions and fade out requirements applied from 1970 until 
1987 (Grosse 1989, pp.74-77 and pp.l 13-115). Regulations 
during the late 1980s unclear but a suite of new legislation 
governing foreign investment introduced in the early 1990s does 
not stipulate any blanket ownership restrictions or fade out 
requirements (IADB 1997; US Department of State 1997a). 
Authorisation requirement and ceilings applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1992 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1991 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1991
Foreign investment code of 1967 specified a general joint 
venture requirement. Projects granted ‘pioneer’ status were 
allowed to be fully foreign owned initially but were subject to a 
fade out requirement (Robinson 1976, pp.l 18-168; UNCTC 
1983a, pp.97-98). A new code introduced in 1991 lifted local 
participation requirements (Estanislao 1997). Authorisation 
requirement and ceilings applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1991 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1986 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1986
1 1 1
67. P o rtugal L iberal p o licy  reg ard in g  fo re ign  ow nersh ip  (H am m er et al. 1983, 
p p .243-244 ; U N C T C  1986, pp .75-76). A utho risa tion  
req u irem en t, ceilings and  w aiting  periods app lied  to  cap ital 
transfers.
O w nersh ip  restrictions', none 
P ro fit restrictions'. 1970-1986 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions'. 1977-1986
68. Saudi A rab ia L ibera l p o licy  reg ard in g  cap ital transfers  but b lanket ow nersh ip  
restric tions ap p lied  until in troduction  o f  new  foreign  investm ent 
code in 2000  (Joffe  1993; U S D epartm ent o f  C om m erce 2003). 
O w nersh ip  restrictions'. 1970-2000 
P ro fit restrictions:  none 
L iq u id a tio n  restr ic tio n s: none
69. S enegal F o re ig n  investm en t code dating  from  early  1970s does not 
stipu la te  b lanket ow nersh ip  restric tions and ev idence  suggests a 
new  code in troduced  in 1987 w as m ore liberal (U N C T C  1978a, 
p .79 ; S iggel 1994). A u th o risa tion  req u irem en t applied  to capital 
transfers.
O w nersh ip  restrictions', none 
P ro fit restrictions: 1970-2000 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions: 1970-2000
70. S in gapore L iberal p o licy  reg ard in g  fo reign  ow nersh ip  (U N C T C  1978b, 
p. 131; H ä m m e re t al. 1983, p p .255-265). A utho risa tion  
req u irem en t applied  to  cap ital transfers  w h ich  w as freely  g iven  
to  on ly  som e ty p es o f  tran sfe rs  during  the  1970s.
O w nersh ip  restrictions:  none 
P ro fit restrictions: none 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions: 1970-1978
71. S o u th  A frica L ibera l p o licy  reg ard ing  fo re ign  ow nersh ip  (A ilo la  2000). 
A u th o risa tio n  req u irem en t app lied  to som e cap ita l transfers. 
O w nersh ip  restrictions:  none 
P ro fit restrictions:  none 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions: 1970-1986
72. S pain L iberal p o licy  reg ard in g  fo re ign  ow nersh ip  and cap ital transfers 
(H am m er et al. 1983, pp .275-277).
O w nersh ip  restrictions:  none 
P ro fit restrictions: none 
L iq u id a tio n  restrictions: none
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73. Sri Lanka
74. Sweden
75. Syria
76. Taiwan
77. Tanzania
Blanket ownership restrictions lifted in 1977 (Athukorala and 
Rajapatirana 2000, pp.52-55). Restrictions applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1977 
Profit restrictions'. 1970-1977 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1977
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership (Hammer et al. 1983, 
pp.279-282). Historically, authorisation requirement applied to 
some capital transfers, which were freely given.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Socialist style policies and nationalisation prominent in 1960s. 
New government in 1970 placed greater emphasis on private 
sector development but attitudes to foreign investment remained 
hostile. Foreign investment code of 1991 opened up various 
sectors to domestic and foreign private investment but foreign 
participation only allowed in partnership with public sector 
(Perthes 1995, pp.23-79; Efrat 1999). Authorisation requirement 
applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-2000 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
Liberal policy regarding foreign ownership (OECD 1995). 
Waiting periods applied to some capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1987
Socialist style policies and widespread nationalisation of foreign 
assets from late 1960s. Process of liberalisation commenced in 
mid 1980s and first market oriented code was established in 
1990. However, this maintained blanket foreign ownership 
restrictions which were not removed until a revised code was 
introduced in the late 1990s (UNIDO 1986; World Bank 1994, 
pp. 169-170; UNCTAD 2002). Restrictions and authorisation 
requirement applied to capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1997 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1996 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1996
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78. Thailand
79. Trinidad and 
Tobago
80. Tunisia
81. Turkey
Some ownership restrictions existed in the early 1970s but 
exemptions were allowed, including for export oriented 
production (Robinson 1976, pp.68-76). Liberal policy regarding 
capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: none
Liberal attitude towards foreign investment up until 1972 when 
government embarked on program of widespread public 
investment and nationalisation of foreign assets. Blanket 
ownership restrictions enshrined in foreign investment code 
dating from late 1970s. A new foreign investment code that 
does not stipulate blanket ownership restrictions introduced in 
1990 (Hammer et al. 1983, pp.289-291; UNCTC 1983b, pp.192- 
193; Coyne 1995, p.74; US Department of State 1997b). 
Authorisation for profit remittances and capital repatriation 
required until 1993.
Ownership restrictions: 1972-1990 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1993 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1993
Instances of nationalisation during 1960s but gradual move 
towards liberalisation began in early 1970s. Foreign investment 
code of 1972 includes provision to allow full foreign ownership 
in some circumstances (UNCTC 1978b, p. 170; Hopkins 1989; 
Grissa 1991). Authorisation requirement and ceilings applied to 
capital transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1972 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1984 and 1988-1991 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1993
Some ownership restrictions existed during 1970s but no 
evidence of blanket restrictions and move towards more liberal 
policy commenced in early 1980s (OECD 1983; UNCTC 1983b, 
pp.246-248). Authorisation requirement applied to some capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: none 
Profit restrictions: none 
Liquidation restrictions: 1985-1990
1 14
8 2 . U g a n d a W id e s p r e a d  n a t io n a l i s a t io n  o f  f o r e ig n  a s s e ts  th ro u g h  1 9 7 0 s  
( W o r ld  B a n k  1 9 8 2 ) . A  n e w  f o r e ig n  in v e s tm e n t  c o d e  in t r o d u c e d  
in  1991 d o e s  n o t  s t ip u la te  b la n k e t  r e s tr ic t io n s  o n  fo r e ig n  
o w n e r s h ip  ( U N C T A D  2 0 0 0 ) .  R e s t r ic t io n s  in c lu d in g  c e i l in g s  a s  
w e ll  a s  a u th o r i s a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n t  a p p l ie d  to  c a p ita l  t r a n s f e r s .  
O w n e r s h ip  r e s t r i c t i o n s : 1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 1  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 4  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 8
83 . U n i te d  A r a b  
E m ir a te s 43
L ib e r a l  p o l ic y  r e g a r d in g  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s  b u t  b la n k e t  o w n e r s h ip  
r e s t r ic t io n s  ( J o f f e  1 9 9 3 ).
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 3 -2 0 0 0  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e
8 4 . U n i te d  
K in g d o m
L ib e r a l  p o l ic y  r e g a r d in g  o w n e r s h ip  a n d  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s  
( H a m m e r  e t  al. 1 9 8 3 , p p .2 9 3 - 2 9 9 ) .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e
8 5 . U n i te d  S ta te s L ib e r a l  p o l ic y  r e g a r d in g  o w n e r s h ip  a n d  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s  
( H a m m e r  e t  al. 1 9 8 3 , p p .3 0 1 - 3 0 7 ) .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e
8 6 . U r u g u a y L ib e r a l  p o l ic y  r e g a r d in g  f o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  (E 1 U  1 9 7 1 ; 1 9 7 4 ; 
H a m m e r  e t  al. 1 9 8 3 , p p .3 0 9 -3 1  1). A u th o r i s a t io n  r e q u ir e m e n t ,  
ta x e s  a n d  c e i l in g s  a p p l ie d  to  c a p i ta l  t r a n s f e r s .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s :  n o n e  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 9  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 3
8 7 . V e n e z u e la A n d e a n  P a c t  r e g u la t io n s  w h ic h  s t ip u la te d  b la n k e t  o w n e r s h ip  
r e s t r ic t io n s  a n d  fa d e  o u t  r e q u ir e m e n ts  a p p l ie d  f r o m  1 9 7 3  u n t i l  
1 9 8 7 . H o w e v e r ,  fa d e  o u t  p r o v is io n s  a p p e a r  to  h a v e  b e e n  
m a in ta in e d  fo r  a  s h o r t  p e r io d  a f te r  th is  ( P f e f f e r m a n n  19 8 8 ; 
G r o s s e  1 9 8 9 , p p .7 4 -7 7  a n d  p p . l  1 3 -1 1 5 ) . P re s id e n t ia l  d e c r e e  in  
1 9 9 2  l i f te d  b la n k e t  o w n e r s h ip  r e s t r ic t io n s  a n d  fa d e  o u t 
r e q u ir e m e n ts  ( I A D B  1 9 9 7 ) . R e s t r ic t io n s  a p p l ie d  to  c a p ita l  
t r a n s f e r s .
O w n e r s h ip  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 3 -1 9 9 2  
P r o f i t  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 4  
L iq u id a t io n  r e s tr ic t io n s :  1 9 8 8 -1 9 8 9
43 FDI policy indicators coded from 1973 onwards.
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88. Zambia
89. Zimbabwe
Move towards socialism in late 1960s. Constitutional 
amendment in 1969 allowed for compulsory acquisitions of 
private enterprise for public purposes and widespread 
nationalisation ensued during the 1970s. A new foreign 
investment code introduced in 1986 was vague, containing few 
details on important criteria. Structural adjustment program 
began in 1990 and a more detailed, liberal foreign investment 
code that does not stipulate blanket ownership restrictions was 
introduced in 1991 (World Bank 1994, pp. 190-191; Ailola 
2000). Authorisation requirement and ceilings applied to capital 
transfers.
Ownership restrictions: 1970-1991 
Profit restrictions: 1970-1994 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-1994
No indications of ownership restrictions in pre-independence era 
but regulations dating from early 1980s stipulated blanket 
ownership restrictions. Also, classified as socialist by Komai 
(1992, pp.6-7) from 1980. In 1992 a new foreign investment 
code allowing for frill foreign ownership in some circumstances 
was introduced. Restrictions including ceilings and 
authorisation requirement applied to capital transfers before and 
after independence (Chimombe 1986; UNCTC 1988, pp. 101- 
103; Skalnes 1995, pp.143-145; Ailola 2000).
Ownership restrictions: 1980-1992 
Profit restrictions: 1970-2000 
Liquidation restrictions: 1970-2000
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Chapter 5
Determinants of multinational export orientation: the case of 
US multinational affiliates___________________________
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 3, differences in the nature of MNE affiliate production are 
hypothesised to affect the growth impact of FDI. In turn, it was argued that the nature 
of MNE affiliate production is influenced by a range of host country factors, thereby 
providing a link between certain host country factors and gains from FDI. In particular, 
it was argued that a strong human capital base, combined with open trade and liberal 
FDI policies creates an environment conducive to attracting the most productive and 
dynamic forms of MNE production.
As a prelude to analysing the gro wth effects of FDI, this and the following chapter first 
examine the determinants of two different aspects of MNE affiliate production which 
are hypothesised to influence the growth effects of FDI. This chapter presents an 
analysis of the determinants of MNE affiliate export orientation while the following 
chapter examines the determinants of technology transfer to MNE affiliates. By 
examining these issues, the analysis in these chapters aims to provide some direct 
empirical evidence on the underlying hypotheses concerning the heterogeneous growth 
effects of FDI discussed in chapter 3 and explored subsequently in chapter 7.
To briefly recap from chapter 3, MNE export production is hypothesized to bring about 
larger increases in host country productivity than MNE local market production for at 
least three reasons. First, export production is likely to be technologically superior, and 
therefore give rise to greater knowledge spillovers. Second, the nature of the linkages 
that export affiliates establish with local firms are also likely to maximise opportunities 
for knowledge spillovers. Third, export MNE affiliates generally involve larger scale 
operations which may improve opportunities for local suppliers to achieve productivity 
gains through economies of scale.
By definition, the export orientation of MNE production in a given country depends on 
the relative magnitude of export platform and local market MNE production. Therefore, 
host country factors influence the overall level of MNE export orientation by affecting
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the underlying mix of MNE production. Since local market production is primarily 
motivated by market access, larger countries are likely to attract relatively more of this 
type of production and hence have a lower level of overall MNE export orientation. In 
contrast, because export production is generally footloose and primarily motivated by 
access to low cost inputs and a sound operating environment, countries with a superior 
operating environment and lower costs are expected to have higher levels of MNE 
export orientation. Finally, lower trade costs will also increase export orientation by 
increasing the quantity of export platform production and deterring local market 
production.
The analysis employs data on the activities of overseas US manufacturing MNE 
affiliates operating in a diverse sample of countries between 1982 and 1997. Using 
sales data for MNE affiliates a measure of export orientation is derived and employed as 
the dependent variable in a range of empirical specifications. The impact of a wide 
range of host country factors on export orientation is considered. Flowever, following 
the central theme in this thesis, of particular interest is the influence of trade and FDI 
policies, as well as host country human capital.
As discussed in chapter 3, the export activities of MNE affiliates has been examined in 
existing empirical studies. However, this analysis contains a number of original 
contributions. First and foremost, the use of the FDI policy indicators introduced in the 
previous chapter provides a new assessment of the impact of FDI policies, including a 
unique examination of the role of different types of FDI policy restrictions. The 
analysis also incorporates a greater range of other explanatory variables and a longer 
sample than existing studies, and makes use of alternative samples and estimation 
techniques to ensure robust results.
The following section discusses the US dataset used in this analysis and model 
specification. This is followed by an overview of the data sample in section 5.3. In 
section 5.4 the results are presented and discussed while the chapter concludes in 
section 5.5. The appendices provide summary statistics, details of data definitions and 
sources as well as supplementary results.
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5.2 Measuring export orientation and model specification
5.2.1 Measuring export orientation and the US Bureau o f  Economic Analysis 
dataset
As highlighted in chapter 1, international flows of FDI have grown rapidly over recent 
decades, outstripping growth in global output and trade. However, these figures mask 
some significant changes in the nature of international investment and MNE production 
which can only be revealed using detailed production data for multinational firms 
(Lipsey 2003). A rich data source which provides such data for US MNE affiliates 
operating around the world is compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, US 
Department of Commerce (BEA).44 This dataset is used extensively in both this and the 
following chapter, to shed light on the country factors that influence the nature of MNE 
affiliate production.
Since 1982 the BEA has collected on an annual basis a variety of investment and 
production data on US MNE affiliates by way of surveys issued directly to the 
affiliates.45 In most years a standard survey is issued which covers many aspects of 
affiliate production including assets, sales and employment. In addition, ‘benchmark’ 
surveys are issued at irregular intervals which request more detailed operational 
information. Most, but not all, data are available by broad industrial categories. These 
categories have varied over time but in all years data for at least twelve industries, 
including seven manufacturing industries are available. The published data are, 
however, incomplete due to confidentiality considerations leading to the suppression of 
a number of observations (Mataloni 1995).
Of particular interest for the analysis in this chapter are data on sales by US MNE 
affiliates, which are reported for each host country and major industrial classification. 
This data distinguishes between sales by affiliates to the local market and sales abroad 
(exports). By combining the sales data it is possible to construct a measure of export 
orientation of affiliate production.
44 The BEA defines an affiliate as an enterprise in which a single US investor owns an equity stake of at 
least 10 per cent.
45 Data are available prior to 1982 on an irregular basis.
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The dependent variable employed in this analysis, Export orientation, is constructed by 
dividing the total value of US affiliate exports by the total value of affiliate sales, for 
each industry and host country combination, as follows:
Exports
Export orientation^, = ------------------------------ (5.1)
Exports ijt + Localsales ijt
In equation 5.1 Exports represents the total value of US MNE affiliate exports to all 
destinations, Localsales the value of US MNE affiliate sales within the host country, 
while subscripts i,j  and t denote industry, country and period respectively. Therefore, 
the sample used in this analysis comprises a panel which spans host countries, industries 
and time. Using industry, rather than country, level data avoids the potential pitfall of 
aggregation bias that may arise from intra-industry heterogeneity. It also provides a 
potentially richer source of information.
The BEA data used to construct the dependent variables in the analyses presented in this 
and the following chapter are only available for majority owned US affiliates. This has 
the advantage that the data will primarily reflect the decisions of the parent company, 
rather than the influences of other investors which may vary across the sample. A 
downside, however, is that the sample may be correlated with the ownership variable 
included in the analysis, giving rise to possible sample selection bias. Since comparable 
data on non-majority owned affiliates are unavailable it is impossible to investigate this 
issue.
A further restriction on the sample is that it only includes affiliates engaged 
predominantly in manufacturing activities. As noted above data for other industries are 
available, including for petroleum and service industries. However, it is unclear 
whether standard theories of FDI, which motivate the empirical specification, readily 
apply to industries outside of manufacturing.46
Using a sample comprising only US MNE affiliates is not ideal but reflects a practical 
limitation of data availability. On the upside US MNE interests span the globe, as 
reflected in the BEA dataset, and the US has been a major source of FDI over a long 
period. Moreover, a significant advantage of the BEA dataset is that it is measured and
46 Investment in the petroleum industry, for example, will clearly be motivated by proximity to oil 
reserves.
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collected on a consistent basis for all countries, ensuring direct international 
comparability. Another problem avoided is that of varying international institutional 
capacity to collect data. It is well known that in many small developing countries, in 
particular, the capacity for authorities to collect high quality data is limited.
5.2.2 Explanatory variables
The objective of this analysis is to examine the impact of a wide range of host country 
factors on the export orientation of MNE affiliates, with particular emphasis on the role 
of host country policies and human capital. Reflecting this, a relatively diverse set of 
explanatory variables are incorporated in the empirical model, motivated by theories of 
FDI and international production discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Each of the core 
explanatory variables used in the analysis relates to one of three sets of host country 
factors that are hypothesised to determine export orientation. As noted in chapter 3, 
these are trade costs, including trade policies, aspects of the operating environment and 
market size and factor costs.
The primary measure of host country trade policies used is the ratio of total trade to 
GDP {Openness). This is a commonly used proxy which is justified on the basis that 
more open trade policies will be revealed through greater observed trade flows. The 
major advantage of this measure is that it provides a broad indicator of trade policies at 
the national level and is widely available.
However, the use of this proxy has limitations. First, a high trade ratio may reflect 
country specific factors rather than underlying trade policies. Countries with large 
endowments of natural resources will tend to have higher trade to GDP ratios on 
account of these resource endowments. Also, less populous and less diversified 
economies will naturally trade more than larger countries. A second problem is that 
since MNE exports form part of total national exports, by construction the ratio of trade 
to GDP will be correlated with MNE export orientation. Hence, any observed 
correlation between the dependent variable and Openness may reflect a statistical 
artefact, rather than the impact of trade policies on export orientation.
To minimise these problems, two alternatives to Openness are employed. The first is 
the ratio of imports to GDP {Openness imports). Applying this variable addresses the 
problem of the trade to GDP ratio being inflated by exports of natural resources and
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goes someway to correcting the problem of MNE exports being correlated with the 
trade to GDP ratio. If export oriented firms use imported inputs more intensively then 
this measure will clearly be imperfect. Nevertheless, to the extent that it is less 
correlated with the dependent variable than the trade to GDP ratio it represents an 
improvement. Second, a population adjusted measure of the trade to GDP ratio is 
constructed (Openness adjusted) which represents Openness net of the impact of 
population. This measure is derived as the residual from regressing Openness on 
population, which by definition represents the predicted trade to GDP ratio after 
adjusting for population.
An additional dimension of trade policy that may be important in the context of 
explaining patterns of MNE export orientation that may not be adequately captured by a 
general measure of trade openness are preferential or free trade agreements (FTA). As 
with reductions in other trade barriers, membership of an FTA may enhance 
opportunities for export platform production by providing improved access to foreign 
markets. At the same time, by reducing barriers for foreign producers, FTAs should 
also deter local market MNE production (Blomstrom and Kokko 1997). On this basis 
FTA membership is expected to increase export orientation.
A caveat, however, is that many FT As incorporate rules of origin which may prevent 
improved market access for exporters. In the presence of such rules, market access is 
dependent on firms not exceeding prescribed limits on the use of inputs produced 
outside the FTA area (Rodriguez 2001). This may present a binding constraint in the 
case of MNE affiliates which form part of a complex vertical supply chain and use 
foreign produced inputs intensively. In this case such regulations will be incompatible 
with the preferred organisation of MNE production. Therefore, FTA membership will 
not provide an added incentive for export platform production.
To assess the impact of FTAs, dummy variables are included for membership of a 
number of agreements that involve countries included in the sample. In recent years 
there has been a sharp rise in the number of preferential trade agreements but many of 
these were developed after the end of the sample used in this analysis. Dummy 
variables are included for membership of the European Union (EU), Mercosur 
(Mercosur), the Central American Common Market (CACM) or the North American
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Free Trade Agreement {NAFTA). As with the trade openness variable, the coefficients 
on each of these dummy variables are expected to be positive.
In addition to trade policies, transport costs will also have an important bearing on trade 
costs. Incorporating transport costs in this type of analysis poses a considerable 
challenge due to the lack of internationally comparable data. As an alternative to using 
data on actual trade costs, a widely available geography based proxy is used instead. 
Transport costs are likely to increase in proportion to the distance a good must travel 
between the point of manufacture and sale. On this basis the variable Air distance is 
included as a proxy for transport costs. This variable represents the great-circle distance 
between a country and the nearest potential major export market which, on the basis of 
market size, is assumed to be either Europe, Japan or the US. Like lower trade policy 
barriers, lower transport costs are presumed to encourage export production and 
discourage local market production. Therefore the coefficient on Air distance is 
expected to be negative.
An alternative proxy for transport costs experimented with in the analysis is the 
indicator of coastal access proposed by Gallup et al. (1999). This variable, termed 
Pap 100, is the proportion of a country’s population located within 100 kilometres of the 
open sea. The use of this proxy is based on the observation that international transport 
costs are often heavily influenced by proximity to the open sea, especially for remote, 
developing countries. This reflects the superiority of sea transport for the movement of 
many internationally traded goods, especially bulk items over long distances. The 
variable Pop 100 is, in effect, a superior alternative to using a simple landlocked dummy 
which may provide a misleading indicator of whether economic activity is proximate to 
the coast for countries that are not landlocked. A higher value of PoplOO is expected to 
be associated with lower transport costs and on this basis is expected to be positively 
correlated with Export orientation.
The other main policy variable of interest examined is FDI policies. The role of FDI 
policies is assessed using the three policy indicator variables introduced in the previous 
chapter, namely Ownership restrictions, Profit restrictions and Liquidation restrictions. 
As FDI policies form an important element of the operating environment for 
multinational production, the presence of these policy restrictions is expected to deter
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export production in particular. Therefore, the prior expectation is that the coefficient 
on each of these variables will be negative.
An additional aspect of the operating environment that has a direct bearing on costs is 
the tax burden. To control for the effect of different tax rates across countries, a proxy 
variable is constructed using data on actual taxes paid by US MNE affiliates, reported in 
the BEA dataset. This approach is likely produce a superior proxy than one based on 
published tax rates. Many countries offer tax holidays to investors on a discretionary 
basis in which case reported tax rates may differ significantly from the actual tax burden 
faced by investors.
In constructing a tax proxy from reported tax payments data one would ideally divide 
tax payments by gross income, in order to derive a measure of the revealed corporate 
income tax rate. Unfortunately, however, gross income figures are generally only 
reported in the BEA dataset on an aggregated, national, basis. Given that tax rates may 
vary significantly across major industry groups, petroleum production, for example, is 
likely to be different, it is not possible to use gross income data. Instead, the tax proxy 
Corporate tax is calculated by dividing reported tax payments for all manufacturing 
affiliates by the value of total manufacturing sales, for each country. By raising 
production costs at the margin, a higher tax burden is expected to reduce export 
orientation. The coefficient on Corporate tax is therefore expected to be negative.
The level of macroeconomic stability may also form an important element of the 
general operating environment. To control for this factor, the variable Inflation, which 
is the annual change in the GDP price deflator, is included. Like higher taxes, and 
restrictive FDI policies, macroeconomic instability is expected to be particular 
detrimental to export production and on this basis a negative relationship between 
Inflation and Export orientation is expected.
To assess the role of international differences in labour costs, a simple measure of
manufacturing wages is constructed for each country, using data on employee
compensation available in the BEA dataset. This is derived by dividing the total wage
bill for all manufacturing affiliates in a particular country by the number of workers
employed by all manufacturing affiliates in the same country. This series is then
deflated using the US GDP deflator to yield a constant US dollar measure of
remuneration. Therefore, the variable Wage is simply the real average wage per worker
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employed by US MNE manufacturing affiliates. Deriving separate wage measures for 
each manufacturing industry was considered but deemed impractical due to missing 
observations.
Higher wages not only reflect higher costs but are also likely to in part reflect higher 
labour productivity. Therefore, it is necessary to supplement the Wages variable with a 
measure of labour quality. In practice this is difficult as many aspects of worker quality 
are unobservable. Given this constraint, worker quality is proxied using a national level 
measure of the average years of schooling amongst the adult population. The variable 
Years o f schooling draws on data from Barro and Lee (2001). Theories of vertical FDI 
predict that MNE export affiliates will be attracted to countries with lower cost workers. 
On this basis a negative coefficient on Wage and a positive coefficient on Years of 
schooling are anticipated.
While differences in factor costs provide the fundamental motive for MNE export 
platform production, market access is the principal driver of local market production.
To control for the impact of market size the proxy GDP, a measure of real GDP, is 
included in all specifications. With larger markets expected to attract more local market 
MNE production the coefficient on this variable is expected to be negative.
Finally, as the analysis focuses on the operations of firms affiliated with US MNEs, 
rather than a universal sample of countries, it is important to control for any US specific 
factors that might affect the results. One possibility is that US MNEs view countries 
located within the Americas differently. First, the countries of this region are located 
within the US sphere of influence, which may give rise to greater economic, political 
and social linkages that influence investment patterns. Second, these countries are 
located within a similar longitudinal range to the US and therefore within a similar time 
zone which may again influence MNE activity.47 To control for the possibility that 
Export orientation is influenced by either of these factors a dummy variable for location 
within the Americas, Western hemisphere, is included in the analysis.
47 See Stein and Daude (2007) for evidence that longitude affects aggregate FDI flows.
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5.3 Sample and descriptive statistics
5.3.1 Sample
The countries included in the BEA dataset have changed since the first annual 
publication in 1982. Some countries, including Libya, have been omitted while others, 
such as China and a number of former Soviet block countries have been added. Since 
1982, data on MNE operations in up to 63 countries have been published but data for 
only 48 countries are available for every year. The sample used in this analysis includes 
up to 50 countries, 31 one of which are classified as developing. Countries that are 
excluded due to a lack of available data for key explanatory variables tend to be small 
and or available for a very limited period. Collectively countries in the sample account 
for around 99 per cent of all US MNE manufacturing affiliate sales for the period 
analysed.48
The data used in the analysis spans the period 1982 to 1997, with the start and end dates 
dictated by the availability of comparable annual data. While the BEA has published 
data since 1997, the industry classification scheme changed in the late 1990s from the 
Standard Industrial Classification to the North American Industry Classification 
System. As a result the more recent data are not frilly comparable to the earlier data (US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2004). As noted above, the sample is restricted to 
manufacturing industries covered by the BEA dataset over the period of interest. These 
include: food, chemicals, metals, machinery, electronics, transport and miscellaneous 
manufacturing.
Given the high costs of relocating production facilities, the broad pattem of 
international production is unlikely to vary significantly from year to year. Indeed, year 
to year changes in Export orientation may well reflect more noise than useful 
information about the underlying drivers of export orientation. For this reason annual 
data are averaged over multiple years to ensure that longer run relationships are more 
readily identifiable.
The number of years over which the data are averaged represents a trade off between 
ensuring long run patterns are identifiable and the dynamic aspects of the data are fully 
exploited. Just as using annual data are unlikely to be optimal, averaging over the
48 Table A5.5 of the appendix details the countries included in the analysis, including those classified as 
developing countries.
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16 years for which data are available is likely to result in the loss of useful information. 
In the absence of clear guidance on what is optimal, data are averaged over four 
non-overlapping years. By applying this approach a sample comprising four periods, 
each spanning fours years, is derived.49
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Key aggregates in the BEA dataset highlight the increasing importance of export 
platform production for US MNEs since the early 1980s. Between 1982 and 2003 the 
value of exports produced by US MNE affiliates rose from around US$92 billion to 
over US$560 billion. While local sales by affiliates also rose sharply during this period, 
the increase in the value of exports was larger. As a result, the average proportion of 
US manufacturing affiliate output that was exported increased from around 34 per cent 
in 1982 to over 40 per cent by the late 1990s. These figures, together with the 
observation that aggregate FD1 flows have been increasing rapidly, suggest a growing 
importance of MNE production in the world economy and a greater vertical 
specialisation amongst MNE affiliates.
At the same time, the average level of export orientation amongst US manufacturing 
affiliates varies enormously across countries. Table 5.1 lists the ten countries with the 
highest average level of export orientation for US manufacturing affiliates between 
1982 and 1997, as well as the ten countries with the lowest average export orientation.
In less than ten countries more than half of all sales are exported with the top three, 
Ireland, Singapore and Malaysia, exporting more than three quarters. At the other end 
of the distribution, in six countries affiliates exported on average 5 per cent or less of all 
sales. Countries with the lowest levels of export orientation are diverse and include 
small industrialised countries as well as large developing countries.
49 Using data from 1982 to 1997 the four periods in the panel correspond to the periods 1982 to 1985, 
1986 to 1989, 1990 to 1993 and 1994 to 1997.
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Table 5.1: Highest and lowest average export orientation, 1982 to 1997
C o u n tr y E x p o r t  o r ie n ta t io n
T e n  h ig h e s t  a v e ra g e  e x p o r t  o r ie n ta t io n
Ireland 0.86
S ingapore 0.84
M alaysia 0.76
Dom in ican Republic 0.70
Belgium 0.68
N etherlands 0.65
Thailand 0.63
Hong Kong 0.60
Israel 0.52
Denm ark 0.48
T e n  lo w e s t  a v e ra g e  e x p o r t  o r ie n ta t io n
New Zealand 0.09
C olom bia 0.07
Honduras 0.07
India 0.06
South Africa 0.05
Egypt 0.05
Venezuela 0.05
Peru 0.05
Saudi A rabia 0.04
Nigeria 0.00
Notes: average proportion of total sales exported by all US MNE manufacturing 
affiliates between 1982 and 1997. See appendix 5.2 for definitions and sources.
Table A5.1 in appendix 5.1 provides summary statistics for the sample used in the 
empirical analysis. As noted above, in all cases these figures represent averages over 
four year periods. Beginning with the dependent variable, Export orientation, the mean 
observation is around 0.29, indicating that on average just under 30 per cent of all 
affiliate output in a particular industry and country pair was exported in a given four 
year period. Relative to the mean, the standard deviation is a high 0.28, suggesting a 
high degree of variability in the level of Export orientation. Indeed, in a large number 
of countries US MNE activities appear to be focussed on serving the local market while 
a small number of countries attract US MNE activity that is almost entirely engaged in 
exporting activities.
In the full sample, the countries with the highest level of Export orientation tend to be 
developing countries and or have small populations. As noted above, this is expected 
on the basis that larger countries will attract relatively more local market production. 
For just three observations Export orientation has the value of one (that is all MNE
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output is exported). This includes the machinery sector in Ecuador, during the late 
1990s, the food sector in Israel for the early 1980s and the metals sector in the 
Philippines, during the early 1990s.
Aside from these three observations, many of the highest figures for Export orientation 
are for Ireland, particularly in electronics. Amongst developing countries Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand also feature a number of observations above 0.9. Aside from 
all being relatively small, these countries share no other common characteristics, 
suggesting that overall export orientation is influenced by a number of factors.
As with the dependent variable, there is considerable statistical variability in data for 
each of the explanatory variables. Beginning with the three FDI policy indicators 
Ownership restrictions, Profit restrictions and Liquidation restrictions, observed values 
range from zero to one. These values reflect a consistently restrictive or liberal 
approach to FDI policies over a particular four year period. Out of the three FDI policy 
indicators, the mean value of Ownership restrictions is lowest, followed by Profit 
restrictions and Liquidation restrictions. This is consistent with the general pattern 
observed for the full FDI policy dataset discussed in the previous chapter.
The proxy for trade policies, Openness, which is the trade to GDP ratio, ranges from a 
low of just over 0.1, recorded for India during the late 1980s, to a high of around 3.0 for 
Singapore, again recorded during the late 1980s. Singapore also scores the highest 
value for an alternative openness proxy, Openness imports, at around 1.6 during the 
1980s. At the other end of the spectrum the lowest values are recorded for Brazil and 
Argentina, both around 0.05 during the 1980s and early 1990s. Observations for the 
measure of macroeconomic stability, Inflation, accord with prior expectations. The 
highest inflation figures are all for developing countries, especially those located in 
South America, while low inflation observations are generally dominated by 
industrialised countries.
The average value for Wage, the measure of labour costs, is 0.026. As values for this
variable are expressed in millions of constant US dollars per year this equates to annual
remuneration of US$26,000. Observations range from a high of 0.082, for Japan during
the late 1990s, down to 0.003 for China during the early 1990s. As expected, values for
other countries also correlate strongly with levels of development. The highest figures
are dominated by Japan and Western European countries including Belgium, France and
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Germany. Countries at the other end of the spectrum include the Dominican Republic, 
India and the Philippines. The measure of human capital, Years o f schooling, also 
correlates broadly with levels of development. Guatemala and India record the lowest 
levels of average educational attainment, with the former recording figures as low as 2.5 
years. The highest figure is recorded for New Zealand, at 11.8 years.
Reported values for Air distance, used to proxy transport costs, reflect geographic 
isolation from major economic hubs. Countries that record high figures include Japan, 
reflecting distance from Europe and the US, and New Zealand and South Africa, which 
are particularly distant from all three major centres of Europe, the US and Japan. 
Conversely, figures for European countries and Canada are low, reflecting close 
proximity to the major markets of other European countries and the US respectively.
The average figure for Corporate tax, which is the value of income tax paid as a 
percentage of total sales, is around 2.7 per cent. This variable displays considerable 
variation across the sample and there is no obvious correlation with country 
characteristics such as levels of development or economic performance. The lowest 
figure of 0.2 per cent is recorded for Chile during the late 1980s and the highest for 
Brazil at 9.2 per cent, also during the late 1980s. Alongside Chile at the low end of the 
distribution are the Dominican Republic, Ireland, Singapore and Sweden which all 
record figures less than 1 per cent for at least one period in the sample. At the other end 
are Japan, Peru and Turkey.
Bivariate correlations between the variables included in the analysis are presented in 
table A5.2 of appendix 5.1. In general the bivariate correlations between Export 
orientation and each of the explanatory variables are consistent with prior expectations 
as outlined above. This provides some assurance that the model is well specified and 
the proxies used are valid.
All three FDI policy indicators, Air distance, Corporate tax, GDP and Inflation are
negatively correlated with Export orientation, as expected. In contrast, measures of
trade policies, including Openness and most of the FTA dummy variables, and Years of
schooling are positively correlated with Export orientation. The correlation is
particularly strong in the case of Openness. The one outlier amongst these bivariate
correlations is Wage, which is positively correlated with the dependent variable. One
possible explanation for this is that as noted above, higher wages reflect higher quality
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workers that are particularly attractive for export production. This highlights the need 
to control for worker quality, in addition to labour costs, as proposed in this analysis. 
Consistent with the analysis and discussion in chapter 4, there is a high correlation 
between the three FD1 policy indicators, particularly Profit restrictions and Liquidation 
restrictions.
5.4 Estimation strategy, results and discussion
5.4.1 Estimation strategy
Two particular issues arise when considering the appropriate estimation technique for 
this analysis. The first concerns the possibility that the results may suffer from 
endogeneity bias caused by unobservable heterogeneity. As the analysis draws on 
industry level cross-country data, unobservable heterogeneity may arise from either 
time invariant industry or country specific characteristics. The second methodological 
issue relates to two unusual features of the distribution of the dependent variable, Export 
orientation which is illustrated in a histogram in figure A5.1 of appendix 5.1.
The first unusual feature of Export orientation is that it is bounded between zero and 
one, since it is not possible for affiliates within a particular industry and country pair to 
have either negative sales or an export to total sales ratio greater than one. Second, 
approximately 10 per cent of the observations have a value of zero. That is, in a number 
of periods in the sample, affiliates in particular industry and country pairs produced 
entirely for the local market. In summary, the distribution of Export orientation is 
censored at zero and one, with a number of observations taking a value of zero.
In general, using ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate a model where the dependent 
variable features this type of skewed, censored distribution will lead to inconsistent 
coefficient estimates (Wooldridge 2002, pp.524-525). The severity of this 
inconsistency will depend on the nature of the distribution, with a more skewed 
distribution leading to more inconsistent estimates using OLS. To overcome this 
problem it is necessary to use the Tobit estimator, the limited dependent variable 
estimator designed for censored distributions where the dependent variable is 
continuous over a certain range.
The standard solution for bias caused by time invariant unobservable effects with panel 
data is to use a fixed effects estimator which removes the time invariant effect through a
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de-meaning or difference transformation. Unfortunately, it is not possible to combine 
the Tobit procedure with a fixed effects method, as the Tobit fixed effects estimator is 
undefined (Greene 2004). Therefore, a trade off exists between alternative approaches. 
Possible unobservable heterogeneity bias caused by industry or country specific effects 
can be addressed by applying fixed effects. Alternatively, the inconsistency caused by 
applying a least squares estimator to a censored distribution can be overcome by using 
Tobit.
However, it is important to note that the problem of unobservable heterogeneity is 
merely hypothetical. It could be that industry or country specific effects are not 
correlated with the explanatory variables in the model. In this case there would be no 
need to consider the use of a fixed effects estimation technique and the standard Tobit 
procedure would be ideal. This issue can be resolved using a Hausman test which 
compares the coefficients derived using random effects with those from a fixed effects 
procedure. If unobservable heterogeneity causes bias then the results from the two 
procedures will be systematically different.
In applying the Hausman test industry dummy variables are included in the 
specification. Hence, any unobservable heterogeneity arising from industry effects are 
controlled for, leaving country effects as the only possible source of unobservable 
heterogeneity. The test is undertaken in this fashion because industry dummy variables 
would be included in any subsequent specification, irrespective of the estimation 
technique applied.
The results from the Hausman test show that there is no systematic difference between 
the estimates derived using random and fixed effects. The reported p-value for the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the estimates is around 0.4, indicating that the null 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. Therefore, unobservable 
heterogeneity from country effects does not appear to pose a problem in this particular 
application.
As a consequence there is no need to consider trade-offs between alternative estimation 
techniques. The Tobit estimator, which is theoretically superior, is used to generate all 
of the results reported in sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 below. For comparative purposes 
results derived using random effects are reported in table A5.3 of appendix 5.1. Since
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the proportion of dependent variable observations that is zero is relatively small it is 
unsurprising that the Tobit and random effects results do not differ greatly.
Given the empirical specification is not explicitly derived from theory it is useful to 
experiment with alternative specifications. An overly parsimonious specification may 
give rise to biased results if important explanatory variables are omitted. Equally, the 
inclusion of extraneous variables may cause multicollinearity. As noted above, 
alternative proxies for trade openness and transport costs are employed in the analysis.
In addition, the binary indicators of FDI policies are entered separately, and also as a 
composite variable. This experimentation helps to illuminate identification problems in 
the analysis. Changes in results caused by the addition of new explanatory variables or 
the use of alternative proxies may signal fragility while stable coefficients are more 
likely to reflect robust relationships.
5.4.2 Full sample results
Table 5.2 presents the results from applying a variety of specifications to the full 
sample. All specifications include industry dummy variables to control for possible 
industry heterogeneity and robust standard errors are used to infer statistical 
significance. A chi-square test of model significance, which tests whether the predicted 
value of the dependent variable differs between the full model and a model comprising a 
constant term only, indicates that all specifications are highly significant. The pseudo 
R-squared, derived as the correlation between the predicted and actual values of the 
dependent variable indicates that the estimated models explains just under half of the 
variation in the dependent variable.
The first regression includes all three FDI policy indicators, Opermess and all FT A 
dummy variables, the controls for labour costs and quality, Wage and Years of 
schooling, Air distance, GDP and the Western hemisphere dummy. Most of the results 
from this specification conform to expectations. Starting with trade policies, the 
coefficient on Openness is positive and significant. All four FTA dummy variable 
coefficients are also positive, although only European Union and Mercosur are 
significant at conventional levels of significance. These results highlight the importance 
of trade policies in influencing export orientation, especially in terms of general trade 
openness. The results for the three FDI policy indicators are not uniform. While the
1 3 3
coefficient on Ownership restrictions features the expected negative sign and is highly 
significant, neither Liquidation restrictions nor Profit restrictions are significant.
The coefficient on both Wage and Years o f schooling are not statistically significant, 
possibly owing to multicollinearity. As noted in table A5.2 in appendix 5.1, the 
bivariate correlation between these variables in the full sample is over 0.6. However, 
the coefficients on GDP and Air distance are both significant with the expected 
(negative) sign. The coefficient on GDP supports the hypothesis that countries with 
larger domestic markets will, overall, tend to host less export orientated MNE 
production. The negative coefficient on Air distance supports the hypothesis that higher 
trade costs reduce export orientation by both increasing local market country production 
and discouraging export production. When Pop 100 was included as an alternative 
proxy for trade costs (not reported) it was found to be insignificant. Finally, the 
Western hemisphere dummy variable is positive but insignificant.
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Table 5.2: Determinants of MNE export orientation, full sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
O w nership -0.112*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.101*** -0.098*** -0.093***
restrictions (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Profit restrictions 0 .035 0 .036 -0 .036
(0.031) (0.032) (0.022)
Liquidation -0.049 -0.054* -0.048**
restrictions (0.03) (0.03) (0.022)
Capital restrictions -0.021 -0.044** -0.024
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
O p e n n e ss 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.226*** 0.228*** 0.224*** 0.223***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
O p e n n e ss  ad justed 0.223***
(0.015)
O p e n n e ss  im ports 0.425***
(0.026)
EU 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.117*** 0.113***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
NAFTA 0.052 0.055 0.062 0 .079 0.075 0 .057 0.048 0.06
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
M ercosur 0.078** 0.068* 0.082** 0.095*** 0.085** 0.073** 0.046 0.067*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
CACM 0.076 0 .078 0.099** 0.144*** 0.125*** 0.101** 0.115** 0.093*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.05) (0.05) (0.049)
Air d is tan ce -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
W age 0 .123 0 .334 0 .297 0.401 0 .459 0.251 0.739 0.44
(0.766) (0.786) (0.778) (0.789) (0.78) (0.783) (0.793) (0.782)
Y ears of schooling 0 .004 0 .004 0 .005 0 .006 0 .005 0 .005 0.006 0 .006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
G D P -0.017* -0 .015 -0 .013 -0.01 -0.012 -0 .013 -0.026** -0.015
(0.01) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
W estern 0.02 0 .014 0 .009 -0 .005 0 0 .012 0.027 0 .015
h em isp h ere (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
C orpo ra te  tax -0 .005 -0 .003 -0 .007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Inflation 0 .007 0 .006 0 .009 0.01 0 .007 0.009 0 .007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Industry dum m ies Y es Yes Yes Y es Y es Y es Y es Yes
C h i-square  statistic 1010*** 1017*** 1013*** 977*** 974*** 1010*** 989*** 1016***
P seu d o  R -squared 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.48
O bs. 893 893 893 893 893 893 893 893
Notes: the dependent variable Export orientation is the proportion of US MNE manufacturing affiliate 
output exported, by industry and country. All results derived using the Tobit estimation technique.
All specifications include a constant term and industry dummy variables that are not reported for 
brevity. Reported coefficients are marginal effects derived from the unconditional expected value of 
the model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses while ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as the 
correlation between the fitted and actual values of the dependent variable while the chi-square statistic 
is a joint test of model significance. See appendix 5.2 for definitions and sources.
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All of the industry dummy variables, omitted from the table for brevity, are significant 
at the 10 per cent level or better, highlighting the benefits of using industry level data 
that allows for the control of industry heterogeneity. Relative to the base group of 
miscellaneous manufacturing, the industry dummies for food, chemicals and metals are 
all negative. In contrast, the coefficients for machinery, electronics and transport 
equipment are all positive, consistent with the idea that production in these industries is 
internationally fragmented.
In regressions two to eight of table 5.2 additional control variables are added and 
alternative proxies introduced. In regression two, Corporate tax and Inflation are added 
but neither are found to be significant. The addition of these variables makes a small 
difference to the estimates for some variables. Most notably, the FDI policy indicator 
Liquidation restrictions become significant with a negative coefficient while GDP 
becomes marginally insignificant.
In regressions three, four and five, each of the FDI policy indicators are entered 
individually, alongside the full set of control variables. As noted above, the correlation 
between each of these variables is high, especially for the two capital transfer related 
policy indicators, which may pose a problem to inference. When Ownership 
restrictions and Liquidation restrictions are entered individually both feature the 
expected negative sign and are significant at the 1 and 5 per cent level respectively. The 
third FDI policy indicator, Profit restrictions is also negative and is borderline 
significant with a t-statistic of 1.63. These results suggest that multicollinearity may 
indeed plague results for the two capital transfer indicators.
To further explore this problem, in regressions six, seven and eight, a composite 
indicator of controls on the transfer of FDI related capital is created by combining 
observations for Profit restrictions and Liquidation restrictions. The binary variable 
Capital restrictions takes the value of one if the value of either Profit restrictions or 
Liquidation restrictions is one. Hence, the composite variable indicates the presence or 
otherwise of any type of restriction on FDI related capital transfers. This variable is 
negative, as expected, but significant in only one regression.
A second experiment is to use the alternative indicators of trade policies, Openness
adjusted and Openness imports. Both of these variables are found to be positive and
highly significant, while the results on the FTA dummy variables are largely unchanged.
136
Hence, the use of these alternative proxies does not make any difference to the 
conclusion that greater trade openness exerts a strong positive impact on Export 
orientation.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients suggest that changes in FDI and trade 
policies are likely to lead to significant changes in the export orientation of MNE 
affiliate production. The abolition of joint venture requirements, as defined by the FDI 
policy indicator variable Ownership restrictions, is predicted to increase export 
orientation by around 10 per cent. The results for the other FDI policy indicators are 
more fragile but the magnitude of the coefficients suggest that a further 3 to 5 per cent 
increase in export orientation would be achieved by relaxing restrictions on the transfer 
of FDI related capital.
The adoption of more liberal trade policies, as reflected in an increase in the trade to 
GDP ratio of 10 per cent, is predicted to increase export orientation by around 2 to 
3 per cent. This result is consistent with other studies of MNE export orientation which 
report a statistically and economically significant impact from trade openness, including 
Kumur (1998) and Hanson et al. (2001). The results from the FTA variables are mixed, 
consistent with the findings of Shatz (2004). On the whole the results provide some 
support to the hypothesis that FTA membership can exert a positive influence on MNE 
export orientation. Of the FT As examined, membership of the European Union appears 
to cause the largest rise in export orientation, around 11 per cent.
Some of the results reported in table 5.2 differ from those reported in existing studies 
discussed in chapter 3. For example, Kumar (1994; 1998) and Shatz (2004) find a 
statistically significant negative relationship between wage costs and export orientation. 
The insignificant result on the tax variable Corporate tax also contrasts with the 
findings of Hanson et al. (2001) and Shatz (2004) who find robust evidence that higher 
taxes deter export orientation.
5.4.3 Developing and industrialised country sub-sample results
The results presented in table 5.2 are derived using the full sample of countries. In 
estimating a model using the full sample it is implicitly assumed that the model 
coefficients are constant across the sample. In other words, it is assumed that the 
relationship between the dependent variable Export orientation and each of the control
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variables is constant for all countries. It is possible, however, that each of the variables 
considered in this analysis affects MNE export orientation differently for industrialized 
and developing economies. This will be especially true if the nature of export 
production differs systematically across these two groups. For example, if labour 
intensive production is centred in developing countries, differences in wage costs may 
be more important in explaining the determinants of export platform production in 
developing countries.
To examine whether it is appropriate to pool industrialised and developing countries 
together in this analysis a Chow test is undertaken. This test involves estimating a 
model of export orientation using the full sample and adding to the baseline model 
interaction terms between each of the explanatory variables and an industrialised 
country dummy variable. The coefficients on the interaction terms indicate whether the 
slope coefficients differ between industrialised and developing countries. If there is a 
difference, the interaction terms will be significantly different from zero. An F-test of 
joint significance is then applied to the coefficients of the interaction terms, to make an 
overall assessment of differences between the two groups of countries as a whole.
The results from the Chow test are reported in table A5.4 of appendix 5.1. The null 
hypothesis that all the interaction terms are insignificant is rejected at the 1 per cent 
level. On this basis it is concluded that the slope coefficients differ between the 
industrialised and developing countries. To address this heterogeneity, separate 
estimates are derived using sub-samples comprising only developing or industrialised 
countries. The results from this analysis are reported below, in tables 5.3 and 5.4.
Since no developing country is a member of the European Union, the EU dummy 
variable is dropped from the analysis of developing countries. Otherwise, the same 
specifications reported using the full sample in table 5.2 are applied to the developing 
country sub-sample in table 5.3. As with the full sample, a chi-square test indicates that 
all specifications are highly significant. However, the pseudo R-squared is considerably 
lower, suggesting that model fit is not as good for developing countries. Most of the 
industry dummy variables are again significant.
The results for the FDI policy indicators and variables capturing trade openness are
similar to those derived using the full sample. Again the existence of FDI policy
restrictions appears to reduce export orientation, especially policy restrictions captured
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by Ownership restrictions. A more open trade policy stance, as reflected by Openness 
also exerts a positive impact on export orientation. The coefficients on the FTA dummy 
variables are similar for the developing country sub-sample, providing support to the 
hypothesis that FTA membership can boost MNE export orientation in developing 
countries.
Table 5.3: Determinants of MNE export orientation, developing countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ownership
restrictions
-0.112***
(0.036)
-0.109***
(0.035)
-0.104***
(0.03)
Profit restrictions 0.049
(0.035)
0.051
(0.035)
Liquidation
restrictions
-0.063**
(0.03)
-0.07**
(0.03)
Capital restrictions
Openness 0.174***
(0.015)
0.175***
(0.016)
0.185***
(0.016)
Openness
adjusted
Openness imports
NAFTA 0.094
(0.071)
0.102
(0.072)
0.114
(0.07)
Mercosur 0.088*
(0.047)
0.086*
(0.05)
0.107**
(0.047)
CACM 0.063
(0.054)
0.061
(0.055)
0.088*
(0.05)
Air distance -0.005
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.009*
(0.005)
Wage -3.502*
(2.058)
-3.353
(2.129)
-3.498*
(2.09)
Years of schooling 0.012**
(0.006)
0.011*
(0.007)
0.013*
(0.007)
GDP -0.047
(0.071)
-0.071
(0.072)
-0.06
(0.062)
Western
hemisphere
0.024
(0.023)
0.009
(0.026)
0.005
(0.026)
Corporate tax -0.007
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.006)
Inflation 0.015*
(0.009)
0.014
(0.009)
-0.098*** -0.105*** -0.086*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.04*
(0.024)
-0.061***
(0.023)
-0.027 -0.042** -0.032
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.189*** 0.181*** 0.18***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.18***
(0.016)
0.357***
(0.029)
0.102 0.09 0.097 0.123* 0.089
(0.073) (0.072) (0.07) (0.071) (0.07)
0.079 0.058 0.088* 0.093* 0.073
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
0.15*** 0.13*** 0.094* 0.091* 0.095*
(0.045) (0.044) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
-0.004 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
-3.21 -3.112 -3.627* -2.999 -3.776*
(2.135) (2.08) (2.109) (2.087) (2.097)
0.014** 0.013* 0.012* 0.014** 0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.04 0.036 -0.044 -0.15** -0.01
(0.059) (0.056) (0.062) (0.06) (0.062)
-0.001 0.003 0.01 0.019 0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
-0.008 -0.011 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
0.014 0.015* 0.014* 0.019** 0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi-square statistic 487*** 485*** 477*** 454*** 459*** 476*** 465*** 509***
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.26
Obs. 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
Notes: results derived using developing country sub-sample. Other notes as for table 5.2
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The most noticeable difference in the results for the developing country sub-sample 
concerns the labour market variables. Whereas for the full sample the coefficient for 
Wage is positive but insignificant, for developing countries it is consistently negative 
and marginally significant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that most MNE 
export production in developing countries is engaged in labour intensive production that 
is more sensitive to labour costs.
However, the results for Years of schooling suggest that it is not just labour costs alone 
that matter for developing countries. The coefficient on this variable is consistently 
positive and significant, suggesting that higher quality labour also enhances export 
orientation. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that an increase in the average 
level of educational attainment by one year would increase export orientation by a little 
over 1 per cent.
Table 5.4 presents results for the industrialised country sub-sample. The specifications 
used to analyse the determinants of MNE export orientation in the industrialised country 
sub-sample features three minor differences from the specification applied to the full 
sample. First, since the FDI policy restrictions reflected in the policy indicator variable 
Ownership restrictions have not applied in any industrialised countries, this variable 
was dropped. Second, although FDI policy restrictions reflected in the policy indicators 
Profit restrictions and Liquidation restrictions do apply in some industrialised 
countries, they occur together in every instance. Therefore, it is not possible to 
separately identify the impact of each of these variables for this sub-sample. To address 
this latter problem the composite variable Capital restrictions discussed above is used. 
Finally, the Mercosur and CA CM FT A dummy variables are omitted since these 
groupings comprise developing countries only.
Diagnostic tests for the industrialised country sub-sample produce similar results 
reported for the full sample. The pseudo R-squared indicates that the models explain 
around 40 per cent of the variation in Export orientation, only marginally lower than for 
the full sample. Once again the chi-square test statistic indicates the specifications are 
highly significant while around half of the industry dummy variables are found to be 
significant.
The coefficients on each of the alternative proxies for general trade policies are positive,
highly significant and do not appear to be sensitive to model specification. Hence, as
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with the results for the full sample and developing country sub-sample, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that more open trade policies increase export orientation. Indeed, 
the magnitude of the coefficient on Openness suggests that trade policies have a 
stronger impact on export orientation in industrialised countries.
The trade cost proxy, Air distance, also remains negative and significant, indicating that 
high trade costs also reduce export orientation in industrialised countries. However, the 
coefficients on the two FT A dummy variables that apply to the industrialised country 
sub-sample, NAFTA and EU, are both insignificant. The insignificance of the EU 
dummy is a notable difference from the full sample, where the coefficient for this 
variable is found to be large, positive and highly significant. One possible explanation 
is that this variable was picking up other industrialised country factors in the full 
sample.
A second difference with the industrialised country sub-sample is that the proxy for 
macroeconomic stability, Inflation, is negative and statistically significant, in contrast to 
the full sample where it is insignificant. This suggests that to the extent macroeconomic 
stability influences the operating environment, it is only relevant in the case of MNE 
production locating within industrialised countries.
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Table 5.4: Determinants of MNE export orientation, industrialised countries
1 2 3 4
Capital restrictions -0.089* -0.051 -0.048 -0.073
(0.05) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
O penness 0.472*** 0.444***
(0.037) (0.038)
Openness adjusted 0.447***
(0.039)
O penness imports 0.885***
(0.08)
EU 0.031 0.026 0.024 0.031
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
NAFTA 0.011 -0.009 -0.01 -0.015
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
A ir d istance -0.02*** -0.021*** -0.02*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
W age -0.463 -2.016* -1.958* -2.011*
(0.904) (1.049) (1.053) (1.075)
Years o f schooling 0 -0.006 -0.006 0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
GDP 0.015 0.015 0.006 0.016
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
W estern hem isphere -0.056 -0.056 -0.057 -0.062
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
C orporate tax -0.006 -0.006 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation -0.065** -0.066** -0.077***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Industry dum m ies Yes Yes Yes Yes
C hi-square statistic 562*** 624*** 621*** 590***
Pseudo R-squared 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.38
Obs. 429 429 429 429
Notes: results derived using industrialised country sub-sample. Other notes as for 
table 5.2
A third difference for the industrialised country sub-sample relates to the two labour 
market related variables. In the expanded specifications in regressions two to four, the 
labour cost proxy Wage, is negative and significant while the measure of human capital, 
Years o f schooling, is insignificant. This result suggests that industrialised countries 
might compete for export FDI on the basis of labour cost but not quality.
The fact that the coefficient on the labour cost variable is negative and statistically 
significant for each of the sub-samples but not statistically significant for the full sample 
indicates that important differences in the impact of labour costs are obscured in the full 
sample. The estimated coefficient on Wage is around 50 per cent higher in the 
developing country sub-sample, suggesting that MNE export production is far more
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sensitive to labour costs in these countries. Again, this result is consistent with MNE 
production in developing countries being more labour intensive than in industrialised 
countries.
However, it is surprising that worker quality, as reflected by levels of human capital, 
affects export orientation only in developing countries. MNE export platform affiliates 
based in industrialised countries are more likely to specialise in skill intensive 
production. On this basis, one would expect industrialised countries to compete on the 
quality of labour and for the human capital variable to be significant. One possible 
explanation is that the variation in levels of educational attainment amongst 
industrialised countries is very low, making the identification of this effect difficult. A 
second possibility is multicollinearity, caused by the high correlation between levels of 
education and labour costs.
The relatively low degree of variation in levels of human capital amongst industrialised 
countries might also help to explain the more significant results for Inflation and 
Openness reported for this sub-sample. If levels of human capital are very similar then 
it is to be expected that small variations in other relevant factors such as macroeconomic 
stability and trade policies would become more important.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the determinants of the export orientation of MNE affiliates 
using sales data for US MNEs operating in a diverse sample of countries. The analysis 
aims to provide some direct empirical evidence on how host country factors influence a 
dimension of MNE production that is hypothesised to influence the growth effects of 
FDI. Of particular interest is the impact of host country FDI and trade policies, as well 
as human capital.
Theories of FDI predict that three sets of host country factors impact on MNE export 
orientation. Therefore, a variety of explanatory variables are incorporated in the 
analysis. In addition to proxies for trade and FDI policies, controls are included for 
market size, labour costs and quality, transport costs, tax rates and other aspects of the 
operating environment. Many, though not all, of these variables are found to be 
statistically significant with the theoretically predicted sign.
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Amongst the FDI policy indicators, evidence is found to suggest that restrictions on the 
ownership structure of affiliates exerts a strong negative influence on export orientation. 
The evidence for FDI policy restrictions relating to the transfer of FDI capital is weaker 
but indicates that these policies may also have an adverse impact on export orientation. 
As expected, the results also highlight an important role for trade policies. A variety of 
general trade policy proxies are found to exert a positive impact on export orientation. 
However, the evidence on the effects of FTA membership is more mixed, suggesting 
that the specific design of the FTA may be important.
It is also found that the impact of some explanatory variables differs between 
industrialised and developing countries. Although higher wages are found to exert a 
negative influence on export orientation in all countries, the magnitude of this impact is 
much greater in developing countries. In addition, levels of human capital are found to 
be important in explaining inter-country variation in the degree of export orientation 
only for developing countries, presumably due to relative uniformity in the levels of 
human capital amongst industrialised countries.
Having provided some new empirical evidence that host country trade and FDI policies, 
as well as human capital, influences MNE export orientation, the next chapter 
investigates whether these and other factors also influence technology transfer to MNE 
affiliates.
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Appendix 5.1 Descriptive statistics and supplementary 
results
Table A5.1: Summary of statistics
Mean Standard
deviation
M inim um Maxim um
Export orientation 0.292 0.277 0 1
Ownership restrictions 0.105 0.290 0 1
Profit restrictions 0.158 0.349 0 1
Liquidation restrictions 0.215 0.393 0 1
Openness 0.575 0.531 0.111 3.031
Wage 0.026 0.017 0.003 0.082
Years of schooling 7.125 2.263 2.517 11.775
GDP 0.390 0.688 0.004 4.531
Air distance 3.505 2.922 0.140 9.387
Corporate tax 2.677 1.455 0.206 9.194
Inflation 2.218 1.214 0.339 7.084
Notes: see appendix 5.2 for definitions and sources.
Figure A5.1: Distribution of export orientation
r^rrl
Export orientation
Notes: histogram o f Export orientation, based on BEA data for the years 1982 to 1997. See 
appendix 5.2 for definition and source.
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Table A5.3: Determinants of MNE affiliate export orientation, random effects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
O w nership  restrictions -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.09*** -0.087*** -0.085***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Profit restrictions 0 .004 0 .005 0.228*** -0.056**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022)
Liquidation restrictions -0 .03 -0.031 0.059** -0.053**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023)
Capital restrictions -0 .015 -0 .025 -0.014
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
O p en n e ss 0.226*** 0.225*** 0.054** 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.227***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
O p e n n e ss  ad justed 0.22***
(0.025)
O p e n n e ss  im ports 0.427***
(0.046)
E li 0.059** 0.06** 0 .019 0.061** 0.063** 0.059** 0.062** 0.063**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
NAFTA 0.054** 0.054** 0.083** 0.063** 0.065** 0.055** 0.055** 0.056**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.041) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
M ercosur 0 .004 0.002 -0.02*** -0 .018 -0 .015 0 .008 -0.007 0.001
(0.029) (0.031) (0.004) (0.029) (0.03) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
CACM 0.073* 0.072* 0 .726 0.094** 0.076* 0.082** 0.086** 0.074*
(0.042) (0.043) (0.746) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Air d is tance -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.013 -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
W age 0 .722 0 .702 -0 .003 0 .467 0 .485 0.701 1.001 0 .834
(0.713) (0.752) (0.031) (0.746) (0.746) (0.751) (0.761) (0.745)
Y ears  of schooling -0 .004 -0 .004 -0 .002 -0.001 -0 .002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
G D P -0 .014 -0 .013 -0 .003 -0 .006 -0 .008 -0 .013 -0.025* -0 .015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
W este rn  h em isphere 0.001 0 .002 -0.001 -0 .002 -0 .002 0 0.01 0.001
(0.03) (0.031) (0.004) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
C orpo ra te  tax -0.001 -0.088** -0 .002 -0 .004 -0.001 -0.001 0
(0.004) (0.039) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation 0 -0 .046 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001
(0.007) (0.036) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Industry dum m ies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
C h i-square  statistic 343*** 347*** 343*** 321*** 320*** 345*** 333*** 341***
P seu d o  R -squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46
O bs. 893 893 893 893 893 893 893 893
Notes: results derived using random effects estimation technique. Other notes as for table 5.2
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Table A5.4: Chow test for structural break
O w n e r s h i p  r e s t r i c t i o n s -0 .0 8 4 * * *
( 0 .0 2 3 )
C a p i t a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s - 0 .0 4 *
( 0 .0 2 2 )
O p e n n e s s 0 .1 9 5 * * *
( 0 .0 2 5 )
E U 0 . 0 2 2
( 0 .0 2 6 )
N A F T A 0 . 0 7 3
( 0 .0 5 4 )
M e r c o s u r 0 . 0 5 3
( 0 .0 5 )
C A C M 0 .0 8 8 *
( 0 .0 5 1 )
A ir  d i s t a n c e - 0 .0 0 6
( 0 .0 0 8 )
W a g e -5 .0 3 2 * *
( 2 .0 8 9 )
Y e a r s  o f  s c h o o l in g 0 . 0 1 2
( 0 .0 0 9 )
G D P - 0 .0 7 1
( 0 .0 8 3 )
W e s l e r n  h e m i s p h e r e 0 . 0 1 9
( 0 .0 3 6 )
C o r p o r a t e  t a x 0 .0 0 1
( 0 .0 0 6 )
In f la t io n 0 . 0 0 2
( 0 .0 0 9 )
I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y 0 . 2 1 3
( 0 .1 4 8 )
C a p i t a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y 0 .1 2 6 * *
( 0 .0 5 8 )
O p e n n e s s  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y 0 .2 1 * * *
( 0 .0 6 7 )
N A F T A  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y - 0 .0 7
( 0 .0 7 7 )
A ir d i s t a n c e  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y - 0 .0 1 4
( 0 .0 1 1 )
W a g e  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y 4 .9 7 1 * *
( 2 .3 7 1 )
Y e a r s  o f  s c h o o l in g  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y - 0 .0 2 5 *
( 0 .0 1 4 )
G D P  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y 0 . 0 7 3
( 0 .0 8 6 )
W e s t e r n  h e m i s p h e r e  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  
d u m m y
C o r p o r a t e  t a x  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y
- 0 .0 6 3
( 0 .0 8 7 )
- 0 .0 0 5
( 0 .0 1 )
In f la t io n  x  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  d u m m y -0 .0 5 5 * *
( 0 .0 2 3 )
I n d u s t r y  d u m m i e s  
C h i - s q u a r e  s t a t i s t i c  
O b s .
Y e s
3 7 3 * * *
8 9 3
Notes: results derived using random effects estimation. Industrialised dummy equal 
to one for industrialised countries. Other notes as for table 5.2.
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Appendix 5.2 Data definitions and sources
Export orientation: total US MNE manufacturing affiliate exports divided by total sales, 
by industry and host country. All data measured in nominal US dollars.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce.
Ownership restrictions: binary variable equal to one if country imposes mandatory joint 
venture requirement, as described in chapter 4.
Profit restrictions', binary variable equal to one if country imposes restrictions on the 
repatriation of FDI related income, as described in chapter 4.
Liquidation restrictions', binary variable equal to one if country imposes restrictions on 
the repatriation of the proceeds from the liquidation of FDI related assets, as described 
in chapter 4.
Openness: ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. All data measured in nominal US 
dollars.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics online database, World Bank World 
Development Indicators online database and World Bank Growth Resources Database 
(Easterly 2001).
Openness adjusted', population adjusted measure of Openness estimated by regressing 
Openness on total population.
Source: trade data as for Openness, population data from World Bank World 
Development Indicators online database and for Taiwan only, Penn World Table 
(Heston et al. 2002).
The regression applied is as follows (standard error in parentheses):
Openness = 0.6369 - 0.0005*Population 
(0.00004)
Openness imports', ratio of imports to GDP. All data measured in nominal US dollars. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators and World 
Bank Growth Resources Database (Easterly 2001).
EU: dummy variable indicating membership of European Union.
NAFTA : dummy variable indicating membership of North American Free Trade 
Association.
Mercosur: dummy variable indicating membership of Mercosur or the Southern 
Common Market.
CACM: dummy variable indicating membership of the Central American Common 
Market.
149
GDP: real GDP, purchasing power parity basis.
Source: Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2002).
Wage: total employee compensation paid by US MNE manufacturing affiliates divided 
by total employment, by industry and host country. Series converted to constant US 
dollar basis using US GDP deflator.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce, and World 
Development Indicators.
Years o f schooling: total years of schooling of workers 25 years and older.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
Western hemisphere: dummy variable equal to one for countries located within North, 
Central or South America.
Pop 100: proportion of country population located within 100km of coastal fringe. 
Source: Gallup et al. (1999).
Air distance: great-circle air distance to one of the three major economic hubs of 
Europe, Japan or the United States, specifically Rotterdam, Tokyo or New York, 
measured in thousands of kilometres. For Japan, distance to Rotterdam applies.
Source: Gallup et al. (1999).
Corporate tax: income taxes paid by US MNE manufacturing affiliates divided by total 
sales, by industry and host country. All data measured in nominal US dollars.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce.
Inflation: annual change in GDP price deflator.
Source: World Development Indicators.
150
Table A5.5: Country sample
Argentina
Australia*
Austria*
Belgium*
Brazil
Canada*
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Denmark*
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
Finland*
France*
Germany*
Greece*
Guatemala 
Flonduras 
Hong Kong 
India
Indonesia
Ireland*
Israel
Italy*
Japan*
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands*
New Zealand*
Nigeria
Norway*
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Portugal*
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain*
Sweden*
Taiwan
Thailand
Trinidad-Tobago
Turkey
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom* 
Venezuela
Notes: * denotes industrialised country.
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Chapter 6
Determinants of multinational technology transfer: the case 
of US multinational affiliates_________________________
6.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the determinants of technology transfer to MNE affiliates. As 
with the analysis of export orientation presented in the previous chapter, it aims to 
highlight the host country factors that influence an aspect of multinational production 
which is hypothesised to influence the growth effects of FDI. The technological 
capability of MNE affiliates not only influences the productivity of the affiliate itself, 
but also opportunities for knowledge spillovers to domestic firms.
To recap from chapter 3, a number of theoretical and analytical contributions have 
highlighted a variety of host country factors that are likely to influence technology 
transfer to MNE affiliates. One factor is FDI policies, particularly those policies which 
seek to limit foreign control over MNE affiliates. Moran (1998; 2001) argues that 
foreign investors may be reluctant to transfer propriety knowledge to an affiliate that is 
not wholly owned for fear of rival firms gaining access to proprietary knowledge. This 
risk is likely to be particularly acute where intellectual property rights (IPR) are weak. 
Ramachandran (1993) also argues there will be an immediate financial disincentive to 
technology transfer under a joint venture if the parent company is not fully compensated 
for undertaking costly technology transfer.
The theory of FDI spillovers devised by Wang and Blomstrom (1992), highlight two 
additional factors influencing technology transfer to MNE affiliates. One of these is the 
degree of market competition faced by affiliates. In more competitive markets there is a 
need for additional technological resources in order to compete with rival firms. 
Therefore, policies that increase market competition, including more open trade 
policies, are expected to encourage higher technology transfers to MNE affiliates.
A second factor highlighted by Wang and Blomstrom (1992) is host country absorptive 
capacity. Consistent with general theories of absorptive capacity discussed in chapter 2, 
the model assumes that technology transfer will be less costly in countries with stronger 
absorptive capacity, including a better educated workforce. Therefore, affiliates
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located in countries with higher levels of human capital and other technical resources, 
will also tend to be the beneficiaries of greater technology transfer.
The aim of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that liberal FDI policies with respect to 
foreign ownership, open trade policies and higher levels of host country human capital 
all encourage technology transfer to MNE affiliates. The analysis employs data on 
technology payments made by US manufacturing MNE affiliates from the same BEA 
dataset used to analyse export orientation in chapter 5. This dataset enables a 
cross-country analysis of the determinants of technology transfer using industry level 
data between 1982 and 1994. The impact of FDI policies is assessed using one of the 
FDI policy indicators introduced in chapter 4 while alternative measures of educational 
attainment and trade openness are used to test the role of human capital and trade 
policies.
As noted in chapter 3, no existing empirical study has examined the direct impact of 
FDI ownership policies on technology transfer. Nevertheless, a number of studies, 
including Mansfield and Romero (1980), Ramachandran (1993), Urata and Kawai 
(2000) and Desai et al. (2004) provide some indirect evidence. Rather than 
investigating the impact of policy restrictions, these studies examine the effect of the 
ownership structure of foreign affiliates on technology transfer. Each of these studies 
report at least some evidence that technology transfer to MNE affiliates is lower or takes 
place at a slower pace for joint ventures, compared with wholly foreign owned 
affiliates. The aim of the current analysis is to build on these findings by examining the 
direct impact of FDI ownership policies.
The following section discusses model specification, including details on the 
construction of the dependent variable. In section 6.3, data are discussed, including an 
overview of patterns of technology transfer amongst US affiliates, as well as descriptive 
statistics for the sample used in the analysis. Section 6.4 begins with a discussion of the 
estimation strategy, before moving on to a presentation of the results. Section 6.5 
concludes while sample statistics, country coverage, supplementary results and data 
sources are presented in the appendices.
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6.2 Measuring technology transfer and model specification
6.2.1 Measuring technology transfer
To analyse the determinants of technology transfer to MNE affiliates, a proxy for 
technology transfer is constructed using data on technology related payments by US 
MNE affiliates. This measure is then regressed on a number of explanatory variables, 
including measures of FDI and trade policies, human capital and other controls. The 
data for the dependent variable are sourced from the same BEA dataset used in the 
analysis of export orientation in chapter 5 and again relate to majority US owned 
manufacturing affiliates.
The dependent variable for this analysis, Technology transfer, is constructed by dividing 
the total value of US MNE affiliate technology payments by the total value of affiliate 
sales, for each industry and host country combination, as follows:
Technology payments...
Technology transferijt = ------------:-----:--------— (6.1)
Salesijt
In equation 6.1 Technology payments represents the total value of US MNE affiliate 
payments, Sales the total value of US MNE affiliate sales and subscripts i,j  and t denote 
industry, country and period respectively. Therefore, as in chapter 5, the sample used in 
this analysis comprises a panel spaning host countries, industries and time. Once again, 
the use of industry, rather than country, level data avoids possible aggregation bias 
arising from intra-industry heterogeneity and provides a potentially richer source of 
information.
Data on technology payments reflect payments for technology licensing and franchise 
fees for industrial products and processes. While this data are arguably of a high 
standard, and unique in its coverage, the use of data on technology related payments as 
a proxy for technology transfer is imperfect. Such data are likely to provide a good 
indicator of transfers of knowledge embodied in tangible blueprints and designs. 
However, like other forms of data associated with technology exchange, may not 
provide an accurate account of less formal exchanges of knowledge. For example, the 
routine movement of staff between the parent company and affiliate is unlikely to be 
captured. The same is also likely to be true for many informal exchanges of 
information. Where any such interactions fall outside the domain of contracted
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services, technology payments data will understate the true magnitude of technology 
transfer.
Another potential problem with the data is that firms may use technology related 
payments as a guise for transferring capital from the affiliate in order to reduce tax 
liabilities or circumvent capital controls which exempt technology payments.50 
However, this is unlikely to be a major problem with BEA data. This is because US and 
other jurisdiction legislation reduces the discretion of firms to manipulate how 
technology payments are reported in the BEA surveys (Branstetter et al. 2006).
First, there is a general legal requirement to price technology transfers within the 
company in the same manner that would apply to an arms length exchange. Therefore, 
there are clear legal sanctions against US firms engaging in the manipulation of prices. 
Second, technology transfers from parent companies to foreign affiliates are typically 
centrally managed by the parent company. As a result, discrepancies in technology 
related prices are relatively easy to detect by enforcement authorities.
6.2.2 Explanatory variables
The primary focus in analysing the determinants of technology transfer is to examine 
the impact of host country FDI and trade policies, as well as human capital. As argued 
in chapter 3, FDI policies which require foreign investors to form joint ventures with 
local investors are expected to represent a significant deterrent to technology transfer. 
However, despite the relevance of this policy variable, no existing study of technology 
transfer to MNE affiliates has examined its impact. This issue is examined here using 
the Ownership restrictions indicator compiled in chapter 4, which indicates the presence 
of joint venture requirements. Since this variable takes the value of one where countries 
impose ownership restrictions, a negative coefficient on this variable is expected.
The theoretical model of technology transfer by Blomstrom and Wang (1992) highlights 
the importance of market competition in affecting technology transfers. There are many 
factors that are likely to influence the degree of market competition, including trade 
policies. Trade policies are likely to be particularly important in tradeable goods 
sectors, including the manufacturing industries examined in this analysis. On this basis,
50 This is related to transfer pricing whereby firms intentionally misrepresent internal trading prices to 
ease the movement of capital within the firm.
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it is anticipated that more open trade policies increase technology transfer to MNE 
affiliates by increasing the degree of market competition in the host country. Other 
factors, including competition policies, are also likely to be important. However, it is 
difficult to control for these policies in this analysis given the lack of comparable 
cross-country data.
Two measures of trade openness are used in the analysis, labelled Openness and 
Openness adjusted. As in chapter 5, the first of these variables represents the ratio of 
total trade to GDP. As noted in the previous chapter, a shortcoming of this proxy is that 
more populous countries will naturally trade less. Therefore, values for this variable not 
only reflect openness to international trade but also country size. To correct this, the 
indicator Openness adjusted is derived as it is in the previous chapter, as a population 
adjusted measure of Openness. Both of these measures are expected to be positively 
correlated with Technology transfer.
Proxies for human capital are included to capture the role of absorptive capacity in 
aiding technology transfer. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the availability of 
adequate human capital is likely to have a bearing on the costs of technology transfer, 
an idea grounded in broader theories of the complementarity between the embodied 
knowledge of workers and disembodied knowledge. In this analysis, the impact of 
human capital is assessed using two alternative measures of educational attainment from 
the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset. The main variable used, Years o f schooling, reflects 
the average years of schooling amongst the adult population. An alternative variable, 
Years o f secondary schooling, reflects years of secondary schooling.
Another factor that is likely to impact on technology transfer is IPR. Like joint venture 
requirements, weak IPR may pose risks to the ownership and control of proprietary 
assets (Branstetter et al. 2006). Even where a parent company has full control over a 
foreign affiliate, opportunities for rivals to appropriate priority knowledge through such 
mechanisms as demonstration effects and labour turnover will abound. Without strong 
IPR there will be no recourse to legal sanctions if technology is misappropriated.
In this analysis, the strength of IPR is proxied using the measure of property rights 
protection proposed by Clague et al. (1999). Termed Contract intensive money, this 
measure is constructed as the proportion of broad money held in forms other than
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currency. It is premised on the idea that the level of confidence economic agents have 
in contract enforcement and property rights will be reflected by their willingness to hold 
wealth in forms that depend on contract enforcement, including financial instruments 
other than currency. The primary attraction of this variable over alternative measures of 
institutional quality is that it is objective, in that it reflects the actions of independent 
economic agents, and is widely available.
Strictly speaking this variable is designed to reflect the strength of private property 
rights, rather than IPR as such. However, since strong private property rights and IPR 
are both underpinned by the same legal principals it is likely that the two are strongly 
correlated. Furthermore, there is a dearth of alternative data, as highlighted by the 
Branstetter et al. (2006) study which relies on an IPR indicator compiled specifically for 
that study.51 Finally, Clague et al. (1999) report that the monetary based proxy is 
strongly correlated with subjective measures of property rights, providing some 
assurance that the variable is well founded.
As noted above, it is possible that firms use intra firm technology related payments to 
reduce tax liabilities and or circumvent capital controls. If this were the case then the 
presence of capital restrictions or high corporate taxes would be associated with higher 
levels of technology payments as firms seek to exploit this ‘loophole’. As discussed 
there are doubts as to how effectively US MNEs can manipulate technology payments. 
Nevertheless, to ensure that the misreporting of payments does not affect the 
interpretation of the results, two additional control variables are included.
As discussed in section 5.2.2 of chapter 5, this variable offers the advantage of 
providing a very good indicator of the actual tax burden faced by firms. However, a 
draw back is the possibility that it may be endogenous in the sense that firms may aim 
to manipulate technology payments to minimise tax liabilities. In the absence of 
instrumental variables or alternative proxy variables that cover the sample of interest, 
examining the precise nature of this issue is difficult.
The first is the FDI policy indicator introduced in chapter 4 which details restrictions on 
the transfer of income earned on FDI, Profit restrictions. The second is a proxy for the 
tax liabilities faced by MNE affiliates. The variable used is the same tax proxy
51 The IPR indicator compiled by Branstetter et al. (2006) was not considered for this analysis as it is only 
available for a small number of countries.
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employed in the previous chapter, Corporate tax, which is based on actual taxes paid by 
US MNE manufacturing affiliates. If MNEs seek to manipulate technology payments it 
is expected that the coefficient on one or both of these variables will be positive.
Finally, as with the analysis of the determinants of export orientation presented in 
chapter 5, industry dummy variables are included to capture industry specific effects.
As in chapter 5, the dummy variable Western hemisphere is also included which takes a 
value of one for countries located within the Americas. This variable is included on 
account of the data covering only US MNEs which may view the countries of the 
Americas differently owing to geographic or political factors not adequately controlled 
for by the other explanatory variables.
6.3 Sample and descriptive statistics
6.3.1 Sample
Data on technology payments has not been collected by the BEA on an annual basis. 
Rather, this data was collected as part of the ‘benchmark surveys’ that are undertaken to 
collect more detailed operational data on an irregular basis. Benchmark surveys that 
contain information on technology payments that are used in this analysis pertain to the 
years 1982, 1989 and 1994.
As with the regular annual BEA publications, each of the benchmark surveys provide 
data on the activities of US MNE manufacturing affiliates by major industrial 
classification across a large sample of countries. However, as noted in section 5.2.1 of 
chapter 5, some BEA data are suppressed from publication due to confidentiality 
requirements. In addition, a small number of countries are dropped from the sample due 
to a lack of data for some explanatory variables. The final sample used in the analysis 
includes up to 43 countries, 24 of which are classified as developing.52 The sample also 
includes data for the same 7 manufacturing industries covered in the analysis in the 
previous chapter. These are: food, chemicals, metals, machinery, electronics, transport 
and miscellaneous manufacturing.
52 Table A6.5 of the appendix details the countries included in the analysis, including those classified as 
developing countries.
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6.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The BEA data show a sharp increase in technology payments by US manufacturing 
MNE affiliates between 1982 and 1994. During this period the value of total royalties 
and license payments rose from around US$3 billion to well over US$13 billion. 
Significantly, these payments rose faster than total sales, resulting in the ratio of 
payments to total sales almost doubling. This suggests a strong upward trend in how 
intensively technology is used by US MNE manufacturing affiliates. This pattern is 
consistent with a process of increasing international vertical specialisation, where 
MNEs consolidate resources devoted to each part of a global supply chain, including 
technology, in a particular location.
There is a large degree of variation in the average value of transfers across host 
countries. Table 6.1 provides a snapshot of these differences by listing the ten countries 
where US MNE manufacturing affiliates recorded the highest and lowest average levels 
of technology payments over the years 1982, 1989 and 1994. Since payments for 
technology are small relative to sales, the value of payments is scaled by 100.
Therefore, values of Technology transfer are expressed as the number of cents spent on 
technology payments per US dollar of sales.
US manufacturing affiliates in Japan and Ireland are by far the largest recipients of 
technology, with payments in excess of 4 cents per dollar of sales. Also featuring high 
on the list are a number of European countries with high technology manufacturing 
industries, including the Netherlands and Sweden. Only one developing country, China, 
ranks in the top ten. Countries receiving the lowest levels of technology are all 
classified as developing. The list includes countries with a history of adopting 
restrictive FDI policies, including India, Nigeria and Venezuela. However, Malaysia, 
which, as noted in the previous chapter, has a history of hosting export oriented MNE 
production, also features.
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Table 6.1: Highest and lowest average levels of technology transfer, 1982 to 1994
C o u n try T e c h n o lo g y  tra n s fe r
Ten highest recip ients o f technology
Japan 4.94
Ireland 4.04
Netherlands 2.76
Sweden 2.54
Italy 2.45
France 2.27
Egypt 2.22
Finland 2.21
China 2.04
Germ any 1.89
Ten lowest recip ients o f technology
Nigeria 0.44
Venezuela 0.44
Israel 0.44
Malaysia 0.39
Colombia 0.34
India 0.34
Brazil 0.14
Dom inican Republic 0.12
Honduras 0
Trinidad and Tobago 0
Notes: ratio of total technology payments to sales for all US MNE manufacturing 
affiliates averaged over the years 1982, 1989 and 1994. See appendix 6.2 for 
definitions and sources.
Table A6.1 in appendix 6.1 provides summary statistics for Technology transfer and 
explanatory variables for the sample used for the empirical analysis. The mean value of 
Technology transfer across all countries, industries and years is 1.2 cents per dollar of 
sales. The average for industrialised countries, 1.4 cents per dollar, is notably higher 
than for developing countries, 1 cent per dollar. There are also large differences across 
industries, with average payments ranging from a high of 2 cents per dollar for 
chemicals down to 0.4 cents for transport.
The high standard deviation of Technology transfer is likely to partly reflect many zero 
observations in the sample. In contrast, the highest observation in the sample is 12.2 
cents per dollar of sales for the chemicals industry in Ireland in 1994. Although 
developing countries have lower payments on average, it is not the case that 
industrialised countries account for all of the highest observations in the sample. 
Countries as diverse as China, Ecuador and Thailand feature in the highest twenty
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observations for Technology transfer in particular periods and industries, along with the 
likes of Japan, the Netherlands and the UK.
There is also a high degree of sample variation for the explanatory variables. Beginning 
with Openness, a number of countries in the sample record trade to GDP ratios of less 
than 0.2, including Argentina, Brazil and India. In contrast, very open economies 
including Belgium, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore have trade to GDP ratios 
greater than one. For Years o f schooling, the worst performers are Guatemala and India, 
both recording figures of less than 3 years of schooling amongst the adult population in 
1982. The highest average levels of education are for Canada, New Zealand and 
Norway, all in excess of 11 years of schooling.
As expected, the measure of property rights security, Contract intensive money, broadly 
correlates with average levels of development. Countries with the lowest observations 
include the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Indonesia while Finland, New Zealand 
and the UK all score highly. Nevertheless, there are some observations that appear to 
be at odds with prior expectations. For example, Argentina scores poorly while the 
figure for Brazil is comparable to many industrialised countries. As in the sample used 
to analyse export orientation in the previous chapter, there are many observations for 
Corporate tax that suggest MNE affiliates benefited from special tax breaks. For 
example, the lowest observation of 0.21 per cent, which applied to Chile in 1989, 
indicates that taxes paid by affiliates amounts to less than half of one per cent of total 
sales. In contrast, the highest observation is 7.2 per cent, recorded for Japan in 1989.
Bivariate correlations between the main explanatory variables are presented in table 
A6.2 of appendix 6.1. Overall, the direction of correlation generally conforms to prior 
expectation although the strength of correlation in most cases appears weak. As 
expected, Technology transfer is negatively correlated with Ownership restrictions and 
positively correlated with Openness, Years o f schooling and Contract intensive money.
A negative bivariate correlation is observed between Technology transfer and both 
Profit restrictions and Corporate tax. This provides some assurance that the technology 
payments data have not been manipulated by MNEs to avoid capital controls or 
minimise tax liabilities.
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6.4 Estimation strategy, results and discussion
6.4.1 Estimation strategy
Analysing the determinants of technology transfer presents similar methodological 
challenges to those faced in the analysis of export orientation in chapter 5. Once again, 
the analysis draws on industry level cross-country data, raising the possibility of 
unobservable heterogeneity bias arising from either time invariant industry or country 
specific effects. Second, the distribution of the dependent variable, Technology 
transfer, illustrated in figure A6.1 of appendix 6.1, shares two of the unusual 
characteristics of the dependent variable used in the analysis of export orientation.
First, Technology transfer has a lower bound of zero since it is not possible for affiliates 
within a particular industry and country pair to have negative technology payments. 
Second, approximately 15 per cent of the observations have a value of zero. This means 
that for a number of country and industry combinations in the sample, affiliates made no 
technology related payments. In summary, Technology transfer features a distribution 
that is censored at zero and has a relatively high frequency of observations equal to 
zero.
As noted in section 5.4.1 of chapter 5, the limited dependent variable estimator Tobit is 
ideal for estimation where the dependent variable features this type of censored 
distribution. The other potential problem, unobservable heterogeneity, is usually 
addressed by using a fixed effects estimator which removes the time invariant effect 
through a de-meaning or difference transformation. However, since the fixed effects 
Tobit estimator is undefined, it is not possible to implement a technique which 
combines the virtues of Tobit and the fixed effects estimator (Greene 2004). Hence, as 
with the analysis in chapter 5, there exists a potential trade off between using a fixed 
effects estimator and not properly addressing the issue of the censored distribution, or 
using a Tobit estimator and leaving potential unobservable heterogeneity unchecked.
As in chapter 5, the approach taken here is to first examine whether unobservable
heterogeneity is indeed a problem by way of a Hausman specification test. To briefly
reiterate, this test compares the coefficients from a model of technology transfer derived
using the random effects estimator which does not control for unobservable
heterogeneity, to those from a fixed effects estimator. If unobservable heterogeneity
causes the estimates to be biased then the results from applying the two estimation
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techniques will differ. As in chapter 5, industry dummy variables are included in the 
specifications used in the test. The inclusion of these dummies controls for industry 
effects, leaving country effects as the only possible source of unobservable 
heterogeneity. The test is undertaken in this manner as industry dummy variables 
would be included in any subsequent estimation, irrespective of the estimation 
technique chosen to undertake the final analysis.
As in chapter 5, the results from the Hausman test show there is no systematic 
difference between the estimates derived using random and fixed effects. The reported 
p-value for the null hypothesis of no difference between the models is around 0.3, 
indicating that the null cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. This 
suggests that unobservable heterogeneity from country effects does not pose a problem 
to this analysis. Therefore, the theoretically superior Tobit estimator is used to generate 
all of the results reported in sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 below. As in chapter 5, 
comparative results derived using random effects are reported in appendix 6.1 and again 
do not differ significantly from the Tobit results.
6.4.2 Full sample results
Table 6.2 presents results on the determinants of technology transfer, based on the full 
sample. All specifications include industry dummy variables to control for possible 
industry heterogeneity. In all cases robust standard errors are reported and used to infer 
statistical significance. The pseudo R-squared, which is the correlation between the 
predicted and actual values of the dependent variable indicates the models explain 
approximately 20 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable. Despite this 
relatively low figure a chi-square test of model significance indicates that all 
specifications are statistically significant.
The coefficients on all of the industry dummy variables, omitted from the table for 
brevity, are significant except for electronics. The significance of the industry dummy 
variables highlights the benefits of using industry level data that allows for the control 
of industry heterogeneity. Relative to the base group of miscellaneous manufacturing, 
the industry dummy for chemicals is positive while the industry dummies for food, 
metals, industrial machinery and transport equipment are all negative.
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Beginning with regression one, the coefficient on Ownership restrictions is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Consistent with the results reported in 
other studies on technology transfer which control for human capital, the coefficient on 
Years o f schooling is positive at the 1 per cent level. The other three explanatory 
variables, Openness, Contract intensive money and Western Hemisphere are all 
insignificant, although the first two of these feature the expected positive sign.
In regressions two and three the additional control variables Corporate tax and Profit 
restrictions are added to the base specification. The coefficients on both of these 
variables are negative but neither is significant. The results for the existing variables 
are largely unchanged. This suggests that technology payments are not influenced in 
any systematic manner by restrictions on the repatriation of FDI related income, or the 
level of host country corporate tax.
Alternative measures of human capital and trade openness are introduced in regressions 
four and five. First, the population adjusted measure of trade openness, Openness 
adjusted is used in lieu of Openness and then Years o f secondary schooling is used as a 
substitute for Years of schooling. The modified openness variable appears to make little 
difference to the results. Like Openness, Openness adjusted features the expected 
positive sign but is insignificant at the 10 per cent level. However, the alternative 
human capital proxy, based on years of secondary schooling, is insignificant. This 
suggests some fragility may exist in the relationship between Technology transfer and 
levels of educational attainment.
The magnitude of the coefficient on Ownership restrictions implies that a change in 
policy to allow the establishment of at least some wholly owned foreign affiliates would 
lead to an increase in technology payments of approximately 0.35 cents per dollar of 
sales. This represents a significant increase relative to the average level of payments 
across the full sample. In comparison, the coefficient on Years o f schooling implies that 
technology payments would rise by around 0.07 cents per dollar in response to a one 
year increase in the average level of educational attainment.
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Table 6.2: Determinants of MNE technology transfer, full sample
1 2 3 4 5
O wnership restrictions -0.346** -0.356** -0.34** -0.331** -0.357**
(0.165) (0.166) (0.165) (0.165) (0.164)
Openness 
Openness adjusted
0.139
(0.145)
0.102
(0.157)
0.082
(0.154)
0.116
(0.153)
0.061
(0.153)
Years o f schooling
Years o f secondary 
schooling
0.079***
(0.026)
0.073***
(0.028)
0.064**
(0.027)
0.066**
(0.027)
0.075
(0.047)
Contract intensive 0.971 0.773 0.35 0.421 0.823
money (1.164) (1.157) (1.154) (1.141) (1.149)
W estern hem isphere -0.194 -0.186 -0.168 -0.153 -0.172
(0.118) (0.117) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
Corporate tax 
Profit restrictions
-0.04
(0.042)
-0 .035
(0.043)
-0.26
(0.188)
-0.031
(0.042)
-0.265
(0.191)
-0.044
(0.043)
-0.294
(0.187)
Industry dum m ies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
C hi-square statistic 88*** 88*** 93*** 93*** 93***
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18
Obs. 427 422 422 422 422
Notes: the dependent variable Technology transfer is the ratio of payments of royalties and 
licence fees to total sales for US MNE manufacturing affiliates, by industry and country. 
All results derived using Tobit estimation technique. All specifications include a constant 
term and industry dummy variables that are not reported for brevity. Reported coefficients 
are marginal effects derived from the unconditional expected value of the model. Robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses while ***, ** and * demote statistical significance 
at the 1,5 and 10 per cent level respectively. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as the 
correlation between the fitted and actual values of the dependent variable while the chi- 
square statistic is a joint test of model significance. See appendix 6.2 for definitions and 
sources.
The lack of statistical support for the hypothesis that property rights or trade openness 
influences technology transfer is somewhat surprising but may reflect the quality of the 
proxy variables used. While greater openness to trade is expected to enhance 
competition by exposing domestic firms to foreign rivals there are likely to be many 
other factors, notably government regulations, which also influence competition. The 
proxy for IPR, Contract intensive money, also has limitations. In particular, as noted 
above, this variable is designed to reflect the strength of private property rights at large, 
rather than IPR specifically. Alternatively, these results may indicate differences in the 
relevance of these variables for different groups of countries, an issue which is 
examined in the next section.
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6.4.3 Developing and industrialised country sub-sample results
The results reported in table 6.2 are based on the full sample of countries. Pooling 
countries in this manner assumes that the model coefficients are constant across all 
countries. However, it may be more reasonable to assume that at least some of the 
control variables affect technology transfer to MNE affiliates in industrialized and 
developing economies differently. This is especially so if production processes and 
technology usage differs between these groups of countries. As noted above, affiliates 
which are the recipients of the highest levels of technology transfer tend to be located in 
industrialised countries. This suggests that higher technology production is 
concentrated in industrialised countries, possibly owing to complementarities between 
human capital and disembodied technology. In this case it is likely that the strength of 
intellectual property rights, for example, will matter more in industrialised countries.
To examine whether the model coefficients differ between developing and industrialised 
countries a Chow test is undertaken. As in chapter 5, this test involves estimating a 
model of technology transfer using the full sample and adding to the baseline model 
interaction terms between each of the explanatory variables and an industrialised 
country dummy variable. Inferences about whether the slope coefficients differ 
between the industrialised and developing countries are made by examining the 
coefficients on the interaction terms. An overall assessment of differences between the 
two groups of countries can then be made by applying an F-test of joint significance to 
the coefficients of the interaction terms.
The null hypothesis that all of the interaction terms are insignificant is rejected at the 
1 per cent level. Therefore, the test indicates that the slope coefficients do indeed differ 
between industrialised and developing countries. On this basis, models are separately 
estimated using sub-samples for each of these groups. The results for developing 
countries are reported in table 6.3 and in table 6.4 for industrialised countries.
For the developing country sub-sample, the same specifications used to generate the 
results reported in table 6.2 are again used. For this sub-sample the pseudo R-squared is 
fractionally lower while the chi-square test statistic indicates the specifications are again 
highly significant. The coefficient on Ownership restrictions is again negative and 
significant, albeit at the 10 per cent level. The magnitude of the coefficient is once
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again large, suggesting that the removal of this policy restriction would increase 
technology transfer to MNE affiliates markedly.
As with the results based on the full sample, the coefficients on Contract intensive 
money and alternative measures of openness are again insignificant. A notable 
difference, however, is that the coefficients on the human capital variables are 
insignificant in a majority of specifications. This is perhaps surprising given prior 
expectations regarding the importance of human capital.
Table 6.3: Determinants of MNE technology transfer, developing countries
1 2 3 4 5
O w nership  restrictions -0 .299* -0 .294* -0 .282* -0 .275* -0 .291*
(0 .1 6 6 ) (0 .1 6 6 ) (0 .1 6 4 ) (0 .1 6 5 ) (0 .1 6 4 )
O p e n n e ss 0 .071 0 .0 1 4 -0 .0 0 8 -0 .0 2 8
(0 .1 5 7 ) (0 .1 7 2 ) (0 .1 6 7 ) (0 .1 7 3 )
O p e n n e ss  adjusted 0 .0 2 8
(0 .1 6 9 )
Y ears of sch oolin g 0 .099* 0 .0 6 3 0 .0 5 7 0 .0 5 9
(0 .0 5 1 ) (0 .0 5 7 ) (0 .0 5 6 ) (0 .0 5 6 )
Y ears of seco n d a ry 0 .0 8 2
sch oo lin g (0 .1 4 9 )
Contract in ten sive  m on ey -0 .2 1 3 -0 .1 9 -0 .7 6 8 -0 .7 6 2 -0 .6 2 6
(1 .3 7 3 ) (1 .3 9 5 ) (1 .3 8 3 ) (1 .3 7 3 ) (1 .39 )
W estern  h em isp h ere -0 .151 -0 .1 2 9 -0 .121 -0 .0 9 8 -0 .1 2 2
(0 .1 8 ) (0 .1 7 8 ) (0 .1 8 ) (0 .1 8 2 ) (0 .1 7 8 )
C orporate tax -0 .088* -0 .0 7 6 -0 .071 -0 .087*
(0 .0 4 9 ) (0 .0 5 3 ) (0 .0 5 2 ) (0 .05 )
Profit restrictions -0 .2 8 6 -0 .2 8 3 -0 .2 9 4
(0 .1 8 1 ) (0 .1 8 8 ) (0 .1 8 2 )
Industry d um m ies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
C hi-square statistic 34*** 38*** 48*** 48*** 52***
P se u d o  R -squared 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 6
O bs. 193 190 190 190 190
Notes: results derived using developing country sub-sample. Other notes as for table 6.2.
The same empirical specifications estimated with the full sample are applied to the 
industrial country sub-sample with one exception. The FDI policy indicator Ownership 
restrictions is not included as this type of policy restriction does not apply in any 
industrialised country. For this sub-sample the pseudo R-squared falls to around 0.1 but 
the chi-square test statistic of model significance indicates the specifications are highly 
significant.
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The results for the industrialised country sub-sample differ considerably from those 
reported using both the full sample and the developing country sub-sample. First, the 
proxy for property rights protection, Contract intensive money, is positive and highly 
significant, indicating that stronger 1PR encourages greater technology transfer to 
affiliates located in industrialised countries. Second, alternative trade based proxies for 
market competition, Openness and Openness adjusted, are also positive and significant. 
This result supports the hypothesis that greater market competition, brought about by 
trade openness, encourages technology transfer to affiliates. It is also consistent with 
the findings of Blomstrom et al. (1994a) and Kokko and Blomstrom (1995), who find 
that technology transfer is positively correlated with alternative proxies for market 
competition.
Table 6.4: Determinants of MNE technology transfer, industrialised countries
1 2 3 4 5
Openness 0.827** 1.048** 1.057*** 1.049***
(0.398) (0.405) (0.404) (0.402)
Openness adjusted 1.134***
(0.414)
Years o f schooling -0.001 -0.012 -0.007 -0.006
(0.044) (0.044) (0.039) (0.039)
Years of secondary -0.025
schooling (0.054)
C ontract intensive 5.503*** 5.916*** 6.051*** 6.258*** 6.042***
money (1.991) (2.015) (2.113) (2.127) (2.052)
W estern hem isphere -0.088 0.028 0.019 0.02 0.032
(0.192) (0.202) (0.2) (0.199) (0.188)
Corporate tax 0.118* 0.118* 0.118* 0.118*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.069) (0.069)
Profit restrictions 0.161 0.191 0.143
(0.56) (0.561) (0.567)
Industry dumm ies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
C hi-square statistic 96*** 99*** 98*** 98*** 98***
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
Obs. 234 232 232 232 232
Notes: results derived using industrialised country sub-sample. Other notes as for table 6.2.
Neither of the human capital proxies are significant which is again surprising given the 
hypothesised importance of absorptive capacity to the successful transfer and utilisation 
of technology. Collectively, the three reported sets of results suggest that human capital 
may be somewhat important as a general determinant of technology across all countries. 
Indeed differences in human capital may offer a partial explanation as to why MNE 
affiliates in developing countries receive on average considerably less technology than
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affiliates located in industrialised countries. At the same time the results suggest that 
amongst countries of similar levels of development, differences in human capital do not 
markedly affect levels of technology transfer. Nevertheless, given the low degree of 
variation in the human capital variable, particularly amongst industrialised countries, 
some caution must be exercised in interpreting this result.
A final difference in the results for the industrialised country sub-sample is that the 
coefficient on the Corporate tax variable is positive and statistically significant. It is 
possible that this result reflects MNEs manipulating payments in order to minimise tax 
liabilities. However, as noted in section 6.2.1, legal sanctions on misreporting imposed 
by the US and other governments make this doubtful. An alternative explanation for 
this finding is that the tax variable is picking up higher technology payments to 
industrialised countries specialising in advanced manufacturing which also happen to 
impose relatively high tax rates. Many of the industrialised countries where affiliates 
attracted the highest levels of transfer were concentrated in northern Europe, where tax 
burdens are generally above industrialised country averages.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents an analysis of the determinants of technology transfer to MNE 
affiliates using industry level data on technology payments by US MNE manufacturing 
affiliates. As with the previous chapter it aims to provide some direct empirical 
evidence of the policies and other host country characteristics that influence an 
underlying determinant of the productivity of FDI. Consistent with the theme in this 
thesis, of particular interest in the analysis are the role of FDI policies, particularly 
restrictions on foreign ownership, trade openness and host country human capital. The 
results indicate that all three factors play some role in affecting technology transfer to 
MNE affiliates.
The first set of results draw on a general sample comprising both developing and 
industrialised countries. Additional separate results are also estimated for each of these 
groups. The FDI ownership policy indicator presented in chapter 4 is used in the 
analysis to test the role of FDI policies. Robust evidence is found that this variable 
exerts a negative impact on technology payments, both in the general sample and the 
developing country sub-sample. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient on this 
variable suggests that liberalising FDI policies to allow the establishment of some fully
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foreign owned MNE affiliates would increase aggregate technology transfer 
considerably.
Consistent with theories of absorptive capacity, some evidence is found of a positive 
relationship between technology transfer and levels of human capital. However, this 
result is sensitive to the choice of sample. The results on trade openness and private 
property rights protection is also sensitive to the sample, with a positive link between 
these variables and technology transfer identified for industrialised countries only. One 
possible explanation for this latter finding is that the latest innovations tend to be the 
preserve of affiliates located in industrialised countries, owing to greater absorptive 
capacity requirements. In this case, differences in property rights between industrialised 
countries will matter more than differences across all countries.
Having provided some direct empirical evidence that FDI and trade policies, as well as 
human capital, influence technology transfer to multinational affiliates, the next chapter 
examines whether these variables impact on the growth effects of FDI.
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Appendix 6.1 Descriptive statistics and supplementary 
results
Table A6.1: Summary of statistics
Mean Standard
deviation
M inim um M axim um
T e c h n o lo g y  tra n s fe r 1.202 1.382 0 12.204
O w ne rsh ip  res tr ic tio ns 0.082 0.275 0 1.000
O pe nne ss 0.568 0.561 0.128 3.207
Y e a rs  o f schoo ling 7.185 2.282 2.564 11.624
C o n tra c t in te ns ive 0.891 0.054 0.721 0.985
m oney
P ro fit res tr ic tio ns 0.138 0.345 0 1
C o rp o ra te  tax 2.760 1.556 0.206 9.194
Notes: see appendix 6.2 for definitions and sources.
Table A6.2: Correlation matrix
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O w n e rsh ip  res tr ic tio ns -0.132
O pe nne ss 0.094 -0.123
Y e a rs  o f schoo ling 0.147 -0.305 -0.025
C o n tra c t in te ns ive  m oney 0.092 -0.397 -0.011 0.510
P ro fit res tr ic tio ns -0.119 0.286 -0.173 -0.388 -0.418
C o rp o ra te  tax -0.101 0.153 -0.327 -0.174 -0.025 0.191
Notes: see appendix 6.2 for definitions and sources.
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Figure A6.1: Distribution of technology transfer
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Technology transfer
Notes: histogram of Technology transfer, based on BEA data for the years 1982, 1989 and 
1994. See appendix 6.2 for definition and source.
Table A6.3: Determinants of technology transfer, random effects
1 2 3 4 5
Ownership restrictions -0.445*** -0.451*** -0.433** -0.417** -0.456***
(0.166) (0.166) (0.171) (0.17) (0.17)
Openness 0.215 0.204 0.194 0.174
(0.192) (0.203) (0.2) (0.2)
Openness adjusted 0.229
(0.2)
Years of schooling 0.089** 0.086** 0.082** 0.084**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Years of secondary 0.108*
schooling (0.061)
Contract intensive 0.034 -0.145 -0.354 -0.269 0.137
money (1.267) (1.274) (1.27) (1.254) (1.258)
Western hemisphere -0.176 -0.159 -0.147 -0.124 -0.15
(0.151) (0.149) (0.157) (0.156) (0.157)
Corporate tax -0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.02
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Profit restrictions -0.134 -0.151 -0.16
(0.222) (0.226) (0.223)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi-square statistic 83*** 83*** 87*** 87*** 86***
R-square 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Obs. 427 422 422 422 422
Notes: results derived using random effects estimation technique. Other notes as for table 
6.2
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Table A6.4: Chow test for structural break
O wnership restrictions -0.452*
(0.247)
Openness 0.073
(0.154)
Years o f schooling 0.062
(0.063)
Contract intensive m oney -2.128
(1.809)
W estern hem isphere -0.145
(0.233)
Corporate tax -0.07
(0.056)
Profit restrictions -0.292
(0.234)
Industrialised dum m y -9.259***
(3.18)
O penness x Industria lised dum m y 1.18***
(0.411)
Years o f schooling x Industria lised dum m y -0.023
(0.088)
Contract intensive m oney x Industria lised dum m y 9.283***
(3.502)
W estern hem isphere x Industria lised dum m y 0.062
(0.463)
Corporate tax x Industria lised dum m y 0.217**
(0.091)
Profit restrictions x Industria lised dum m y 0.888*
(0.515)
Industry dum m ies 
Chi-square statistic 
Obs.
Yes
104***
422
Notes: results derived using random effects estimation technique. Industrialised dummy 
equal to one for industrialised countries. Other notes as for table 6.2.
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Appendix 6.2 Data definitions and sources
Technology transfer, ratio of total US MNE affiliate payments of royalties and licence 
fees to total sales, by manufacturing industry and host country. All data measured in 
nominal US dollars. Value of payments is scaled by 100 so that ratio represents US 
cents per US dollar of sales.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce
Ownership restrictions: binary variable equal to one if country imposes mandatory joint 
venture requirement, as described in chapter 4.
Profit restrictions', binary variable equal to one if country imposes restrictions on the 
repatriation of FDI related income, as described in chapter 4.
Openness: ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. All data measured in nominal US 
dollars.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank World Development 
Indicators and World Bank Growth Resources Database (Easterly 2001).
Openness adjusted: population adjusted measure of Openness estimated by regressing 
Openness on total population.
Source: trade data as for Openness, population data from World Bank World 
Development Indicators online database and for Taiwan only, Penn World Table 
(Heston et al. 2002).
The regression applied is as follows (standard error in parentheses):
Openness = 0.6369 - 0.0005*Population 
(0.00004)
Years o f schooling: total years of schooling of workers 25 years and older.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
Years o f secondary schooling', total years of secondary schooling of workers 25 years 
and older.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
Corporate tax: income taxes paid by US MNE manufacturing affiliates divided by total 
sales, by industry and host country. All data measured in nominal US dollars.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce.
Contract intensive money: proportion of broad money (M2) held in forms other than 
currency. All data measured in nominal local currency units.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics online database and International 
Financial Yearbook, various editions.
Western hemisphere: dummy variable equal to one for countries located within North, 
Central or South America.
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Table A6.5: Country sample
Argentina
Australia*
Austria*
Belgium*
Brazil
Canada*
Chile 
China 
Hong Kong 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Denmark*
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
Finland*
France*
Germany*
Greece*
Guatemala
India
Indonesia
Notes: * denotes industrialised country.
Ireland*
Israel
Italy*
Japan*
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands*
New Zealand*
Norway*
Peru
Philippines 
Portugal* 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain*
Sweden*
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom* 
Venezuela
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Chapter 7
Heterogeneous growth effects of FDI: evidence from 
cross-country data
7.1 Introduction
This chapter takes the final step in testing the core hypothesis examined in this thesis 
that host country factors influence the growth effects of FDI. As discussed in chapter 3, 
host country factors are hypothesized to alter the nature of multinational production a 
country will tend to attract and as a consequence, the growth effect of the associated 
FDI. The empirical analyses presented in chapters 5 and 6 provide new evidence 
supporting the first part of this hypothesis. Results indicate that liberal trade and FDI 
policies, as well as investment in human capital, increase MNE affiliate export 
orientation and or the level of technology transfer to affiliates. On this basis, it is 
expected that these policies should also influence the growth effects of FDI.
The chapter builds on a number of existing studies discussed in chapter 3 which 
incorporate host country factors in a general empirical model of long run growth that 
includes FDI as an explanatory variable. These studies provide some support in favour 
of the hypothesis that host country factors, including trade policies and human capital, 
affect the growth effects of FDI. However, there is little analysis of the impact of FDI 
policies, or whether host country factors have any complementary effects. The aim of 
this chapter is to address this gap.
The impact of FDI policies is examined using the FDI policy dataset presented in 
chapter 4. As these indicators are available for a large number of countries over a 
lengthy period they present one of the few available options for investigating the 
relevance of FDI policies in a long run framework. The impact of FDI policies are 
examined in isolation and in conjunction with measures of trade openness and human 
capital. This enables a broad assessment of the role of liberalisation and absorptive 
capacity in conditioning the growth effects of FDI.
The analysis draws on cross-country data for a diverse sample of countries, spanning the 
period 1971 to 2000. In response to criticisms levelled at these types of studies careful 
attention is paid to the estimation methodology employed. Efforts are made to address
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endogeneity bias by applying instrumental variable techniques, model uncertainty 
through the inclusion of a diverse set of explanatory variables, and heterogeneity 
through experimentation with different samples and interaction terms.
The next section provides a concise review of the cross-country growth empirics 
literature. This is used to motivate the methodology and model specification, which is 
discussed in section 7.3. The results of the analysis are presented and discussed in 
section 7.4 while section 7.5 concludes. Supplementary results, data sources and 
additional details on the empirical techniques are presented in the appendices.
7.2 A concise survey of the growth empirics literature
The past two decades have seen an outpouring of empirical research that aims to 
identity the sources of long run economic growth. This work shares the common 
approach of analysing partial correlations between some measure of output growth and 
a range of explanatory variables, using data for a wide sample of countries. There is, 
however, diversity in terms of the specific methodology employed.
While some studies are firmly grounded in theory others take a more informal approach 
to model specification. Early analyses tended to employ cross-section data but more 
recent contributions have used panel data that exploit within country variation and allow 
the application of more advanced methods designed to address a range of long standing 
technical problems including endogeneity bias. Motivated in part by advances in 
growth theory and the availability of new data, there has also been a trend towards 
examining the relevance of a range of new variables and incorporating these and 
existing variables using innovative approaches such as with interaction terms and in 
non-linear specifications.
One of the weaknesses of this literature is that, as most studies solely examine partial 
correlations between different variables and growth outcomes, the precise channels 
through which factors influence growth are often left unidentified. Nevertheless, it 
remains a useful approach for identifying common empirical regularities. Further, it 
remains one of the only options for examining empirically many country specific factors 
that are either time invariant or slow to change.
No attempt is made here to provide a comprehensive review of the vast empirical
growth literature. However, in order to motivate the different empirical specifications
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considered in this analysis, a brief overview of some of the key results is presented in
c  o
the following section. This discussion is arranged around three categories of 
explanatory variables that either theory suggest are important or have been found to be 
robustly correlated with some measure of growth in a number of empirical studies.
These include measures of factor accumulation and initial conditions (which capture the 
process of conditional convergence), government and policy related variables and other 
relevant factors.
7.2.1 Factor accumulation and initial conditions
One of the key predictions of the Solow-Swan growth model is that changes in the 
capital labour ratio cannot drive a perpetual expansion in labour productivity. However, 
with changes in the capital labour ratio adjusting slowly in response to changes in the 
savings and investment rate, a higher rate of investment will result in faster growth to 
the new steady-state equilibrium. In an alternative theoretical framework, with an 
augmented production function that incorporates an additional factor of production such 
as human capital, diminishing returns to physical capital may be avoided and increases 
in the investment rate can drive faster perpetual growth.
Based on either of these postulates, one would expect a positive relationship between 
the rate of capital accumulation and output growth. This is a common empirical 
observation, indeed different proxies for the rate of physical capital accumulation are 
one of the most robust explanatory variables in growth regressions (Levine and Renelt 
1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997; Hoover and Perez 2004). However, some have argued that 
the observed strong correlation between investment rates and growth is due to reverse 
causation, a criticism found to have some empirical support. For example, in applying 
Granger causation analysis Blomstrom et al. (1996) find that past investment rates are 
not correlated with current growth rates whereas past growth rates are correlated with 
current investment rates. There is also some evidence that certain types of physical 
investment have a stronger impact on growth. For example, De Long and Summers 
(1991; 1993) find that the rate of return on investment in machinery and equipment is 
higher than for investments in dwellings and structures.
As discussed in chapter 2, theory highlights two mechanisms by which human capital 
affects economic growth. First, if human capital represents a direct factor of production
53 This discussion draws heavily from Hill and Hill (2005).
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higher rates of investment in human capital will drive faster growth (Rebelo 1991). 
Second, as postulated in many endogenous growth theories such as Römer (1990a), 
human capital may be important for creating knowledge or aiding knowledge diffusion 
from a more technologically advanced country. In this case higher levels of human 
capital would be expected to drive higher growth. However, the results on the impact of 
human capital in empirical growth studies are mixed, with a sizeable number of studies 
failing to detect any robust correlation. This is not only surprising in light of the 
predictions of growth theory but also contrast with many microeconomic based 
empirical studies that find significant, positive rates of return from education (Krueger 
and Lindahl 2001).
A number of early studies using cross-sectional data report a robust correlation between 
the level of human capital and growth outcomes but differ in their interpretation. For 
example, Barro (1991) and Barro and Lee (1994) include measures of the initial stock of 
human capital, proxied by enrolment or educational attainment data. The authors 
interpret this finding as evidence that higher levels of human capital are associated with 
higher rates of transitionary growth to the steady-state. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) 
separately test for whether growth rates are contemporaneously correlated with levels or 
growth rates of human capital and find a significant correlation in the levels 
specification only. They interpret this as support for the hypothesis that higher levels of 
human capital facilitate knowledge diffusion. However, Temple (1999) argues that the 
weak results Benhabib and Spiegel report for growth in human capital stocks might be 
due to influential outliers.
More recent studies which make use of panel data and more sophisticated econometric 
techniques to control for estimation problems, including country specific effects, also 
report mixed results. Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) fail to find any robust 
relationship. In contrast Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002), who apply a pooled 
mean-group estimator that allows for both short and long run dynamics to a sample of 
industrialised countries find evidence that higher rates of human capital accumulation 
are associated with faster growth.
One possible explanation for the weak results relating to human capital is measurement 
error. For a sample of industrialised countries, de la Fuente and Domenech (2001) build 
on a dataset devised by Barro and Lee (1996) using other international and national
179
sources to generate what they claim are more precise indicators of educational 
attainment. Using this particular measure they find that the rate of growth in the stock 
of human capital, proxied by changes in educational attainment, is robustly correlated 
with output growth. Similarly, Cohen and Soto (2007) also devise a new dataset on 
educational attainment and report a robust link between the growth of the human capital 
stock and output growth. Finally, other studies using data on internationally comparable 
test scores also report stronger evidence on the role of human capital accumulation 
(Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Barro 2001).
Aside from the inclusion of basic factors of production, almost all cross-country growth 
studies include the initial (lagged) level of some measure of productivity as an 
explanatory variable. The coefficient on this variable is often found to be negative and 
statistically significant, supporting the ß-convergence hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, 
poorer countries tend to grow faster than rich countries. This finding has been reported 
for studies using both cross-section and panel data, in conjunction with more 
sophisticated techniques.54
One interpretation of this result, consistent with the findings of a range of historical 
country and industry level studies, as well as theoretical models of technological 
diffusion, is that technological backwardness provides an opportunity for growth 
through a process of catch-up.55 An alternative interpretation, based on the dynamics of 
the Solow-Swan model and often referred to as classical convergence, is that lagged 
labour productivity reflects the distance between actual output and the steady-state level 
of output (Mankiw et al. 1992). In this case the finding of a negative coefficient on this 
term is interpreted as supporting evidence of convergence occurring through a process 
of capital deepening. This latter interpretation is, however, problematic where the 
empirical analysis uses capital stock data rather than a proxy for the savings or 
investment rate (Rogers 2003).56
"4 For studies using cross-section data see for example Baumöl (1986), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) and 
Barro (1991), and using panel data Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996), Lee et al. (1997) and Dowrick and 
Rogers (2002).
55 For example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
56 Other empirical studies, which suggest that a large proportion of the international variation in output 
levels is due to factors other than factor accumulation, also lend support to the technological convergence 
hypothesis (see for example Hall and Jones (1999) and Easterly and Levine (2001)).
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7.2.2 Government and policy
A range of policy variables are likely to influence technical and allocative efficiency, 
thereby impacting on growth outcomes directly, or by altering the incentives and 
opportunities for factor accumulation, impacting on growth indirectly. Amongst the 
most common types of direct policy variables assessed in empirical growth studies are 
policies relating to international trade openness, macroeconomic stability and the size 
and nature of government expenditures.
Beginning with openness to international trade, it has been hypothesized that this policy 
variable affects long run economic performance through a multitude of channels (Berg 
and Krueger 2003). Openness may reduce inefficiencies by spurring market competition 
and lessen opportunities for rent seeking and encourage specialization that in turn may 
facilitate greater economies of scale. Finally, openness increases opportunities for trade 
in capital equipment that embodies new technology, thereby facilitating knowledge 
diffusion from abroad."
A large body of empirical evidence, using different measures of both trade regimes and 
measures of revealed openness to trade have found this variable to be robustly 
correlated with growth (see for example Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1997) and 
Edwards (1998)). Many of these studies have been the subject of a wide ranging 
criticism relating to measurement error and especially endogeneity bias (Rodriguez and
r  o
Rodrik 2000). Nevertheless, using refined measures of trade openness and 
instrumental variable techniques Dollar and Kraay (2004) report results consistent with 
greater trade openness promoting higher growth.
The orthodox view of economic management and growth, espoused by Fischer (1993) 
amongst others, contends that a relatively stable macroeconomic environment is a 
prerequisite for sustained growth. However, as with the link between growth and some 
other policy variables, the precise theoretical linkages are not always clear (Temple
57 It is worth noting that many of the hypothesised beneficial affects of greater openness to trade may be 
static, suggesting that openness and the dynamic process of growth may be unrelated. However, it is 
possible that many of these static effects play out over long time horizons. Moreover, as noted in 
chapter 3, endogenous growth theory highlights a role for openness in facilitating technology diffusion 
which is a dynamic determinant of growth (see for example Rivera-Batiz and Römer (1991)).
58 In a separate critique, Vamvakidis (2002) examines the growth-openness nexus since 1870 and argues 
that the finding of a robust, positive correlation is sensitive to the period examined. In particular, he 
reports that the strongest correlation between openness and growth appears to exist for the period since 
1970, which corresponds to the period most cross-country studies cover, and that for earlier periods there 
is a general lack of evidence of a positive correlation.
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2000). In addition, defining exactly what constitutes macroeconomic stability and 
assessing whether it has ongoing or temporary effects on growth is problematic and this 
is born out in some empirical studies. Bruno and Easterly (1998) argue that the general 
cross-country correlation between inflation and growth tends to break down as the 
sample period expands, consistent with the hypothesis of money neutrality. Also, 
significant findings for macroeconomic stability are sometimes sensitive to the inclusion 
of crisis-afflicted countries that experience sustained high inflation.
Governments may also influence growth through their decisions to produce and 
consume. Government activity can crowd out and distort private investments, 
particularly where access to credit is limited. Equally, government expenditure on 
projects with strong public good characteristics may generate high social returns with 
positive spillovers to the private sector.
The weight of empirical evidence appears to suggest a negative relationship between the 
size of government and growth performance. Specifically, a number of cross-country 
studies show that the ratio of government consumption to output is negatively correlated 
with growth (Barro and Lee 1994; Barro 2001; Folster and Henrekson 2001). However, 
using cross-country data Easterly and Rebelo (1993) report a positive correlation 
between certain types of public investment and growth. This suggests that the 
composition of government expenditures is important.
7.2.3 Other factors
The enforcement of contracts and the safeguarding of private property rights are a 
fundamental requisite for most forms of economic activity, including production and 
exchange. Many empirical studies of growth have attempted to examine the impact of 
property rights security and in general the results from these conform to expectations. 
However, accessing data that accurately gauges property rights security remains a major 
challenge.
Many studies employ indicators of investment risk and contract enforcement, 
constructed by private ratings agencies, either directly or in conjunction with an 
instrumental variable based on geographic or historical factors (see for example Knack 
and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001)). A limitation of 
using these subjective measures of property rights is that they may be affected by
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economic performance if those formulating the data are subtly influenced by good or 
bad economic news for a particular country. This weakness has led to the development 
of alternative measures of property rights protection including the measure proposed by 
Clague et al. (1999) used in chapter 6.
Although not a policy lever, in the sense of the variables discussed above, like various 
policy variables, financial sector development may support growth directly, by 
facilitating the efficient allocation of resources and indirectly, by encouraging savings 
and capital formation. Using cross-country data King and Levine (1993) test for 
correlations between a number of different measures of financial development, and 
growth rates and other indicators of economic performance. Their results provide 
support for the hypothesis that financial development aids growth with strong 
contemporaneous correlations between the variables of interest reported. In a more 
recent study, Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) conduct a similar exercise that makes use of 
panel data. They generate similar results, although these are sensitive to the inclusion of 
country specific effects.
Like macroeconomic stability, political stability may represent a necessary though not 
sufficient condition for growth. Sudden adverse changes in the political environment are 
likely to damage confidence in the security of property rights and weaken incentives to 
participate in exchange and engage in factor accumulation. However, political stability 
is multifaceted and it is likely that some aspects of political instability will be a greater 
hindrance to economic activity than others. Frequent changes in the executive, for 
example, may not be adverse for growth where a commitment to sound and predictable 
policy settings is maintained. In this respect the quality and independence of the 
bureaucracy can play an important role. Accounting for these subtle nuances in an 
aggregate measure of policy stability is, however, difficult.
An additional political factor considered in some empirical growth studies is the type of 
political regime. This is often done to test a prior expectation that a more open and 
competitive political system is more consistent with an environment conducive to 
productive economic activity. A number of studies have included some indicator of the 
type of political regime, often a dummy variable for whether a country is deemed to be 
democratic (see for example Barro and Lee (1994)). However, there is no doubt that, as 
the East Asian experience clearly demonstrates, authoritarian regimes can bring about a
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sound economic environment that is conducive to growth, particularly in the early 
phases of development. By the same token, democratic regimes might not always be 
able to achieve this goal (Barro 1997).
Aside from political variables, the importance of other so-called ‘soft factors’ have also 
been highlighted. These include factors that have traditionally been seen by some as 
beyond the realms of mainstream economics. For example, empirical studies have 
examined the importance of social cohesiveness which may play an important role in 
helping to facilitate a range of economic activities where explicit contracts are difficult 
to monitor and enforce.
This issue is explored by Knack and Keefer (1997), who argue that ‘social capital’, is 
important for both encouraging factor accumulation and innovation. In addition, they 
suggest that greater social capital may have a range of indirect effects on growth owing 
to, for example, superior public policy outcomes as a result of greater political 
participation. The study reports a strong statistical association between growth 
outcomes and two measures of social capital derived from the World Values Survey. In 
a similar study, Temple and Johnson (1998) report that a composite index of social 
capability is a good predictor of subsequent long run growth performance.
Some have argued a key factor in explaining poor growth performance in Africa, in 
particular, is ethnic fractionalisation. Like other forms of social disharmony, this may 
represent a fundamental constraint on economic activity, as well as contributing to an 
environment of polarization and poor policy outcomes. Supporting this view, Easterly 
and Levine (1997) report a strong negative association between the degree of ethnic 
fractionalisation, measured using a range of proxies, and both growth outcomes and 
sound policies.
Finally, different geographic and environmental factors are argued by some to be very 
influential in shaping long run economic performance (Bloom et al. 1998). A tropical 
climate may increase the prevalence of disease, thereby retarding productivity as well as 
reducing the incentive for investments in human capital. This type of climate is also 
associated with lower yields for certain types of staple crops. It is also possible that a 
tropical climate may limit opportunities for technology diffusion where innovations are
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most suited to the temperate climates of innovative countries. This is likely to be 
especially so for innovations associated with agriculture.
7.3 Methodology and data
7.3.1 Assessing the role o f host country factors
The three FDI policy indicators introduced in chapter 4, along with measures of trade 
policies and human capital are used to test the hypothesis that more liberal policies and 
higher investments in human capital enhance the growth effects of FDI. The impact of 
FDI policies is assessed by estimating a series of general growth equations using 
different samples based on prevailing FDI policies and examining differences in the 
estimated FDI coefficient. Any evidence that FDI is more productive or robustly 
correlated with growth in the sample comprising countries with liberal policies is 
interpreted as supporting the relevance of these policies in conditioning gains from FDI.
An alternative method for examining the relevance of FDI policies would be to interact 
each policy indicator with the FDI variable. Flowever, since the policy indicators are 
binary and highly time invariant such an approach leads to multicollinearity problems. 
To illustrate, for a country that applies a particular FDI policy restriction, the policy 
indicator variable will take a value of one and the interaction term will take the same 
value as the FDI variable. Alternatively, where a particular policy restriction does not 
apply, both the policy indicator and the interaction term will take the value of zero.
The impact of trade policies and human capital are examined both individually and in 
conjunction with FDI policies. Since the proxies of trade policies and human capital 
used in the analysis are both continuous and time varying, the multicollinearity problem 
associated with interacting the FDI policy indicators noted above may be less severe. 
Therefore, two approaches are used to examine the impact of trade policies and human 
capital.
The first involves the same approach used to examine the impact of FDI policies. The 
general sample is divided in to sub-samples comprising countries that rank relatively 
high or low on measures of trade openness and human capital. Regressions are then 
estimated using each sub-sample and inferences made about the impact of trade policies 
and human capital by comparing results from the two sub-samples. The second 
approach uses the full sample to estimate a specification that incorporates an interaction
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variable between FDI and either a measure of trade policies or human capital. In this 
approach inferences regarding the relevance of trade policies and human capital are 
made by direct inspection of the coefficient on the interaction term.
The possibility of two way interactions between FDI policies and either trade policies or 
human capital are also examined. The approach taken to examine this issue is to 
include interactions between the FDI variable and either proxies for trade policies or 
human capital separately for sub-samples comprising countries with and without FDI 
policy restrictions. This makes it possible to control for FDI policies while also 
examining the impact of trade policies or human capital.
7.3.2 Model specification
The core empirical specification is based on an aggregate production function where 
per capita output is assumed to be a function of physical capital and factors that 
influence total factor productivity. Given the focus of the analysis, physical capital is 
disaggregated in to FDI and domestically sourced investment. This approach to model 
specification ensures that all forms of physical capital, which represent an important 
determinant of labour productivity, are controlled for, while also allowing for an 
assessment of the heterogeneous growth effects of FDI. The empirical model used in 
this analysis can be represented by the following equation:
A ln y it = ß  In y i(t_T) + (Jk u + Skit +afit+ f  + £it (7.1)
Where y  represents per capita output, k and/ growth in the stocks of domestic and 
foreign capital respectively, x a vector of other control variables, A time invariant 
unobservable country heterogeneity and s the stochastic error term.
In order to remove the effects of short run fluctuations, following the approach adopted 
in a number of other growth studies, five year averages of the data are used rather than 
annual observations. Therefore, the dependent variable is the annualised growth rate of 
per capita output over a five year period. Lagged per capita output 
(Initial per capita output) is included to capture the effects of conditional convergence. 
This variable is the log level of per capita output at the beginning of each five year 
block in the panel. Like the dependent variable, all other explanatory variables 
represent averages over five year periods. With data for many of the variables of
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interest available from 1970 to 2000, taking five year averages yields a maximum of six 
observations per country. However, missing data for some countries reduces this 
number in some specifications.
Growth in the stock of domestically sourced investment (.Domestic investment) is 
calculated as growth in the stock of total investment less growth in the stock of foreign 
investment (FDI). From a methodological point of view it makes no difference whether 
FDI is included alongside a measure of total investment or Domestic investment. The 
decision to include domestic, rather than total, investment is made purely on 
presentational grounds, to allow an easy direct comparison of the total impact of FDI 
across different specifications. Given the limited availability of capital stock data for 
FDI and other forms of investment, ratios of investment spending to GDP are used to 
proxy growth in the stocks of domestic capital and FDI.
Output data are measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis and taken from the 
Penn World Table (PWT) by Heston et al. (2002). In a cross-country context using data 
expressed in international prices provides a more meaningful comparison than data 
based on local currency measures (Dowrick 2005). Furthermore, in some instances, the 
availability of data is greater in the PWT. Data for total investment expenditures are 
also available on a PPP basis in the PWT. However, data on FDI, which are sourced 
from UNCTAD, are measured in nominal US dollars. Therefore, raw FDI data are first 
converted to international prices using the PPP investment deflator available in the 
PWT.59 This ensures that all investment data used in the analysis are measured on the 
same internationally comparable basis.
A challenge in modelling the determinants of growth is adequately controlling for the 
determinants of total factor productivity, as reflected in the vectorx in equation 7.1. 
Naturally the selection of explanatory variables should be informed by growth theory. 
However, there are limits as to how far this approach can be taken as different theories 
tend to highlight the importance of a single variable whereas the results of numerous 
empirical studies point to a wide range of factors as being important. A number of 
studies have sort to shed light on this issue by using different statistical methods to 
identify the variables most robustly correlated with growth. However, the results from
See appendix 7.2 for details.
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these studies appear to be sensitive to the technique employed and there remains no 
consensus on precisely which explanatory variables are the most important.60
As with any form of model uncertainty, this problem may lead to misleading inferences 
about the importance of particular explanatory variables. Observed partial correlations 
may simply result from a spurious correlation underpinned by a missing correlated 
explanatory variable (Rogers 2003). This problem is particularly severe in situations 
where the number of relevant explanatory variables is high and these are strongly 
correlated, both of which apply in the context of growth empirics.
To ameliorate the risk of using an overly parsimonious specification, the approach 
adopted in this analysis is to include a relatively diverse set of explanatory variables. 
Following other growth studies, variables are selected on the basis of theory and the 
results from existing empirical studies. In particular, variables which have been 
reported to be robustly correlated with growth in a large number of existing studies are 
included in this analysis.
Amongst the additional explanatory variables included, the stock of human capital 
(Years o f schooling) is based on educational attainment data by Barro and Lee (2001).
As in chapters 5 and 6, the main measure used is the total years of schooling amongst 
the working age population while a measure based on years of secondary schooling 
(Years o f secondary schooling) is used as an alternative in some specifications. This 
variable is entered in level form by itself to capture the role of human capital in driving 
innovation and faster technology diffusion. It is also interacted with FD1 to examine the 
absorptive capacity hypothesis.
As in chapters 5 and 6, trade policies are proxied using the ratio of total trade to GDP 
(Openness). Like Years of schooling this variable is entered by itself, to capture the 
direct impact of trade openness on growth and also as an interaction with FDI, to assess 
the impact of trade openness on the productivity of FDI. As noted in chapters 5 and 6, 
the ratio of trade to GDP is a crude proxy for trade openness and an attempt is made to 
improve on this by adopting the same modification applied in earlier chapters. The 
variable Openness adjusted is a population adjusted measure of Openness which
See appendix 7.3 for details.
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represents the trade to GDP ratio net of the effect of differences in country populations.
It is derived by regressing Openness on population.
Additional explanatory variables are incorporated to control for other factors that are 
expected to impact on total factor productivity, drawing on the existing growth empirics 
literature outlined above in section 7.2. First, the size of government (Government 
consumption) is measured as the ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP. 
Second, a measure of macroeconomic stability {Inflation) which is the annual change in 
the GDP price deflator. Third, the proxy for property rights protection based on 
monetary aggregates (Contract intensive money) proposed by Clague et al. (1999) and 
used in chapter 6. Finally, the level of financial development {Financial depth) is 
proxied using the ratio of M2 to GDP. Details on all variables are included in appendix 
7.2.
7.3.3 Estimation strategy and data
Estimating a growth equation of the form of equation 7.1 presents a number of technical 
challenges. In particular, it is likely that most, if not all, of the explanatory variables are 
subject to some form of endogeneity bias. One source of endogeneity arises from two 
way causation between growth and many of the explanatory variables. It is not difficult 
to conceive of a situation where a shock to growth will also influence an explanatory 
variable such as investment. Indeed some studies provide formal statistical evidence 
supporting this conjecture, for both total and foreign investment (Blomstrom et al. 1996; 
Choe 2003; Li and Liu 2005).
A second source of endogeneity bias stems from omitted variables. As discussed above 
in section 7.2, theory and empirical evidence highlight a diverse set of factors that 
impact on growth, many of which are difficult to measure and control for satisfactorily. 
In addition, it is likely that at least some of these factors will be correlated with the 
explanatory variables, giving rise to biased estimates. To illustrate, controlling for all 
aspects of geography is likely to be difficult and at least some aspects of geography are 
likely to influence trade related variables.
The presence of unobservable country heterogeneity gives rise to an additional source of 
endogeneity bias in dynamic specifications such as equation 7.1. In this type of 
equation, time invariant unobservable factors will, by construction, be correlated with
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the lag of the dependent variable, which features on the right hand side of the equation 
as the explanatory variable Initial per capita output. Therefore, the presence of 
unobservable country effects will necessarily lead to biased results when estimated with 
OLS.
The standard procedure for addressing omitted variable bias is to use a fixed effects 
estimation procedure. However, applying a fixed effects transformation to a dynamic 
equation such as the specification used here creates additional problems. In particular, 
the fixed effects transformation will induce a new type of endogeneity bias resulting 
from the lagged dependent variable being correlated with the transformed error term 
(Caselli et al. 1996)61
A variety of estimation techniques have been developed to addresses the problem of 
estimating dynamic panel models that feature unobservable heterogeneity. These build 
on Anderson and Hsiao (1981) who showed that the problem of the lagged dependent 
term being endogenous in the transformed model could be addressed by using lagged 
observations of this variable as an instrument for itself. This approach will be valid so 
long as there is no second order serial correlation.
Later, Arellano and Bond (1991) built on this idea by developing a Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimator that increased the efficiency of the Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981) approach by using additional lagged observations to expand the set of available 
instruments. This technique, often referred to as difference GMM, not only enables the 
lagged dependent term to be estimated using instrumental variables but also other 
explanatory variables that may suffer from simultaneity bias. Lagged observations of 
other explanatory variables are again used to form the set of instruments. This makes it 
an ideal method for estimating a specification of the form of equation 7.1 which is likely 
to suffer from simultaneity bias. A variation on this estimator, termed system GMM, is 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Arellano and Bond (1998). This technique 
takes a slightly different approach to specifying the instrument set. Rather than just 
using the lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments, lagged differences 
are also employed.
61 See appendix 7.4 for details.
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These GMM estimators have been used in a large number of cross-country growth 
studies, beginning with Caselli et al. (1996) and including the study focussing on FDI 
by Carkovic and Levine (2005). On the basis of the problems posed by the estimation 
of dynamic specifications outlined above, and to ensure that the reported results are 
comparable with recent evidence, this analysis makes use of both difference and system 
GMM estimators.
To ensure these methods are valid, in each regression the results from two diagnostic 
tests are presented, in addition to a measure of the goodness of fit and a chi-square test 
of model significance. The first is a Sargan test of over identifying restrictions, which 
assesses the contemporaneous correlation between the full set of instruments and the 
residual in each period. This test provides an indicator of whether the lags of all the 
explanatory variables are satisfactory instruments. The second test reported is a test of 
second order serial correlation. As noted above, the validity of these estimators, in 
particular the use of lagged observations as instalments, depends on there being no 
second order (or higher) serial correlation.
The sample used in the analysis is determined by whether a country is included in the 
FDI regime dataset presented in chapter 4, as well as availability of data for other 
variables. A total of 85 countries are included in the sample, a small number of which 
are excluded from some specifications due to insufficient data for certain explanatory 
variables. Table A7.1 of appendix 7.1 provides a summary of each of the variables for 
the period 1971 to 2000, based on the five year averages in the sample. As one would 
expect there is considerable diversity in the sample.
Average annual per capita growth rates vary from a high of around 11 per cent for 
Botswana down to -11.4 per cent recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo during 
the first half of the 1990s. Other countries to experience prolonged episodes of high 
average growth include Jordan during the late 1970s and China during the 1990s. The 
range of reported investment rates for both Domestic investment and FDI also varies 
considerably. The highest value for FDI is recorded for Belgium at over 23 per cent 
during the late 1990s. This figure represents a considerable outlier and presumably 
partly reflects merger and acquisition activity associated with European integration. 
Hong Kong and Singapore also recorded very high figures for FDI. At the other end of
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the spectrum Botswana, Gabon and Panama all recorded periods of negative net 
outflows of FDI.
As detailed in table A7.2 of appendix 7.1, bivariate correlations between the dependent 
and explanatory variables included in the analysis conform to expectations. Per capita 
output growth is positively correlated with the three factor accumulation variables 
Domestic investment, FDI and Years o f schooling, although the correlation coefficient is 
noticeably higher for Domestic investment. Other variables positively correlated with 
growth include Openness, Financial depth and Contractive intensive money. As 
expected both Inflation and Government consumption are negatively correlated with 
growth.
Bivariate correlations between FDI and the other explanatory variables also accords 
with prior expectations. FDI is positively correlated with all explanatory variables 
except Inflation and Government consumption. This includes Domestic investment, 
indicating an (albeit weak) complementarity between domestic and foreign sourced 
investment.
7.4 Results and discussion
Four main sets of results are presented below in tables 7.1 to 7.4. The first set of results, 
in table 7.1, provide a baseline for the analysis. The impact of FDI is examined in a 
range of different specifications using the full sample without controlling for the 
conditioning effects of host country factors. A parsimonious specification is first 
estimated and then additional control variables are added to examine whether results are 
sensitive to model specification. These provide evidence on the average effect of FDI 
on growth in a diverse sample of countries.
In table 7.2 results from applying the same specification to sub-samples based on 
prevailing FDI policies provides evidence on the conditioning impact of FDI policies. 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 report results on the role of trade policies and human capital. In each 
table results are also presented controlling for FDI policies, with the aim of providing 
inferences on possible interactions between these factors and FDI policies.
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7.4.I Full sample results
The results presented in table 7.1 indicate that across the full sample FDI has a strong, 
positive impact on growth that is insensitive to the inclusion of other explanatory 
variables. Beginning with regression one, the most parsimonious specification, Initial 
per capita output has the expected negative sign, indicating support for the conditional 
convergence hypothesis, while Domestic investment and FDI feature the expected 
positive sign. All three variables are significant at conventional levels of significance in 
this and every other specification reported with this set of results.
The first variable added to this parsimonious specification, in regression two, is Years of 
schooling, which is again positive and significant in this and the majority of other 
specifications reported in table 7.1. In regression three, Openness features the expected 
positive coefficient but is marginally insignificant. However, in the expanded 
specifications (regressions four to seven) the coefficient for this variable becomes 
significant. From here the remaining explanatory variables are added, beginning with 
Government consumption which is positive and insignificant in all regressions. Next, 
Inflation features the expected negative coefficient and is highly significant. Finally, 
the proxy for property rights protection, Contract intensive money, and financial 
development, Financial depth, are added but are both insignificant.
The output elasticity of both Domestic investment and FDI varies somewhat across 
specifications but estimates are generally plausible. For Domestic investment the 
coefficient varies from a low of 0.16 to a high of 0.21 while FDI ranges from a low of 
0.19 up to 0.4. Hence, the average output elasticity across domestic and foreign sourced 
investment appears to be similar to output elasticities for total investment derived in 
studies that adopt a similar methodology.62 It is interesting to note that while the 
highest reported elasticity for FDI exceeds the highest elasticity for Domestic 
investment, in the most complete specification the coefficients are of a similar 
magnitude.
62 For example, Dowrick and Rogers (2002) estimate output elasticities for total investment of between 
0.19 and 0.23 using the same estimation technique and a similar data setup.
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Table 7.1: Growth regressions, full sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Initial per capita output -0.119* -0.224** -0.241*** -0.258*** -0.264*** -0.271*** -0.241***
(0.062) (0.09) (0.073) (0.073) (0.07) (0.066) (0.057)
FDI 0.395*** 0.331*** 0.218** 0.204** 0.191** 0.245** 0.214*
(0.144) (0.096) (0.098) (0.103) (0.096) (0.109) (0 .1 2 2 )
Dom estic investm ent 0.162** 0.199*** 0.213*** 0 .2 1 2 *** 0.198*** 0.183*** 0.203***
(0.079) (0.075) (0.055) (0.059) (0.058) (0.066) (0.055)
Years o f schooling 0.007* 0.007* 0.008** 0.006* 0.005 0.005*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Openness 0.037 0.051** 0.056** 0.048*** 0.049***
(0.023) (0.025) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.017) (0.016)
G overnm ent 0.025 0.066 0.06 0.023
consum ption (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.046)
Inflation -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.006**
(0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 )
Contract intensive 0 . 0 1 0.031
money (0.043) (0.045)
Financial depth -0.017
(0.018)
Obs. 424 384 384 384 376 364 360
Pseudo R-squared 0 . 2 1 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.40
Chi-square 43*** 7 4 *** 81*** 87*** 1 2 2 *** 104*** 123***
Sargan test 0.06 0.26 0.47 0.81 0.99 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
Serial correlation 0.60 0.91 0.81 0 . 8 6 0.70 0.60 0.71
Notes: the dependent variable is annual growth in per capita output measured on a PPP basis 
averaged over a five year period. All explanatory variables except Initial per capita output 
represent averages over non-overlapping five year periods. Initial per capita output is the log 
level of output at the beginning of each five year period. Results derived using the difference 
GMM dynamic panel (twostep) estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) using the xtabond2 Stata 
procedure by Roodman (2006). Heteroskedastic robust standard errors based on Windmeijer 
(2005) are reported in parentheses with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
per cent level respectively. The pseudo R-squared is calculated as the correlation between the 
fitted and actual values of the dependent variable while the chi-square statistic is a joint test of 
model significance. The Sargan test is a test of over identifying restrictions while the serial 
correlation test indicates the presence of second order serial correlation. See appendix 7.2 for 
definitions and sources.
A chi-square test of model significance, which tests whether the predicted value of the 
dependent variable differs between the full model and a model comprising a constant 
term only, indicates that all specifications are highly significant. The pseudo R-squared, 
derived as the correlation between the predicted and actual values of the dependent 
variable indicates that the expanded specifications explain around 40 per cent of the 
observed variation in growth outcomes across the sample. This is consistent with 
results from similar studies.
All of the results presented in table 7.1 are derived using the difference GMM estimator 
by Arellano and Bond (1991). As noted above, dynamic panel estimators of this type
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require that there is no second order or higher serial correlation that would negate the 
use of lagged levels of output as instruments. The p-value of a test for the existence of 
such serial correlation is reported for each regression, where the null hypothesis is of no 
second order serial correlation. In all of the specifications reported in table 7.1 the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance, suggesting that 
serial correlation is not a problem.
The results for the Sargan test of over identifying restrictions for the use of lags of all 
explanatory variables as instruments is also presented in table 7.1. With this test, the 
null hypothesis is that the correlation between the instrument set and the residual term is 
zero. In all but the most parsimonious regression the null cannot be rejected, supporting 
the validity of using lags as instruments in each regression. Similar results for both the 
serial correlation and Sargan tests are reported for other results discussed below.
As noted in section 7.3.3, system GMM provides an alternative to the difference GMM 
technique used to generate the results in table 7.1. To examine whether these results are 
robust to the choice of estimation technique, all regressions are re-estimated using 
system GMM. The results, presented in table A7.3 of appendix 7.1, are noticeably 
different. In particular, many of the variables reported to be significant in table 7.1 are 
found to be insignificant. This includes FDI as well as proxies for trade policies and 
human capital, which are insignificant in every regression. Indeed Domestic investment 
and Inflation are the only variables consistently significant.
These results are troubling. They contrast sharply not only with the results derived 
using the difference GMM estimator but also the predictions of theory and the results 
reported in many existing empirical studies. This is especially so in the case of the trade 
openness variable which is invariably found to be positive and statistically significant in 
cross-country growth regressions. Further experimentation with the system GMM 
estimator for other regressions presented in this chapter (not reported) were also found 
to be problematic. Indeed, these results mirror the unstable results reported by 
Carkovic and Levine (2005), who also use a system GMM method.
63 For example, in the analysis incorporating an interaction term between FDI and Openness the results 
implied that more FDI and greater trade openness exerted a statistically significant negative impact on 
growth.
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As noted above, the motivation for using dynamic panel GMM estimators in this 
analysis is to deal with the bias caused by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
as an explanatory variable and the presence of unobservable country heterogeneity.
Both the difference and system GMM estimators address these problems but apply a 
slightly different approach to the construction of the instrumental variable set. Given 
that both techniques are theoretically sound but only difference GMM yields results 
consistent with theory and the bulk of existing empirical evidence, the remainder of the 
analysis focuses on results derived using the difference GMM estimator. It should be 
noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the estimation technique employed.
7.4.2 The role o f  FDI policies
Having established the baseline results the analysis now examines the role of FDI 
policies. Each of the three FDI policy variables included in the dataset presented in 
chapter 4, including Ownership restrictions, Profit restrictions and Liquidation 
restrictions, are employed for this purpose. Table 7.2 presents the results from applying 
the same empirical specification to different sub-samples determined by the value of 
these three policy variables. The full set of explanatory variables reported in table 7.1 
are included on the basis that the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions does not 
suggest any problems in incorporating all of these variables. Indeed, the selection of a 
relatively wide range of explanatory variables should improve the robustness of the 
results.
Regression one in table 7.2 is based on a sub-sample where there are no Ownership 
restrictions while regression two is based on a sub-sample where such restrictions do 
prevail. Likewise, regressions three and four report results from sub-samples without 
and with Profit restrictions and regressions five and six the results from sub-samples 
without and with Liquidation restrictions. As panel data are used, each sub-sample is 
determined by prevailing policies in each country at each five year interval, rather than 
for the full thirty year period covered in the analysis. Taking this approach controls for 
FDI policy changes that occur within countries over time.
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Table 7.2: Growth regressions, the role of FDI policies
1 2 3 4 5 6
No Own Own. No Profit Profit No Liquid Liquid
Initial per capita -0.350*** -0.459*** -0.328*** -0.355*** -0.326*** -0.407***
output (0.065) (0.132) (0.066) (0.113) (0.07) (0.113)
FDI 0.184** -0.633 0.122 -0.083 0.075 -0.053
(0.089) (1.259) (0.077) (0.262) (0.075) (0.256)
Dom estic investm ent 0.203*** 0.193** 0.157*** 0.326*** 0.131** 0.354***
(0.063) (0.092) (0.049) (0.104) (0.054) (0.065)
Years o f schooling 0.014*** 0.007 0.011** 0.004 0.009** 0.010*
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Openness 0.031*** 0.058* 0.025** 0.082*** 0.021 0.086***
(0.011) (0.032) (0.012) (0.025) (0.015) (0.019)
G overnm ent -0.073 0.093 -0.055 0.073 -0.07 0.067
consum ption (0.052) (0.141) (0.061) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059)
Inflation -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.010**
(0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
C ontract intensive -0.007 0.113 0.093** 0.045 0.055 -0.008
money (0.042) (0.104) (0.04) (0.07) (0.066) (0.059)
Financial depth -0.003 -0.027 -0.016 -0.003 0.011 0.032
(0.016) (0.07) (0.015) (0.03) (0.019) (0.033)
Obs. 261 76 190 134 172 152
Pseudo R-squared 0.41 0.28 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.40
Chi-square 138*** 179*** 90*** 100*** 65*** 173***
Sargan test 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Serial correlation 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.56 0.37 0.60
Notes: “No Own.” and “Own.” denote results derived using sub-sample comprising 
countries without and with Ownership restrictions respectively. The same convention 
applies to “No Profit” and “Profit” for the Profit restrictions indicator and “No Liquid” and 
“Liquid” for the Liquidation restrictions indicator. Other notes as for table 7.1.
In regression one the coefficients on Domestic investment and FDI are positive, 
significant at the 5 per cent level or better and are of a similar magnitude to the 
estimates derived using the full sample reported in table 7.1. However, when the same 
specification is estimated using a sub-sample where Ownership restrictions are 
imposed, regression two, the FDI coefficient becomes negative and insignificant. In 
contrast the coefficient on Domestic investment remains positive and significant while 
results for other variables are mixed.
The results for regressions three and four, which are based on sub-samples with and
without Profit restrictions, produce similar, though weaker results. The coefficient on
FDI is positive in the sub-sample without restrictions and on the borderline of
conventional levels of significance. In contrast the coefficient is negative where
restrictions apply. In the final two regressions, where sub-samples are determined by
the existence of Liquidation restrictions, the FDI coefficient is again positive where
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restrictions are not applied and negative where restrictions do prevail. However, in both 
cases the coefficient is insignificant.
A problem in interpreting these results is that the FDI policy indicators may reflect 
factors other than FDI policies. As noted in chapter 4, restrictive FDI policies are more 
prevalent in developing countries. Therefore, different estimated coefficients for FDI 
across different sub-samples determined by each of the policy indicators may actually 
reflect broader differences between developed and developing countries that reduce the 
productivity all investment. The results reported for Domestic investment in Table 7.2, 
however, suggest that this is not the case. In particular, there is no indication that 
locally sourced investment is any less productive where FDI policy restrictions apply. 
Indeed, if anything the opposite appears to be case.
Overall, therefore, the results provide some evidence that restrictive FDI policies reduce 
the growth effects of FDI. The impact of FDI on growth in countries which adopt FDI 
policy restrictions is much weaker, or indeed non-existent, compared with countries 
which do not impose these restrictions. This result appears to be particularly strong in 
the case of policy restrictions captured by the Ownership restrictions variable.
7.4.3 The role o f  trade policies
Having examined the impact of FDI policies, the next set of results adds trade policies 
to the analysis. Table 7.3 presents results examining whether trade policies enhance the 
growth effects of FDI alone, and in conjunction with FDI policies, using two different 
approaches. First, in regressions one to four interactions between FDI and alternative 
measures of trade policies are added to the same baseline specification used in table 7.2 
above.
As noted above, a potential problem arising from the inclusion of the interaction term 
between FDI and measures of trade policies is that these variables are highly correlated. 
Indeed in the sample used here, the bivariate correlation between measures of trade 
policies and the interaction term is over 0.8. Therefore, it seems reasonably likely that 
results for interaction terms are plagued by multicollinearity.
To address this problem, the second approach taken is to estimate equations using
sub-samples based on prevailing levels of trade openness, rather than including
interaction terms. This approach is analogous to the method employed in section 7.4.2
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above to test the role of FDI policies. In regressions five to eight, the full sample is 
divided in to sub-samples determined by whether a given observation is above or below 
the median values of the trade policy proxies Openness or Openness adjusted.64 This 
enables the sample to be divided into observations that are relatively more or less open 
to trade following the approach taken by Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) and 
Greenaway et al. (2007).
Beginning with regression one, the full sample is used to estimate an augmented 
specification that includes the interaction term between FDI and Openness. This 
interaction term is found to be insignificant, providing no support to the hypothesis that 
more open trade policies enhance the growth effects of FDI. To assess whether this 
result is sensitive to the measure of trade openness used, in regression two the 
population adjusted measure of openness, Openness adjusted, is used in the interaction 
term, rather than Openness. The results are largely unchanged with the interaction term 
again insignificant.
It is possible that these insignificant results reflect policy complementarities where open 
trade policies only infer benefits where liberal FDI policies are also adopted. To 
examine this possibility, regressions one and two are re-estimated using sub-samples 
comprising countries with more liberal FDI policies. Specifically, the sub-samples 
comprise observations without Ownership restrictions, the FDI policy variable that was 
found to have the strongest impact in table 7.2. The results presented in regressions 
three and four indicate that controlling for FDI policies makes little difference, with the 
interaction terms between FDI and alternative measures of openness again found to be 
insignificant.
The consistently insignificant coefficient on the FDl-trade policy interaction variables 
suggest that multicollinearity may indeed present a problem. In this case, the alternative 
method of splitting samples in to observations that are relatively open or closed to trade 
may be more suitable. In regressions five and six, the results are estimated using 
sub-samples determined by values of Openness, with the first of these regressions 
comprising observations that are above the median value for the sample. In regressions
64 Dividing the sample to the basis of observations being above or below the sample mean, rather than 
median, produced similar results.
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seven and eight the same approach is taken except that the sub-samples are determined 
by values of the alternative trade policy proxy, Openness adjusted.
Table 7.3: Growth regressions, the role of trade policies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Full
sam p le
Full
sam p le
No Own. No Own. High
O pen
Low O pen High
O pen adj.
Low
O pen adj.
Initial per capita 
output
-0.238***
(0.051)
-0.239***
(0.049)
-0.332***
(0.062)
-0.333***
(0.066)
-0.243***
(0.069)
-0.386***
(0.086)
-0.221***
(0.074)
-0.404***
(0.072)
FDI 0.212
(0.158)
0.245*
(0.137)
0 .157
(0.1)
0.153*
(0.087)
0.185*
(0.113)
0.121
(0.368)
0.183**
(0.079)
-0.011
(0.32)
FDI x O p en n ess -0.015
(0.092)
-0 .012
(0.082)
FDI x O p en n e ss  
ad justed
-0.032
(0.093)
-0.022
(0.091)
D om estic investm ent 0.204***
(0.066)
0.192***
(0.063)
0.203***
(0.055)
0.201***
(0.066)
0.171*
(0.095)
0.257***
(0.091)
0.194***
(0.053)
0.237**
(0.104)
Y ears of schooling 0.005*
(0.003)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.004)
0.006*
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.005)
0.007
(0.004)
0.013***
(0.004)
O p en n e ss 0.040**
(0.016)
0.032**
(0.013)
0.034*
(0.018)
0.102***
(0.029)
O p en n e ss  ad justed 0.038***
(0.014)
0.033**
(0.014)
0.041**
(0.016)
0.086***
(0.033)
G overnm ent
consum ption
0.01
(0.053)
0.025
(0.046)
-0 .068
(0.042)
-0.082*
(0.049)
0 .058
(0.087)
0 .014
(0.082)
0 .055
(0.049)
0 .027
(0.071)
Inflation -0.006***
(0.002)
-0.006**
(0.002)
-0.005*
(0.002)
-0 .004
(0.003)
-0.014***
(0.004)
-0 .004
(0.003)
-0.012**
(0.005)
-0.006**
(0.002)
C ontract intensive 
m oney
0 .028
(0.045)
0.031
(0.047)
-0 .006
(0.043)
-0 .013
(0.046)
-0.07
(0.072)
-0 .005
(0.05)
-0 .108
(0.115)
0 .003
(0.053)
Financial depth -0 .019
(0.022)
-0.019
(0.02)
-0.001
(0.017)
0.001
(0.019)
-0.02
(0.022)
0 .02
(0.026)
-0.003
(0.024)
-0.006
(0.03)
O bs. 360 360 261 261 180 180 180 180
P seu d o  R -squared 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.31 0.39 0.32 0.43
C hi-square 109*** 109*** 184*** 183*** 104*** 85*** 78*** 130***
S arg an  te st 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Serial correlation 0.83 0.77 0.68 0.71 0.62 1.00 0.89 0.55
Notes: “Full sample” and “No Own.” denote results derived using the full sample or a sub-sample 
without Ownership restrictions respectively. “High open” and “Low open” denote results derived using 
observations with values of Openness above or below the full sample median respectively. “High open 
adj.” and “Low open adj.” denote results derived using observations with values of Openness adjusted 
above or below the full sample median respectively. Other notes as for table 7.1.
The results in regressions five to eight support the hypothesis that trade openness 
enhances the growth effects of FDI. In regression five, a relatively open sub-sample, as 
determined by values of Openness, the coefficient on FDI is positive and significant, 
whereas in regression six, a relatively closed sub-sample, it is insignificant. In 
regressions seven and eight, a similar pattern is observed using sub-samples determined 
by values of Openness adjusted. Again, the coefficient on FDI is positive and
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significant only in the relatively open sub-sample. As with the results reported in 
table 7.2, the coefficient on Domestic investment remains positive and statistically 
significant in all specifications. This provides some assurance that the results for FDI 
do not reflect broader factors that may be correlated with trade policies. The result that 
FDI only exerts a positive influence on growth in relatively open countries is consistent 
with the findings of Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) and Greenaway et al. (2007).
7.4.4 The role o f  human capital
The final set of results, focussing on the role of human capital, are reported in table 7.4. 
These are derived using the same process as the one described above for measures of 
trade policies but with measures of human capital used instead. Interaction terms are 
again added to a baseline specification. In addition, given the likely problem of 
multicollinearity, results are presented from using sub-samples based on relatively high 
and low levels of human capital.
Beginning with regression one, the interaction of FDI and Years o f schooling is 
incorporated with the baseline specification and estimated using the full sample. The 
interaction term is found to be insignificant, as is the coefficient on FDI. To examine 
whether this result is sensitive to the human capital proxy used, the same specification is 
applied in regression two except that Years of secondary schooling is used in place of 
Years of schooling. Again the interaction with FDI is found to be insignificant. 
Therefore, using the full sample no evidence is found supporting the hypothesis that 
higher levels of human capital enhance the growth effects of FDI.
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Table 7.4: Growth regressions, the role of human capital
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Full Full No Own. No Own. High edu. Low edu. High sec. Low sec.
sam ple sam ple edu. edu.
Initial per capita output -0.262*** -0.241*** -0.358*** -0.342*** -0.364*** -0.301*** -0.288*** -0.329***
(0.055) (0.063) (0.062) (0.049) (0.063) (0.079) (0.064) (0.07)
FDI 0.092 0.132 0.188 0.230* 0.105 -0.143 0.165 0.072
(0.142) (0.12) (0.125) (0.139) (0.079) (0.342) (0.131) (0.308)
FDI x Years of 0.006 0
schooling (0.01) (0.008)
FDI x Years of 0.006 -0.013
secondary schooling (0.02) (0.016)
Dom estic investm ent 0.205*** 0.208*** 0.176*** 0.195*** 0.157*** 0.222* 0.271*** 0.130**
(0.06) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.053) (0.118) (0.067) (0.062)
Years o f schooling 0.006** 0.013*** 0.008** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Years o f secondary 0.010* 0.024*** 0.015** 0.004
schooling (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Openness 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.027*** 0.028** 0.065** 0.042** 0.028 0.044**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.01) (0.011) (0.028) (0.02) (0.021) (0.021)
G overnm ent 0.037 0.01 -0.077* -0.076 -0.086 0.036 -0.07 0.088
consum ption (0.059) (0.047) (0.044) (0.056) (0.057) (0.074) (0.056) (0.059)
Inflation -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.009*** -0.006* -0.009*** -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Contract intensive 0.022 0.037 -0.022 -0.007 -0.077 0.082* 0.03 0.066
money (0.044) (0.036) (0.042) (0.032) (0.054) (0.05) (0.057) (0.046)
Financial depth -0.016 -0.012 0.002 0.004 0.015 -0.03 -0.012 -0.027
(0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016) (0.028)
Obs. 355 355 258 258 180 180 180 180
Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.44
Chi-square 108*** 115*** 211*** 157*** 137*** 43*** 98*** 53***
Sargan test 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Serial correlation 0.64 0.58 0.67 0.36 0.37 0.96 0.9 0.78
Notes: “Full sample” and “No Own.” denote results derived using the full sample or a sub-sample 
without Ownership restrictions respectively. “High edu.” and “Low edu.” denote results derived using 
observations with values of Years o f  schooling above or below the full sample median respectively. 
“High sec. edu.” and “Low sec. edu.” denote results derived using observations with values of Years o f 
secondary schooling above or below the full sample median respectively. Other notes as for table 7.1.
In regressions three and four the possibility that human capital increases the growth 
effects o f FD1 only where liberal FD I policies are adopted is assessed. The same 
specification used in regressions one and two are estimated using a sub-sample 
restricted to observations where Ownership restrictions do not prevail. In both 
regression three and four the interaction between FDI and alternative measures o f 
human capital are again found to be insignificant. Therefore, these results suggest that 
FDI policies make no different to the impact o f human capital on the growth effects o f 
FDI.
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As in section 7.4.3 it is possible that the insignificant results for the interaction variables 
reflect multicollinearity. Therefore, in regressions five to eight, the alternative method 
of investigating FDl-human capital complementarities by splitting the füll sample on the 
basis of prevailing levels of human capital is applied. In regressions five and six, the 
results are estimated using sub-samples determined by values of Years o f schooling. 
Regression five employs a sub-sample where observations for Years o f schooling are 
above the median value for the full sample, while regression six uses a sub-sample with 
below median values. The same process is repeated in regressions seven and eight 
except that Years o f secondary schooling is used to determine the sub-samples.
In each regression the coefficient on FDI is found to be insignificant at conventional 
levels of significance. However, the coefficients are larger and or positive, and t-ratios 
higher in the sub-samples with higher levels of human capital. Therefore, the results 
from regressions five to eight may be considered to provide weak evidence that higher 
levels of human capital enhance the growth effects of FDI.
The insignificant coefficient on FDI in these regressions contrasts with the results 
presented in table 7.1, which indicate that on average FDI exerts a strong positive 
impact on growth. The results in table 7.4 suggest that other conditions may need to be 
met, even amongst countries with relatively high levels of human capital before FDI can 
be expected to have a consistently positive impact on the growth of the host country. 
This raises the question of the role of FDI and trade policies. Unfortunately, however, 
methodological limitations discussed above make an assessment of this issue difficult.
The results on the role of human capital contrast with the findings of Borensztein et al. 
(1998) but are consistent with those of Blonigen and Wang (2005). The general 
weakness of human capital in this analysis also mirrors the relatively weak results 
reported in chapters five and six. To recap, while some evidence was reported that 
human capital enhanced technology transfer to MNE affiliates in chapter six, this result 
was sensitive to the choice of sample. In addition, in chapter five, human capital was 
not found to influence MNE export orientation in either the full sample or in the case of 
industrialised countries.
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7.5 Conclusion
This chapter seeks to build on the literature which examines how various host country 
factors affect the link between FDI and growth using cross-country data. The primary 
novelty of the analysis is that it examines the role of FDI policies, both alone and in 
conjunction with trade policies and human capital. In light of criticisms levelled at 
many existing empirical studies of FDI and growth, a technique which controls for both 
unobservable country heterogeneity and uses an instrumental variable approach to 
address endogeneity bias is used.
The results lend support to the hypothesis that some FDI policies affect the relationship 
between FDI and growth, although these are sensitive to the choice of estimation 
technique. While FDI is found to exert a robust positive impact on growth in a general 
sample and in countries that adopt liberal FDI policies, this result does not always hold 
where restrictive FDI policies are adopted. Out of the three FDI policies considered in 
the analysis, the strongest evidence is found for policies relating to foreign ownership 
restrictions, consistent with the evidence reported in chapters 5 and 6. Importantly, the 
results indicate that FDI policies impact primarily on foreign, rather than domestically 
sourced investment. This suggests that restrictive FDI policies do not merely reflect 
other factors that may impact on the productivity of all forms of investment.
There is also evidence to suggest that open trade policies enhance the growth effects of 
FDI. However, no evidence could be found that liberal FDI policies have any bearing 
on this impact. The impact of human capital is much less clear, mirroring the findings 
presented in chapters 5 and 6. In particular, only weak evidence was found to suggest 
that higher levels of human capital enhance the growth effects of FDI and again, FDI 
policy settings appear to have no bearing on this result.
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Appendix 7.1 Descriptive statistics and supplementary 
results
Table A7.1: Summary of statistics
Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maxim um
Per capita GDP growth 0.02 0.03 -0.11 0.11
FDI 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.23
Dom estic investm ent 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.56
Years o f schooling 5.73 2.73 0.61 12.25
Openness 0.53 0.41 0.08 3.10
Governm ent consum ption 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.62
Inflation 2.38 1.06 0.47 7.95
Contract intensive m oney 0.81 0.13 0.21 0.98
Financial depth 0.45 0.26 0.00 1.99
Notes: see appendix 7.2 for details.
Table A7.2: Correlation matrix
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FDI 0.22
Dom estic investm ent 0.40 0.36
Years o f schooling 0.14 0.31 0.55
Openness 0.24 0.64 0.39 0.14
Governm ent consum ption -0.20 -0.21 -0.36 -0.34 -0.03
Inflation -0.34 -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.23 0.29
Contract intensive money 0.24 0.27 0.49 0.64 0.16 -0.45 -0.24
Financial depth 0.23 0.35 0.50 0.45 0.36 -0.15 -0.39 0.41
Notes: see appendix 7.2 for details.
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Table A7.3: Growth regressions, system GMM estimation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Initial per capita -0.018 -0.043 -0.042 -0.064* -0.061* -0.099*** -0.078***
output (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.042) (0.045) (0.037) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028)
FDI 0.041 0.029 0.048 0.034 -0.013 0.097 0.098
(0.082) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098) (0.083) (0.08) (0.083)
Dom estic investm ent 0.246*** 0.248*** 0.230*** 0.214*** 0.198*** 0.215*** 0.191***
(0.043) (0.038) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033)
Years o f schooling 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 0.003 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 0  (0 .0 0 2 )
(0.003) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 )
Openness 0 . 0 0 1 0.005 0.003 -0.006 -0 . 0 0 1
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Governm ent -0.058 -0.042 -0.025 -0.043
consum ption (0.042) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034)
Inflation -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005**
(0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 )
C ontract intensive 0.042 0.048*
money (0.027) (0.029)
Financial depth -0.005
(0 .0 1 1 )
Obs. 509 461 461 461 452 439 435
Pseudo R-squared 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 .2 1 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.27
Chi-square 39*** 4 7 *** 51*** 58*** 67*** 99*** 9 4 ***
Sargan test 0.13 0.48 0.94 1 1 1 1
Serial correlation 0.44 0.89 0.94 0.9 0.67 0 . 6 8 0.75
Notes: results derived using the system GM M  dynamic panel (twostep) estimator by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Arellano and Bond (1998). Other notes as for table 7.1.
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Appendix 7.2 Data definitions and sources
Per capita GDP growth: the dependent variable in all regressions is the annual rate of 
per capita output growth, purchasing power parity basis. It is derived as the difference 
between the log level of per capita output over a five year period, divided by five. With 
the sample comprising data from 1970 to 2000, observations for per capita output in 
1970 and every fifth year up to 2000 are used. For example, for the most recent block 
in the panel the value of the dependent variable is the difference between the log of 
per capita output in 2000 and 1995, divided by five.
In a small number of cases, where output data are missing for one of the years used to 
derive growth rates but available for nearby years a linear trend was used to estimate 
observations for the required years. The trend was derived within each five year block 
in the panel. For example, if data were available for the years 1996 to 1999 but missing 
for 2000, the observation for 2000 was extrapolated on the basis of the data for 1996 to 
1999.
Source: Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2002).
FDI: net inflows of FDI as a share of GDP, purchasing power parity basis.
FD1 series converted from nominal US dollars to purchasing power parity basis by 
dividing nominal series by purchasing power parity investment deflator from Penn 
World Table (Heston et al. 2002). This purchasing power parity adjusted series was 
then divided by GDP, measured on a purchasing power parity basis.
Source: UNCTAD online FDI database and Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2002).
Domestic investment: investment share of GDP purchasing power parity basis, less FDI. 
Source: Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2002).
Ownership restrictions: binary variable equal to one if country imposes mandatory joint 
venture requirement, as described in chapter 4.
Profit restrictions: binary variable equal to one if country imposes restrictions on the 
repatriation of FDI related income, as described in chapter 4.
Liquidation restrictions: binary variable equal to one if country imposes restrictions on 
the repatriation of the proceeds from the liquidation of FDI related assets, as described 
in chapter 4.
Openness: ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. All data measured in nominal US 
dollars.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics online database, World Bank World 
Development Indicators online database and World Bank Growth Resources Database 
(Easterly 2001).
Openness adjusted: population adjusted measure of Openness estimated by regressing 
Openness on total population.
Source: trade data as for Openness, population data from World Bank World 
Development Indicators online database and for Taiwan only, Penn World Table 
(Heston et al. 2002).
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The regression applied is as follows (standard error in parentheses):
Openness = 0.5453- 0.0005*Population 
(0.00005)
Years o f  schooling: total years of schooling of workers 25 years and older.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
Years o f  secondary schooling', total years o f secondary schooling of workers 25 years 
and older.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
Government consumption: government expenditure share of GDP, purchasing power 
parity basis.
Source: Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2002).
Inflation: annual change in GDP price deflator.
Source: Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2002).
Contract intensive money: proportion of broad money (M2) held in forms other than 
currency. All data measured in nominal local currency units.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics online database and International 
Financial Yearbook, various editions.
Financial depth: ratio of broad money (M2) to nominal GDP. All data measured in 
nominal local currency units.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics online database and International 
Financial Yearbook, various editions and World Bank World Development Indicators 
online database.
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Table A7.4: Country sample
Algeria Italy*
A rgentina Japan*
Austra lia* Jordan
Austria* Kenya
Bangladesh Korea
Belgium * M adagascar
Benin Malaysia
Bolivia M auritius
Botswana Mexico
Brazil Morocco
Burkina Faso Nepal
Cam eroon Netherlands*
Canada* New Zealand*
Central A frican Republic N icaragua
Chile Nigeria
China Norway*
Colom bia Pakistan
D em ocratic Republic Congo Panama
Republic o f Congo Paraguay
Costa Rica Peru
Denm ark* Philippines
Dom inican Republic Portugal*
Ecuador Senegal
Egypt Singapore
El Salvador South Africa
Ethiopia Spain*
Fiji Sri Lanka
Finland* Sweden*
France* Syria
Gabon Taiwan
G erm any* Tanzania
Ghana Thailand
Greece* Trin idad and Tobago
Guatem ala Tunisia
Guinea Turkey
Guyana Uganda
Flonduras United Kingdom*
Hong Kong United States
India Uruguay
Indonesia Venezuela
Iran Zam bia
Ireland* Z im babwe
Israel
Notes: * denotes industrialised country.
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Appendix 7.3 Model uncertainty in growth empirics
One of the key challenges in analysing empirically the determinants of growth is model 
uncertainty. This relates both to the choice of explanatory variables and their functional 
form. A number of studies have sought to address this issue using statistical techniques 
to identify which variables, out of the many highlighted by theory as being potentially 
important, have the strongest statistical correlation with observed growth rates. An 
influential example of this is by Levine and Renelt (1992) who apply extreme bounds 
analysis based on Learner (1983). This technique assesses the robustness of explanatory 
variables by examining how sensitive they are to changes in the choice of other 
explanatory variables.
To illustrate, suppose there is a set x which contains all possible explanatory variables. 
Within this set there is a subset of variables v which are strongly believed to influence 
growth and a second subset w for which prior expectations are weaker. Extreme bounds 
analysis involves examining the estimated coefficients for a single variable z from the 
subset w after controlling for variables included in v and some variables from w.
An assessment of whether or not the variable z is robustly correlated with growth is 
made by identifying the upper and lower values of the estimated coefficient for this 
variable when changes are made to the set of conditioning variables from w. If the 
highest estimated value for the coefficient (the upper bound) is statistically significant 
and positive and the lowest estimated value for the coefficient statistically significant 
and negative (the lower bound) then the variable is deemed to be fragile. The process is 
then repeated for a wide range of variables to build up a view of which variables are 
statistically important and which are not. A similar study is undertaken by Sala-i- 
Martin (1997), using a more flexible methodology. Rather than considering the extreme 
bounds only, the distribution of the estimated coefficients for each variable of interest 
are examined and used to infer robustness.
More recently, Hendry and Krolzig (2004) and Hoover and Perez (2004) have applied 
the general to specific methodology to help identify robust explanatory variables in 
growth regressions. This approach involves starting with a general specification that 
encompasses all possible explanatory variables and then searching over alternative
models to narrow the model to a more parsimonious specification. The decision to
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include or exclude a particular explanatory variables is based on an assessment of the 
statistical significance of the variable and diagnostic tests of the overall performance of 
different specifications.
Unfortunately, the results from these types of studies do not provide any definitive list 
of robust explanatory variables. While some variables, notably proxies for capital 
accumulation, do seem to be robust in different tests, a large number of other variables 
are found to be robust in some tests but fragile in others. Overall, therefore, these 
studies underline the importance of experimenting with different specifications in each 
specific application.
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Appendix 7.4 Dynamic panel data estimation
The estimation of dynamic panel data models such as the one used in this chapter 
requires a careful consideration of the appropriate estimation technique. A dynamic 
specification is one in which a lagged value of the dependent variables is included as an 
explanatory variable. Specifications used to study the determinants of economic growth 
often include the lag of per capita output as a control for the influence of conditional 
convergence and therefore represent a dynamic model.
To illustrate the problems associated with the estimation of dynamic panel models using 
OLS consider a generic dynamic specification:
y lt = ßy,(t-\) + °&it + K + £u (A7 • i)
where x represents a vector of explanatory variables and X unobservable heterogeneity. 
The presence of the lag ofy as an explanatory variable in this type of specification 
induces a particular type of endogeneity bias that requires the application of a dynamic 
panel estimator.
The problem can be decomposed into two parts. First, by construction, the lag of the 
dependent term will be correlated with the unobservable heterogeneity term X. This is 
illustrated by taking the lag of equation A7.1 and applying an expectations operator to 
examine the correlation betweeny  and X as follows:
;)_ d ' t  (ßy. , , - 2) y ))) (A7.2)
(A7.3)
As noted in A7.3, by construction the lagged value o f y  will be correlated with X , 
implying the coefficient on this variable will be biased when estimated with OLS. The 
usual approach to addressing the problem of bias arising from unobservable 
heterogeneity is to apply a fixed effects transformation to eliminate X.  However, with a 
dynamic model this transformation creates a new form of bias. To illustrate, consider 
the first difference of equation A7.1:
y  it ~ y  i(t~ l) — ßbut-x) ~ T/u-2) )+ (^x/r — xi(t~ i))+ [£it ~ £i(t-1)) (A7.4)
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In this equation the time invariant unobservable heterogeneity has been eliminated. 
Therefore, the problem of the lagged dependent variable being correlated with X  has 
been rectified.
However, in equation A7.1 the dependent termy is contemporaneously correlated with 
the error term s .  This implies that lagged values of the dependent term will also be 
correlated with lagged values of the error term. This is problematic in the case of the 
transformed equation A7.4 since the transformed lagged dependent term ( y ^ . »  - JV-y) is 
now correlated with the transformed error term (e„ - which will again give rise to 
biased estimates with OLS. Hence, action taken to remove unobservable heterogeneity 
has created an alternative source of endogeneity bias. This necessitates the need to 
instrument the differenced lagged dependent term.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
FDI plays an increasingly important role in the global economy, linking investors, firms 
and workers across national boundaries. Unlike other international capital flows FDI 
enables foreign control of factors of production thereby facilitating growth in the host 
country through a number of mechanisms, including the transfer of new technology. 
However, the empirical relationship between FDI inflows and growth performance is 
weak. A number of growth studies report an insignificant impact from FDI and some 
even find evidence of a negative effect. This is perhaps unsuiprising given existing 
hypotheses which illustrate how a variety of host country factors can alter the nature of 
MNE production and, ultimately, the growth effects of FDI. Motivated by these 
observations, this thesis provides new evidence on the impact of host country factors on 
the growth effects of FDI.
Existing hypotheses contend that MNE production that is more export orientated and 
associated with higher inflows of technology will bring about larger productivity gains 
in the host country. Therefore, in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis, the 
thesis presents new evidence on how host factors influence these aspects of MNE 
production, in addition to examining the direct growth effects of FDI. Mindful of the 
possibility that a number of different factors influence gains from FDI, the analysis 
focuses on the impact of three host country factors. These are FDI and trade policies 
and investments in human capital.
The thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature. The first is to present a 
new cross-country dataset on FDI policies which aims to fill a significant gap in 
currently available data. A second contribution is to apply this new dataset to examine 
the impact of FDI policies on the nature of MNE production and the growth effects of 
FDI. Third, updated evidence is also presented on the impact of trade policies and 
human capital. Fourth, by examining the impact of these host country factors on both 
the nature of MNE production and the growth effects of FDI the study presents an 
integrated analysis of the role of different host country factors. In addition,
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complementarities between host country factors increasing the growth effects of FDI are 
analysed.
The next section provides an overview of the main findings. Section 8.3 discusses 
policy implications and section 8.4, areas for further research.
8.2 Findings
The newly compiled FDI policy indicator dataset presented in chapter 4 provides annual 
information on policy settings for 89 countries between 1970 and 2000. One policy 
indicator in the dataset details the existence of a joint venture requirement that applies 
across all sectors. A further two indicators reflect controls on the movement of FDI 
related capital, including FDI related income and the proceeds from the liquidation of 
FDI projects. This data are compiled using qualitative information gleaned from a 
number of sources and efforts were made to construct policy indicators that reflected 
how policies have been implemented in practice.
All three FDI policy indicators show a marked increase in the adoption of more liberal 
policies since 1970, with reform efforts particularly widespread during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. This is true of both joint venture requirements and policies restricting 
the movement of FDI related capital. This finding is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence, qualitative assessments of changes in policies within individual countries and 
trends evident in other cross-country datasets cataloguing FDI policies. Also consistent 
with existing evidence is the finding that the most restrictive FDI policies have tended 
to be adopted by authorities in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. In contrast, 
industrialised countries have the longest tradition of adopting the most liberal FDI 
policies.
Owing to the broad coverage of the policy indicator dataset and the specific nature of 
each of the variables, it is not possible to undertake a detailed comparison of the new 
indicators against existing datasets. Flowever, the distribution of restrictive policy 
settings, particularly the concentration in developing countries, as well as the clear trend 
towards the adoption of more liberal policies over time are both consistent with other 
assessments of FDI policies. In addition, a simple partial correlation analysis indicates 
that more liberal FDI policy settings are associated with higher flows of FDI. Given
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that more liberal FD1 policies are likely to attract higher aggregate flows of FDI this 
finding provides some additional assurance of the validity of the compiled data.
The empirical evidence presented supports the hypothesis that host country factors 
influence both the nature of MNE production and the growth effects of FDI. Beginning 
with the analysis of MNE export orientation in chapter 5, consistent evidence is found 
that joint venture requirements reduce export orientation. Moreover, the magnitude of 
this effect is large, with the removal of joint venture requirements, as reflected by the 
policy variable, predicted to increase export orientation by around 10 per cent.
However, the evidence for the two policy indicators relating to restrictions on capital 
transfers is much weaker, with the significance of these variables sensitive to model 
specification. These findings provide new evidence on how FDI policies impact on 
MNE export orientation and are consistent with theoretical predictions that export 
production will gravitate towards superior operating environments.
There is strong evidence that greater trade openness enhances the export orientation of 
MNE affiliate production. Again, this is consistent with the predictions of FDI theory 
and the findings of other studies. However, the evidence on the impact of FTAs is less 
robust. This finding may reflect FTAs providing limited increases in market access, or 
conditional access that is incompatible with vertically integrated production networks. 
For example, rules of origin in FTAs often stipulate binding limits on domestic content 
which prevent the free movement of goods across borders. This will deter vertically 
integrated MNE export production that makes extensive use of inputs produced by 
affiliates located in other countries located outside the FTA’s boundaries.
Finally, evidence is found to suggest that after controlling for labour costs, higher levels 
of human capital increase export orientation, but only in developing countries. Higher 
labour costs are found to reduce export orientation, especially in developing countries. 
These results are again consistent with the predictions of FDI theory which suggest that 
when establishing export facilities MNEs will be attracted to countries where the most 
productive workers are located.
The analysis of the determinants of technology transfer to MNE affiliates in chapter 6 
provides new evidence on the impact of FDI policies and produced other results 
consistent with existing studies. Robust evidence is reported that joint venture
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requirements reduce technology transfer. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
parent companies transfer less technology to joint ventures owing to fears concerning 
the loss of control over proprietary knowledge or being inadequately compensated for 
outlays associated with the technology transfer process. As in the case of export 
orientation, the magnitude of the impact of joint venture requirements is large.
Theories of technology transfer and spillovers emphasise the importance of absorptive 
capacity, determined by the availability of human capital and other supply side factors. 
In particular, a stronger human capital base is expected to reduce the non trivial costs 
associated with learning and implementing new technology. Consistent with these 
ideas, higher levels of human capital are found to increase technology transfer to MNE 
affiliates. However, this result is sensitive to the choice of sample. Whereas a 
statistically and economically significant impact is reported for the full sample, 
alternative measures of human capital are generally insignificant for developing and 
industrialised country sub-samples.
The analysis of technology transfer also incorporates a measure of trade policies, to 
control for the effects of market competition. Trade openness is found to increase 
technology transfer, but only amongst industrialised countries. This effect is 
economically significant and is consistent with the predictions of the spillover model by 
Wang and Blomstrom (1992). The result is also consistent with empirical studies that 
examine the impact of market competition on technology transfer.
In chapter 7, two approaches are used to analyse the interaction between host country 
factors and the growth effects of FDI. First, to examine the impact of FDI policies, the 
FDI indicator variables introduced in chapter 4 are used to split a universal sample of 
countries in to sub-samples comprising countries with and without policy restrictions. 
Second, to analyse the impact of trade openness and human capital, proxies for each of 
these variables are interacted with FDI flows and used to split the full sample in to 
sub-samples.
The first result to emerge from this analysis is that in a diverse sample, comprising 
countries with different policies and other characteristics, FDI exerts a positive impact 
on growth. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to domestically sourced 
investment and is insensitive to model specification. Moreover, since an instrumental
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variable estimator is used, this result does not appear to be driven by simultaneity bias. 
However, this and other results presented in the chapter do not hold when an alternative 
instrumental variable technique is applied. This finding mirrors results presented by 
Carkovic and Levine (2005) who report no robust evidence of FDI exerting a positive 
influence on growth.
The analysis of the impact of FDI policies suggest that FDI has a stronger influence on 
host country growth where liberal policies are adopted, with the strongest evidence 
found in the case of the policy variable reflecting joint venture requirements. Using 
different specifications and sub-samples, the coefficient on FDI is positive and 
significant for sub-samples comprising countries that did not impose this type of policy 
restriction. In contrast, in countries where this restriction was imposed, FDI was found 
to have no statistically significant effect on growth. Importantly, domestic investment 
was found to exert a statistically significant effect on growth irrespective of the 
prevailing FDI policy. This provides some assurance that the results do not reflect other 
factors that may be correlated with FDI policies. Similar, though slightly less robust 
results are reported for the FDI policy variable relating to restrictions on the transfer of 
FDI related income while the results for the third policy indicator, reflecting other types 
of capital restrictions, are weaker still.
Using alternative proxies for trade policies, some evidence is found to suggest that FDI 
exerts a stronger impact on growth in more open countries. The results, however, 
provide no indication that liberal FDI policies enhance this impact. One possibility is 
that methodological limitations, particularly multicollinearity, prevent the identification 
of this effect.
The results from analysing the impact of human capital on the growth effects of FDI are 
less conclusive. Using both interaction terms and different sub-samples comprising 
countries with relatively high and low levels of human capital, very little evidence could 
be found to suggest countries with higher levels of human capital benefit more from 
FDI. In addition, as with the investigation of the impact of trade policies, no evidence 
could be found that liberal FDI policies have any bearing on this result.
In summary, evidence is found that host country factors affect the export orientation of 
MNE production as well as the level of technology transferred to MNE affiliates.
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Consistent with this finding, some evidence is also found that host country factors 
influence the growth effects of FDI, although these findings are sensitive to the choice 
of estimation technique. Out of the three host country factors assessed in each analysis, 
the strongest evidence is reported for FDI policies relating to joint ventures. The 
variable reflecting this policy restriction exerts a strong influence on both MNE affiliate 
export orientation and technology transfer, as well as the growth effects of FDI. The 
evidence for the other two FDI policy variables is consistently weaker.
Trade policies are found to exert a particularly strong impact on MNE export orientation 
and on the growth effects of FDI. There is also some evidence that the level of human 
capital influences both the export orientation of MNE production and technology 
transfer, although this effect was sensitive to model specification and especially sample 
selection. Consistent with this finding, the evidence on whether human capital enhances 
the growth effects of FDI is also weaker.
8.3 Policy implications
Overall, the evidence presented suggests that host country trade and FDI policies and 
human capital can influence both the nature of MNE production and the growth effects 
of FDI. The results imply that gains from FDI are maximised by the adoption of liberal 
FDI policies, open trade regimes and to a lesser extent investing in human capital. This 
conclusion is broadly consistent with others who argue that a less prescriptive approach 
to regulating FDI and MNE activity is likely to maximise the potential benefits of FDI, 
including Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) and Moran et al. (2005).
In terms of specific policies, the strong evidence reported on the adverse impact of joint 
venture requirements suggest countries would benefit from the removal of this type of 
policy restriction. However, due to the manner in which the FDI policy indicator used 
to draw this conclusion was constructed, it is difficult to make an assessment of whether 
the impact of joint venture requirements will vary according to the manner in which 
they are applied. In particular, whether the selective application of joint venture 
requirements, the approach taken in many countries, would necessarily cause the same 
adverse effects as imposing joint venture requirements universally.
It is likely that joint venture requirements, as well as other prescriptive FDI policies, are 
most detrimental when applied to sectors in which a country possesses a comparative
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advantage. These are the sectors where countries are most likely to attract export 
platform MNE production and, owing to the quantity of inward market seeking FDI 
being constrained by the size of the local economy, the largest quantities of inward FDI. 
Imposing policy restrictions including joint venture requirements in these sectors is 
therefore likely to bring about a twofold negative impact. First, significantly reducing 
the quantity of inward FDI and second, reducing the export orientation of MNE 
production.
The evidence on the impact of FDI related capital controls is considerably weaker. In 
the case of restrictions on the liquidation of FDI related projects this result is perhaps 
unsurprising. As noted in chapter 4, direct investors tend to take a long term view with 
their investments and as such may not be particularly deterred by the presence of these 
types of restrictions when undertaking new investments, including in export facilities. 
Nevertheless, the analysis does provide limited evidence that these capital control 
related restrictions reduce MNE export orientation and, perhaps, the growth effects of 
FDI. On this basis both types of restrictions are deemed undesirable.
There is some support for the hypothesis that more open trade policies and higher 
investments in human capital encourage more desirable forms of MNE production and 
increase the growth of FDI. Therefore, investing in human capital and adopting more 
open trade policies are deemed to help maximise the potential benefits of FDI. An 
interesting nuance in the case of trade policy is the impact of FT As compared with 
unilateral or multilateral reductions in trade barriers. As noted above, the evidence 
presented suggests FT As may not always have the desired effect of increasing MNE 
export orientation. It is likely, therefore, that the impact of FTAs depends on the 
specific nature of the agreement, and in particular whether it is compatible with 
vertically integrated international production networks.
In assessing policy implications one needs to be mindful of the general equilibrium 
effects of policy changes. In the context of the three host country factors examined in 
this thesis, changes which lead to larger gains from FDI are likely to have either broader 
beneficial effects on growth and welfare, or a neutral impact. Specifically, greater trade 
openness and investments in human capital are likely to yield benefits on the host 
economy over and above their impact on the productivity of FDI, while FDI policies are
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unlikely to have any broader effects. On this basis, one may be more confident in 
articulating these policy recommendations.
A detailed analysis of the determinants of aggregate FDI flows is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, it is likely that the adoption of policies to maximise the gains 
from FDI also promote larger inward flows. As argued in chapters 3 and 5, although 
improvements in the operating environment are anticipated to have a disproportionately 
positive impact on export platform investment, other types of FDI are also expected to 
be attracted by these changes. The same is likely to be true of investments in human 
capital. Finally, although greater openness to trade may deter market seeking FDI, it is 
likely that increases in export platform investment can more than offset this reduction 
given that this form of investment is not constrained by the size of the local market.
A more controversial issue is whether governments should provide special incentives, 
including fiscal incentives, to attract FDI, particularly investments associated with 
export or technology intensive production. The existence of FDI spillovers, which 
represent a form of positive externality provides a possible theoretical justification for 
such incentives. However, it is difficult to judge both the effectiveness of such 
incentives and the optimal level of any subsidy. While these issues are beyond the 
scope of this study one particular result from the analysis helps inform one aspect of this 
issue. The analysis in chapter 5 indicates that levels of corporate taxation do not impact 
on the export orientation of MNE affiliates. This suggests that tax incentives may not 
represent an effective instrument for altering the nature of MNE production.
8.4 Areas for further research
There exist many additional avenues for further research on the broad issues canvassed 
in this thesis. One of the contributions of this study is to provide new evidence on the 
impact of host country FDI policies. However, as discussed in chapter 4, there are 
many dimensions of FDI policies which are not captured by the policy indicator 
variables introduced in this study. This includes both restrictive measures such as local 
content and performance requirements, as well as the many incentives governments 
offer to MNEs. Therefore, many avenues exist to build on existing datasets of FDI 
policies to provide more detailed, comparable information on policy settings across time 
and countries.
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More generally, by demonstrating that the underlying patterns of MNE production are 
influenced by a suite of host country factors, analyses of the type presented in chapters 5 
and 6 suggest many other factors are likely to impact on the growth effects of FDI. 
Amongst the factors identified in this study as being important include geography, the 
macroeconomic environment, different aspects of market competition and intellectual 
property rights. A key challenge in considering these broader factors is to devise an 
appropriate methodology to test the relative importance of each factor. This task is 
particularly difficult given that many of these are likely to be highly correlated at the 
country level making identification difficult.
Of the three host country factors focussed on in this thesis, the results presented on the 
role of human capital are perhaps the most unsatisfactory. They provide some evidence 
that human capital affects the nature of MNE production and the growth effects of FDI 
but are unstable and hence inconclusive. In this sense the results presented here parallel 
the collective results reported in existing empirical studies which examine the impact of 
human capital. Given the strong theoretical linkages between human capital and 
technology diffusion additional research focussing on this issue is merited. New data 
sources on human capital continue to be developed and represent one avenue for further 
work.
As discussed in chapter 3, results from recent empirical studies indicate that spillovers 
may be stronger between, rather than within sectors. This suggests that collaboration 
between MNE affdiates and local firms along different parts of the supply chain present 
good opportunities for spillovers. Nevertheless, more evidence on the workings of 
different spillover mechanisms, including the role played by worker mobility, is needed 
to fully understand the impact of FDI on host country production.
Little is also know about whether the sectoral composition of FDI has any consequences 
for host country growth. The manner in which service sector MNE affiliates integrate 
in the host country may differ from manufacturing affiliates, which may have 
implications for the benefits that accrue to local firms. The importance of 
understanding this issue is underscored by the increasing importance of services FDI, 
which as noted in chapter 1, is now the dominant form of direct investment in many 
countries.
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Finally, there are a number of areas where methodological improvements could be 
made. Using firm level data to examine the nature of MNE production enables the 
control of firm level characteristics, including time invariant unobservable 
characteristics where panel data are available, which may produce more reliable results. 
Firm level data may also ease the problem of measurement error which is likely to be 
particularly problematic in the case of aggregate FDI data. Addressing the various 
sources of endogeneity bias also continues to pose a major challenge to empirical 
research on the determinants of growth. This presents a need for continued 
experimentation with new estimation techniques including the use of creative 
instrumental variables.
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